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Mike Mansfield Lecture Series 
on International Relations
April 9, 1971 
University Theater 
Missoula, Montana
Introduction by President Robert T . Pantzer
Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to the 
fourth major program in the Mike Mansfield 
Lectures on International Relations. It is the 
primary purpose of this series to expose the 
campus community, your own community, and 
Montanans in general, to firsthand information 
of timely world issues through addresses by il­
lustrious individuals who have an active in­
volvement and a proven competency in the 
general broad field of international affairs.
These lectures, to date, have been distin­
guished by the names of Senator Mike Mans­
field, Dr. John K. Galbraith, Senator Edward 
Kennedy, and tonight, the appearance of Dr. 
Milton Friedman, we feel, brings added luster 
to the whole series. Regarded by many as the 
world’s most brilliant economist. Professor Mil- 
ton Friedman is a renowned champion of the 
free market system and individual freedom. He 
is credited with setting the agenda for major 
economic debates of the post-World War II era.
Editor’s note: On May 5, the central banks of 
Germany and several other European countries 
suspended purchases of U.S. dollars. Subse­
quently, the German Central Bank (Bundes­
bank) and the Central Bank of the Netherlands 
announced that they were suspending, for the 
time being, foreign exchange operations aimed 
at pegging the price of their own currencies in 
terms of the dollar. As a result, these currencies
He has created, I believe, a revolution among 
both academic economists and policy-makers by 
advancing the view that monetary policy has a 
very substantial effect on income and employ­
ment practices and prices. He has made his 
influence felt, not only by testimony before the 
Congress of the United States, but also through 
his articles and books, his classroom lectures, 
public addresses, and certainly his column in the 
magazine Newsweek. I think his brilliant imag­
ination and his progressive ideas have captured 
the attention of leading economists and policy­
makers over the world; included among those, 
certainly in this country, are President Richard 
Nixon and Barry Goldwater, who called upon 
his advisory expertise in their presidential cam­
paigns.
We are very honored, Dr. Friedman, to have 
you with us on this series this evening. Dr. 
Milton Friedman.
are now “floating”—that is, their prices are free 
to fluctuate in the open market.
On April 9, Professor Milton Friedman, in the 
Mansfield lecture at the University of Montana, 
pointed to the fact that the United States was 
no longer in a position to assure that then-fixed 
exchange rates would be maintained. His 
speech, reprinted below for the first time, cen­
tered on the implications of this fact.
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The Dollar Standard:
Its Problems and Prospects
This series is a series on international prob­
lems, and the topic I am going to talk about is 
the problem of the dollar in the world at large.
As you know, there is an old saying that gen­
erals are always fighting the last war. The same 
thing is true of economics. In economics, as in 
war, there is a strong tendency for policy­
makers to be concerning themselves with the 
earlier problems that they faced rather than 
with the newer problems that are arising. That 
has been the situation in our domestic policy 
ever since the 1930s. We have largely been 
fighting the Great Depression, and that is why 
we have had inflation. If you are walking down 
the street worrying about whether you are going 
to trip over a rock, you are likely to hit your 
head on a branch. The same thing is true in 
the international financial area which I want to 
discuss here.
In recent years, we have been hearing much 
talk about the dollar problem. The newspapers 
have, day after day, had stories about the bal­
ance of payments deficits of the United States; 
about the threat to the dollar raised by the 
accumulation of dollars abroad to an amount 
greater than the value in Fort Knox; about the 
danger of devaluation, and so on, and so on. This 
has been true for a long period, but it has been 
especially prominent in the past few weeks.
In my opinion, this is mostly another case of 
fighting the last war. These concerns are a relic 
of an earlier period, a remnant of earlier prob­
lems, and have little or no relevance today. I 
shall state my own views about the dollar prob­
lem very briefly and succinctly, and then discuss 
the various elements separately.
First, in my opinion, the world today is on a 
dollar standard. In the nineteenth century, 
when Great Britain was the leading financial 
country in the world, the world could have been 
said to be on a British sterling standard. So 
today, the world is on a dollar standard. The 
dollar is the currency that is most widely used 
in trade and exchange; it is the currency in
which many international contracts are ex­
pressed; it is the currency used by Central 
Banks to maintain the exchange value of their 
national currencies. It is the international 
money of the world.
Second, because the world is on a dollar stand­
ard, the U.S. does not have a balance of pay­
ments problem. Germany may have a balance 
of payments problem, Britain may have a bal­
ance of payments problem, but the U.S. does 
not have a balance of payments problem. Our 
balance of payments is a result of the decisions 
made by others.
Third, under these circumstances, there is no 
meaning to the talk about devaluation, if by 
devaluation you mean a change in the price of 
the U.S. dollar in terms of foreign currencies— 
if you mean exchange rates, the number of shill­
ings you can get for a dollar, or the number of 
German marks you can get for a dollar. Ger­
many can appreciate, Britain can devalue, but 
the U.S. cannot devalue. Because the world is 
on a dollar standard, that is outside our hands.
Fourth, devaluation is also used to refer to a 
rise in the official price of gold from the present 
$35 an ounce. We could do that, but it would be 
highly undesirable for us to do so, and I think 
there is little chance that we shall.
Finally, in my view, the official price of gold 
of $35 an ounce exists primarily for the benefit, 
not of the United States, but of the central banks 
of other countries. It will last as long as it bene­
fits them. It raises no problem for us, and there 
is no reason whatsoever for the United States to 
do anything to try to prevent its gold from flow­
ing out, or to protect itself against any threat to 
the price of gold.
I have stated these five elements of my view 
in a very brief, dogmatic form in order to let you 
see the thrust of the argument. Now I would 
like to go back and explain a bit more clearly 
each of these statements, and then turn to the 
question of the problems that this kind of a situ­
ation raises for us, the opportunities it offers to
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us as a nation, and the policies we should follow. 
So let me go back over the various particular 
points.
What do I mean when I say the world is on a 
dollar standard? There was a time when you 
could have said the world was on a gold stand­
ard. That was a time when it was possible for 
individuals who had dollars to go to the Federal 
Reserve Bank, or before the Federal Reserve 
Bank existed, before 1914, to go to the sub- 
Treasury and say, “Here’s a hundred dollars, I 
want gold for it at a specified price.” Before 
1934, that price was a little over $20 an ounce; 
and if you handed in a $100 bill, you were en­
titled to get five ounces of gold, or a little less 
than that. In the same way, a citizen of Britain, 
at that time, could go to the Bank of England 
and give them a pound of sterling and say, “I 
would like to get from you a certain number of 
ounces of gold,” and the Bank of England was 
committed to handing over a certain number of 
ounces.
Under such a true gold standard, the price of 
the pound sterling in terms of the dollar was 
determined by how much gold matched the 
pound sterling, how much gold matched the 
dollar. That kind of a real, honest-to-God gold 
standard, in which individuals separately could 
demand gold for their dollars, disappeared in 
the United States in 1933 when the U.S. went 
off the gold standard. A very different kind of 
gold standard was established in 1934 when the 
price of gold was raised to $35 an ounce. Under 
that new kind of gold standard, it was made 
illegal in the United States for private individ­
uals to hold gold, to buy gold, to sell gold, except 
for numismatic purposes, or for purposes of fill­
ing teeth or making jewelry. Although that was 
a very different kind of gold standard than we 
had had before, it did have some elements of 
the former gold standard. U.S. holders of dollars 
could not demand gold, but foreign holders of 
dollars, people who held dollars in Britain or in 
Germany or in France, could demand gold for 
their dollars, and the U.S. Treasury was com­
mitted to providing an ounce of gold for $35, or, 
in other words, to keeping the world price of 
gold at $35 an ounce. The only way in which it 
could do so was by selling gold at that price to 
anyone who wanted to buy it. As a result, there 
was a free gold market in London in which the 
price was being supported at $35 an ounce, be­
cause the U.S. was providing the gold at that 
price.
When the price of $35 an ounce was first estab­
lished in 1934, that price was way above the 
market price of gold, so gold flooded to these 
shores and we accumulated an immense stock­
pile of gold. But, then, as worldwide inflation 
developed, $35, instead of being a high price, 
became a low price, we started to sell more gold 
than we were buying, and our gold stock went 
down. This reached a climax in 1967 and early 
1968 in the great “gold rush,” when many people 
from all over the world took their dollars and 
tried to buy gold with them. This resulted in 
the establishment on March 17, 1968, of the so- 
called “two-tier system” for the dollar and for 
gold. That was an agreement among the Central 
Banks of the United States and other major 
countries that the U.S. and its fellow members 
in the “gold pool” would no longer try to peg 
the price of gold in London, but, on the other 
hand, would continue to maintain an official 
price of $35 an ounce for dealings among gov­
ernmental monetary authorities.
This two-tier system established in 1968 fun­
damentally changed the character of the world 
monetary system. It meant that the world was 
now on a dollar standard. The way in which 
the price of the pound sterling in terms of the 
dollar is established is by England saying the 
pound sterling will be worth $2.40. Germany 
says a mark will be worth 27.3 cents; France 
says a franc will be worth 18 cents. And at that 
point, we do nothing about it. The price of the 
pound sterling, in terms of the dollar, or the 
franc in terms of the dollar, is pegged and fixed 
by the foreign countries, by the Bank of Eng­
land buying and selling pounds for dollars, by 
the French Central Bank buying and selling 
francs for dollars.
This is why I say the world is on a dollar 
standard in which the exchange rates of other 
currencies are fixed in terms of the dollar, and 
in which those exchange rates are maintained 
by Central Banks buying and selling dollars, and 
in which the U.S. is no longer committed to pro­
viding gold in unlimited quantities to individ­
uals who have dollars.
Other countries can change the price of their 
currencies in terms of the dollar, as Germany 
did in October 1969 when it appreciated the 
mark, as Britain did when it depreciated the
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pound in November 1967, but there is nothing 
we can do about it.
Given that situation, it follows, and I come to 
the second point I made, that we do not have a 
balance of payments problem. One of the most 
interesting things about discussions in this area 
is how hard it is for people to respect the rules 
of arithmetic. For example, to simplify matters, 
let’s suppose you have ten countries. All ten of 
those countries cannot have a balance of pay­
ments surplus. If one country has a balance of 
payments surplus—that means it is taking in 
more foreign currency than it is paying out— 
then some other country must have a balance of 
payments deficit. It is just like people within 
a country. If somebody is spending more than 
he is receiving, then somebody else must be 
receiving more than he is spending. One man’s 
purchases are another man’s sales.
Similarly, if there are only ten countries, and 
you add up all of their balances of payments, 
defined in a consistent fashion, the sum must be 
zero. If one country is taking in more than it 
is paying out, another country must be paying 
out more than it is taking in. That means that 
all ten countries cannot independently decide 
what their balance of payments will be. Nine of 
the countries can decide, but the tenth has to 
let things be what they are. And because the 
United States is providing the standard for the 
world, because the world is on a dollar standard, 
the United States balance of payments is the 
residual of what all the other countries decide. 
If Germany believes its surplus is too large, Ger­
many can change the price of the mark; it can 
appreciate the mark, it can make the mark more 
expensive. If it doesn’t want to do that, it can 
impose restrictions on exports and give induce­
ments to imports in order to affect its balance 
of payments; or it can alter the terms of foreign 
lending or borrowing.
But there is nothing that we can do because 
other countries dealing in dollars are fixing 
their price in terms of dollars. Therefore, our 
balance of payments is the sum of the balance 
of payments of all the other countries. It is 
whatever is left after they make their indepen­
dent decisions. If Japan wants to have a balance 
of payments surplus, it can, but then we will 
have a deficit, and so on down the line.
One proof of this is what has happened in this 
country over the past ten years. Over the past
ten years, we have repeatedly been concerned 
about our balance of payments deficit and have 
tried to do something about it. We imposed an 
interest equalization tax, which essentially was 
a means of trying to make it more expensive for 
other countries to borrow in this country. It was 
a means of making the interest rates in the 
United States different from those abroad. It 
was a restriction on capital movement. That had 
very little effect. We then had a voluntary pro­
gram on the part of banks to restrict lending 
abroad. President Johnson in 1968 introduced a 
compulsory restriction on foreign investment by 
American enterprises, endorsed the credit re­
straint program, and engaged in a lot of talking 
about how patriotic Americans should keep their 
dollars at home. Beyond that, the Defense De­
partment was instructed that if the cost of an 
item in the United States was not more than 50 
percent more than it was abroad, it was to buy 
at the higher price at home in order to save 
dollars. Which shows how silly you can get— 
you spend dollars to save dollars.
We took one measure after another, and I 
have only described some of the measures we 
have taken. They had absolutely no effect. They 
didn’t improve the balance of payments—we 
continued to have large deficits. And, of course, 
this had to be the result because our balance of 
payments depends on what other countries do 
and not on what we do. We cannot have an 
independent balance of payments policy; our 
balance of payments is the result of the decisions 
made by others, and we ought to stop worrying 
about it.
The third proposition I made is that we can­
not devalue in the sense of changing the ex­
change rate. That is up to others, and I think 
it is clear from what I have already said that 
we have nothing to say about the price of the 
dollar in terms of other currencies. The price of 
the dollar in terms of the Canadian dollar varies 
from day to day, because Canada has decided to 
have a floating exchange rate—a free market 
exchange rate. The price of the pound sterling 
is now $2.40, but Britain can, if it wants, change 
that. We cannot change it because the dollar is 
the currency in terms of which all other ex­
change rates are set.
We could devalue in terms of raising the offi­
cial price of gold, but that would be a silly thing 
to do because it would serve no economic func-
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tion. If we raised the price of gold, say, to $50 
an ounce, officially, other countries would raise 
the price in their currencies proportionately, and 
exchange rates would remain the same. The 
only thing the higher price of gold would do 
would be to make gold mining more profitable 
to the Russians and the South Africans, two of 
the countries we seem to have least desire to 
provide with foreign aid. So I can see no justi­
fication whatsoever for raising the price of gold.
But—and this is where I come to my final 
point, and this is where, perhaps, there is more 
nonsense being written and spoken than on any 
other point—you will say, we still have a com­
mitment to provide gold at $35 an ounce to the 
German Central Bank, to the Bank of England, 
the Bank of France. These countries are accu­
mulating more dollars. Suppose they come and 
ask us for gold and we don’t have it, wouldn’t 
that be terrible?
The answer is to analyze why and what func­
tion that official price of $35 an ounce for gold 
serves. It serves no function for us. Indeed, if 
I may be a little bit unrealistic, what I would 
like to do with our gold is to have a great big 
auction and auction off that gold in Fort Knox, 
and have the U.S. get out of the business of 
storing gold. I don’t see why the storage of 
gold should be a nationalized industry.
But that is a bit too radical, so I’ll be some­
what less radical. Let’s suppose we just an­
nounced we are not going to sell any more gold. 
At any price. We are just going to sit on our 
gold. What effect would that have on us? So far 
as I can see, absolutely none. But, you may say, 
how will people have confidence in the dollar? 
If private people abroad hold dollars, and they 
don’t want to hold the dollars, they can buy 
gold; but that will just drive up the price of gold 
in London—it will have no effect on us, it just 
transfers the dollars from one person abroad to 
another. If people in Germany want to turn 
their dollars into the German Central Bank and 
get German marks, they can do so and the dol­
lars will then be in the hands of the Central 
Bank. But then, you will say, the German Cen­
tral Bank would come and try to get gold from 
us. Yes, they could; but suppose they did, and 
suppose the German Central Bank came with a 
billion or two billion dollars in hand and said, 
“Give us the gold.” The Treasury would un­
doubtedly say, “We are committed to giving you
gold only for monetary purposes; the commit­
ment is that the U.S. will provide gold at $35 an 
ounce for monetary purposes.” The Treasury 
will undoubtedly go on to say, “But we don’t ; 
believe you need two billion dollars for mone- - 
tary purposes. And, therefore, we won’t give 
you the gold.” And then, who would be hurt? 
Put yourself in the position of the German Cen- . 
tral Banker, and you will begin to understand 
the role which that $35 an ounce price is playing.
Suppose the German Central Banker is hauled 
before a committee of the Reichstag—the Ger­
man legislature—and they say, “Well, now, look 
here. You’re accumulating all these dollars; are 
you turning Germany into a satellite of the 
United States? Are you simply a tail to the 
American kite?” Right now the German Central 
Banker stands up proud and strong and says, 1 
“Why, of course not. We are on a gold standard. 
We are accumulating these dollars, but that’s I 
only because we know that at all times we can , 
turn them over to the United States and get 
gold for them.” And that is fine. But suppose 
he tried to get the gold and we closed the win­
dow. Then, when the Reichstag asked him this j 
question, he would be in a very embarrassing j 
position. He would either have to admit he was j 
on a dollar standard, and say, “Yes, we are a \ 
satellite of the U.S. dollar and we are on a dollar ; 
standard.” Or else, he would have to do some j 
other things that are unpleasant. He would have 
to let the market determine the price of the 
mark; he would have to let the mark go free.
I personally happen to think that would be a 
good thing for Germany and for the U.S. But 
the Central Banker wouldn’t like it because it , 
would put him out of business. The major inter- ; 
national function of the Central Bankers is to 
fix the price of their currencies in terms of other 
currencies, to fix the price of the mark in terms 
of the pound sterling and the dollar; and they ' 
believe—erroneously in my view—that that’s a ' 
very important thing to do. With fixed ex- | 
change rates of that kind, every now and then , 
there is a crisis—say there is a sterling crisis— ; 
the Central Bankers have to take planes and fly I 
to important meetings and arrange $3 billion 
loans overnight, and this does give them a feel­
ing of great importance and significance.
So they regard those activities as important, i 
Therefore the German Central Bankers would j 
not like to have to let the price of the mark be ’
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a free market price and move up or down. On 
the other hand, it would be very embarrassing 
for them politically to have to say, out and out, 
that they are on a dollar standard. As a result, 
in my opinion, the major role which the official 
price of gold of $35 an ounce serves is to provide 
the European and the other Central Bankers 
around the world with a cloak which enables 
them to pronounce to their peoples that they are 
on a gold standard and not on a dollar standard.
I don’t see that a great deal of harm is done 
by that fiction. As long as nobody comes and 
asks for any gold, there is no reason why the 
price of gold, the official price of gold, can’t re­
main $35 an ounce indefinitely. And nobody 
will come and ask for it. Of course, I am exag­
gerating a little, you might have $20 or $30 or 
$40 or even $100 million go back and forth. In 
order to keep it looking as if there’s something 
real there, the game has to be played from time 
to time. So there are small transfers of gold that 
go on, but, if you look at the record, you will 
see that since the establishment of the two-tier 
system in February 1968, there have been no 
major movements of gold. There have been only 
minor movements. And I confidently predict 
there will not be any major movements, that no 
foreign Central Bank is going to ask for any 
large amount of gold, because they know if they 
did, they wouldn’t get it, and they wouldn’t like 
that result. So I believe that the official price 
of gold will remain $35 an ounce for some time. 
I will come back to the question of how long 
later on.
That’s what I mean when I say the world is 
on a dollar standard.
Let me now ask the question, what problems, 
if any, does this raise for us? One problem it 
raises is that we cannot, in fact, affect our pay­
ments position. We must be passive, we cannot 
have a balance of payments problem. That may 
be a good thing or a bad thing. It has some ad­
vantages and it has some disadvantages. It 
means that if, let us say, Japan and Germany, 
or some other countries, decide that they would 
like to accumulate some dollars, then we must 
accept a situation in which we buy more from 
abroad than we sell abroad.
Despite all the talk you hear, that is a very 
happy situation. If we can get good Japanese 
TV sets and cars and cameras, in return for 
pieces of green paper labeled $1, that’s about as
good a trade as I can think of, if they will only 
hang on to that paper. There is no export in­
dustry in which we have a greater comparative 
advantage than the printing of green pieces of 
paper. But the problem with it is that they will, 
unfortunately, not be willing to continue to do 
that indefinitely. After they have accumulated 
enough dollars, they will change their minds, 
and that will cause some problems of adjust­
ment for us, because we will have to adjust to 
the fact that we are going to have a smaller 
deficit, or a surplus. So I do think that one prob­
lem this kind of a world monetary system raises 
for the United States is that we must be ready 
to adjust to whatever decisions other countries 
make about their balances of payments and 
about their exchange rates, and we must realize 
that we cannot have an active balance of pay­
ments policy.
The second problem is that, in this kind of a 
system, what we do in the United States has 
enormous far-reaching effects around the world. 
Because of the existence of a dollar standard, 
U.S. monetary policy determines world policy. 
I was in Germany last September and talked to 
some German Central Bankers and commercial 
bankers, and I said that I couldn’t understand 
what Germany was doing talking about a mone­
tary policy, that, so long as Germany insisted 
on having a fixed exchange rate, insisted on 
keeping the price of the mark fixed in terms of 
the dollar, German monetary policy was deter­
mined in Washington, and they had very little 
to say about it. And that is the case: if the 
world is on a dollar standard—U.S. monetary 
policy dominates the world situation. If the 
world has suffered from inflation over the past 
ten years, it has been in large part because the 
U.S. decided to have an inflation. This inflation 
has spread from the U.S. to other countries 
throughout the world through the dollar stand­
ard.
That imposes on us a great responsibility that 
we may not be capable of carrying. But this 
kind of an arrangement also offers some very 
real opportunities to us. It offers us the oppor­
tunity to concentrate on our domestic problems. 
It isn’t always true that what is good for Gen­
eral Motors is good for the country. But it does 
happen to be true that what is good for the 
United States in the monetary area is good for 
the world. Because what is good for the United
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States in the monetary area, in my opinion, is 
a policy of steadiness and stability and no infla­
tion. It is a policy of trying to get rid of the 
inflation that we accumulated in the late 60s 
and that we are now, I hope, getting under con­
trol.
To date, we have had some success: from a 
rate of rise of consumer prices of 6% percent 
per year in early 1970, consumer prices in the 
past few months have been going up at the rate 
of something like 3 percent a year. So, as of 
the moment, inflation is tapering off. If we have 
the patience and the courage and the wisdom not 
to push too hard, to maintain a rather steady 
monetary policy, I believe that we can continue 
to taper off inflation. If we do so, we shall pro­
vide a stable economic background not only for 
America, but for the world. The best thing for 
the rest of the countries is a non-inflationary 
policy in the U.S. That in turn will enable the 
countries which have tied their currencies to 
the dollar also to have a non-inflationary policy.
One of the major problems that has arisen 
in recent years is that countries like Germany 
and Switzerland have not wanted to have as 
much inflation as we have had, and this had led 
them to adopt all sorts of expedients and de­
vices, and finally, in Germany’s case, to raise the 
price of the mark in terms of the dollar, to make 
the mark more expensive, in order not to have to 
follow our inflation.
These are the problems and the opportunities. 
What policy should we follow in light of this 
situation to avoid the problems and to take ad­
vantage of these opportunities? I believe my­
self that the very first thing we should do is to 
recognize that we cannot do anything about our 
balance of payments, and can get rid of the mess 
of exchange controls that we have adopted. We 
should tomorrow terminate the interest equali­
zation tax. We should tomorrow end the restric­
tions on foreign investments by American con­
cerns. We should tomorrow end the restrictions 
on foreign lending by American banks. We 
should do so, not only in respect to the exchange 
controls, but we ought to move in the same way 
to reduce our tariffs, our import quotas, and our 
restriction on trade. This is all shadowboxing. 
Since our balance of payments is going to be 
determined by other countries, we will do them 
and ourselves a favor if we stop fooling around 
and imposing artificial restrictions to trade in
the vain attempt to do something about the bal- 1 
ance of payments deficit.
Beyond that, the United States is a great 
country; we are the leader of the world, and the 
world is on a dollar standard. I think it is de­
meaning of us to go around, hat in hand, to j 
Japan or to Hong Kong, and ask them to impose 
limits on their exports of textiles or other prod­
ucts to us in order to protect the U.S. balance of 
payments. What kind of a posture—what kind 
of a behavior is that for a great country? We 
should do what Britain did in the nineteenth 
century. When Britain was a leading country in 
the world, financially and internationally, it 
adopted, unilaterally and on its own, a policy , 
of free trade. It said, “We are not going to im­
pose any restrictions, any tariffs, on imports of 
goods,” and that was one of the best things Brit­
ain did for itself and for the rest of the world.
Under the present circumstances, we ought to 
do the same thing. The argument that we should 
impose tariffs has always been fallacious. It is 
stated in the language of “protection”—we don’t 
protect anybody. We only hurt the consumer by 
making his costs higher; we hurt the exporter by 
making it more difficult for him to export his 
product. The fact that the world is on a dollar I 
standard and that the balance of payments is I 
determined by other people means that we can I 
with safety behave in the way in which we I 
should behave. We can get rid of our restric- I 
tions on foreign trade, get rid of our controls on I 
foreign exchange. I think, also, it is long past 1 
time that we got rid of our restrictions on the | 
private ownership, purchase, and sale of gold. I 
It was, I think, a major mistake and a severe 1 
violation of the basic principles of this country 
when, in 1933, private individuals were required 
to hand over the gold they held at an artificially I 
low price to the government. That was expro- j 
priation of private property of exactly the same I 
kind that we complained of when Cuba did it | 
with land, or when other countries do it with ] 
mines and factories. It made no sense then, i 
there was no monetary justification for doing it. 
The only reason for prohibiting the private I 
ownership of gold was to prevent some private 
owners of gold from profiting from the rise in 
the official price of gold to $35 an ounce.
As of now, there isn’t even that argument. We | 
are not on a gold standard. Gold plays no essen- j 
tial part in our monetary system. Gold reserve ■
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requirements for the Federal Reserve have been 
abolished. Therefore, I see no reason whatso­
ever why we should not permit private indi­
viduals to buy, own, sell, trade in gold, not 
merely for numismatic purposes, not merely for 
dentistry, not merely for jewelry, but just be­
cause they want to hoard gold—I do not neces­
sarily advise them to do it, but if they want to 
do it, why shouldn’t they be free to do so?
I suspect that if that were done, the price of 
gold on the free market might rise some, but not 
much. It has risen to about $38 or $39 an ounce 
in London, and I don’t really see why it should 
rise much higher here.
Finally, and most important in terms of policy, 
we should follow a policy of steady monetary 
growth. We should follow a policy different 
from that which we have followed over the past 
50 years. Over the past 50 years, our monetary 
authorities have alternately stepped too hard on 
the accelerator and too hard on the brake. They 
have put us through a whole series of inflations 
and deflations. Both for the short run and the 
long run, it would be desirable for the United 
States and desirable for the world if our mone­
tary authorities followed a policy of a steady 
rate of monetary growth at a low enough rate to 
enable us to have stable prices.
The question finally comes, what are the pros­
pects for the future? How long will the kind of 
system I described earlier last? How long will 
the world be on a dollar standard? I believe that 
depends predominantly on how we manage our 
internal policy. If we follow the kind of policies 
I have been suggesting, if we succeed in slow­
ing down our present inflation and getting on 
to a steady course with a fairly stable price 
level, with prices either completely steady or not 
rising more than one or two percent a year, then 
I think that the kind of system I have described 
will last for a very long time.
The dollar will continue to be widely used as 
the international medium of circulation. It will 
continue to be used by Central Banks as the in­
tervention currency for pegging their exchange 
rates. Of course, that doesn’t mean that some 
countries may not, from time to time, change 
their exchange rates. Some of the South Ameri­
can countries like Brazil or Argentina, which 
have had inflations of 25 or 30 or 40 percent a 
year for decades, will undoubtedly continue to 
do so, and they will devalue their currency in
terms of the dollar from time to time. Other 
countries may appreciate their currency from 
time to time.
But in the main, under those circumstances, I 
think we would have a fairly stable inter­
national monetary system. On the other hand, 
if we follow an unstable policy, if the pressures 
which are very real and very great right now— 
pressures which arise in large part from the 
exigencies of the political process, from the 
short-sightedness of politicians, and governmen­
tal officials—if those pressures which now exist 
to restart the inflation are effective; if instead 
of continuing on a steady, restrained policy and 
reconciling ourselves to a fairly slow recovery 
from the recession of 1970 along with a con­
tinued tapering off of inflation; if we were to 
pull out all stops and to step on the accelerator 
and start off on another inflationary period so 
that U.S. price level were to start to rise at 5— 
6—7—8—9 percent a year, then, sooner or later, 
and probably sooner rather than later, the kind 
of dollar standard I have described will break 
down. Under those circumstances, there would 
be a strong incentive for countries that did not 
want to inflate that rapidly to cut the link be­
tween their currencies and the currency of the 
United States.
Various possibilities exist. It is possible that 
the German mark will be used as the most prom­
inent currency around. It is possible that a 
variant of the gold standard would reemerge, 
centering on the Swiss franc. There has been 
much talk of developing a common market cur­
rency, but I think that is very unlikely, because 
the different common market countries are 
likely to diverge too much from one another in 
their policies.
In any event, I believe that if we inflated at a 
substantial rate, the dollar standard would break 
down and something else would take its place, 
but it is not possible now to say just what that 
something else would be.
Let me conclude by stressing that I have been 
describing, not necessarily prescribing (or at any 
rate, I have been prescribing for the U.S., but 
not for the rest of the world). If I had my way,
I would much prefer to see free market ex­
change rates among all the currencies; I would 
prefer to see the kind of relation that now exists 
between the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar 
exist also with respect to the pound sterling, the
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German mark, the Swiss franc, the French 
franc, and so on. But that is not up to the U.S. 
That is at the choice of the various countries 
abroad. And I do not believe that they are 
likely to choose that route.
As a result, we in the United States, in form­
ing our policies, must accept the fact that the 
rest of the world—although they hate to admit 
it, although they scream and yell when it is 
suggested to them—is on a dollar standard. We 
in the United States should adapt our policy to 
that reality and that fact. Thank you.
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From the 1970 Census
The second in a series of facts and figures 
of particular interest to Montanans
According to the 1970 Census, Montana has 
135 places—that is, cities, towns, and population 
centers—scattered about its 146,000 square miles 
of mountains and plains. These places range in 
size from Bearcreek, an incorporated town with 
31 residents at the time of the Census count in 
April 1970, to Billings, with a population of 
61,581. Bearcreek, for those who would like to 
get away from it all, is located in Carbon 
County, southeast of Red Lodge.
Sixty-eight Montana towns—one-half the 
total—had fewer than 1,000 residents in 1970. 
Another 35 towns had populations of between 
1,000 and 2,500. Combined, these 103 places ac­
counted for only 85,032 persons or 12 percent of 
the state’s total population.
Montana’s two largest cities reported over 
60,000 residents apiece: Billings, with 61,581, 
nosed out Great Falls with 60,091. Missoula, 
with 29,497, replaced Butte as the third largest 
city in the state.
Population figures for cities can be very mis­
leading; the numbers given include only the 
persons living within the city limits. Missoula’s 
population is drastically understated by this ar­
rangement; a total of 15,526 persons—or half 
again the city population—live in areas adjacent 
to the city but outside its jurisdiction.
Billings’ population outside the central city
amounts to 9,616, and 10,814 persons live just out­
side the Great Falls city boundaries (most of 
them at Malmstrom Air Force Base). Thus, more 
realistic population figures for these three cities 
would be Billings, 71,197; Great Falls, 70,905; 
and Missoula, 45,023.
For many years, Butte was the largest city in 
Montana. Sometime between 1940 and 1950, it 
was surpassed by Great Falls, which recently 
was overtaken by Billings. In 1920, Silver Bow 
County had 60,313 residents, nearly all of whom 
lived in or adjacent to Butte. Last year the 
county population had declined to 41,981. Of 
this number, 23,368 lived within the Butte city 
limits; 17,291 in adjoining areas; and 1,330 in 
other parts of the county.
When measured by land area, Silver Bow is 
the smallest county in the state. Its 42,000 resi­
dents live in uncommonly crowded conditions 
for Montana—58.7 persons per square mile, 
about the same as for the United States as a 
whole, but hardly comparable to the 950 persons 
per square mile reported in New Jersey.
At the other extreme is Petroleum County, 
with a population of 675 persons and a land area 
of 1,655 square miles. Population per square 
mile: 0.4 persons.
Overall, the Census reported 4.8 persons per 
square mile in Montana in 1970. Only three 
states—Alaska, Nevada, and Wyoming—are 
more sparsely settled.
Maxine Johnson is an associate professor in the School of Business Adm inistration a t the University of Montana 
and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research.
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MONTANA ECONOMIC STUDY
What the Economic Study Implies
Director: Samuel B. Chase, Jr. 
Research Associates: Maxine C. Johnson, 
Kenneth P. Johnson, Peter C. Lin, Paul Polzin
We continue our series of reprints from the 
Montana Economic Study with the second half 
of Chapter 11 Volume 1—a discussion of the 
implications of faster economic growth and the 
limited scope of government actions designed to 
promote such growth in the state of Montana.
Pros and Cons of Faster Growth
There can be no doubt that, judged by stan­
dard measures of growth, Montana’s economy 
performed poorly during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Our projections imply that the economic decline 
of the state relative to the nation is not about to 
be reversed. Rather, they indicate that the “job 
gap” will grow, net out-migration will intensify, 
and per capita personal income will continue to 
slip relative to the national average in the 
decade ahead.
It is conventional to regard slow growth of 
population, employment, and income as signs 
of trouble in a region, and to infer that policies 
should be invoked to arrest or reverse such 
trends. In recent years, however, there has been 
increasing dissatisfaction with this conventional 
wisdom, and it has become common to point up 
some of the undesirable results of regional 
growth.
It seems useful to try to present a dispas- I 
sionate review of the major arguments involved 
in weighing the desirability of state efforts 
aimed at promoting economic expansion. (A 
later section points up the limited scope for 
such efforts.) We begin by listing some of the 
more easily identified pros and cons, and then I 
consider more subtle ones. Our discussion is not 1 
intended to be definitive. Indeed, definitive j 
prescriptions for human well-being do not lie j 
within the capability of economic analysis, 1 
Nonetheless, an economic approach can do much 
to clarify the sort of questions that need to be 
considered if rational decisions are to be made.
BENEFITS OF FASTER GROWTH
Suppose that state policies are, in fact, cap­
able of moderating or reversing the relative 
decline of Montana’s economy. What would be 
the benefits, and who would reap them?
Improved Job Market. Most obvious, perhaps, 
are the benefits to workers of a more dynamic 
job market. Nearly 60 percent of Montana’s 
total personal income is accounted for by wages J 
and salaries of hired workers.
According to our projections, the demand for ! 
labor in Montana will continue to grow much 
less rapidly than the “natural” increase in the I
mhen tr M nnLL% Lrf Pw e^ ^ rc e m e n t iov the Montana State Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment Montana State W ater Resources Board and the University of Montana. The preparation of this document 
was financed m  part through an Urban Planning G rant from  the Department of Housing an d U rb an  Development; 
under the provisions of Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954, as Amended. **
Much of the work for this report was done by research assistants Robert J. Bigart. Steven A Carlson Peter D 
MacDonald, Susan S. Wallwork, and student assistant, Loren O. Cabe.
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work force in the decade ahead. This slow 
growth of job opportunities can be expected to 
produce a continuation of the recent weakness 
in the job market.
A slack labor market exacts its toll in three 
ways: (1) persons who would otherwise prefer 
to live in the state may leave because they can­
not find satisfactory jobs, (2) they may work in 
the state even though they could find higher 
wages and better jobs in an area where labor is 
in short supply, or (3) they may remain in the 
state and become unemployed.
The precise distribution of these effects de­
pends on the characteristics of the labor market 
and of its participants. In general, the more 
mobile is labor—that is, the more willing and 
able are workers to move—the greater is the 
extent to which slow growth in the demand for 
labor will show up in net out-migration, and the 
less it will show up in either depressed wages 
or unemployment. Conversely, the more reluc­
tant or unable are workers to leave, the more 
severe is the glutting of local labor markets, and 
hence the greater are downward pressures on 
wages and increases in unemployment.
Government policies can provide relief by 
either (a) making workers more mobile or (b) 
inducing a greater demand for labor. The latter 
result, of course, is one of the goals of industrial 
promotion activities.
Economists often argue that attempts by gov­
ernment to interfere with the location decisions 
of industry are ill-advised, because they entail 
‘distortions” of market forces—distortions that 
lead to inefficient location decisions. It is better, 
they argue, for people to follow jobs. They 
therefore generally tend to view with favor 
programs that are aimed at increasing the mo­
bility of workers, and to frown on programs that 
aim to “distort” industrial location decisions.
But to the extent that moving is costly—both 
in terms of the physical costs of moving oneself, 
one’s family, and one’s possessions, and in terms 
of the emotional costs of being uprooted and 
having to change one’s life style—there may be 
benefits from policies that succeed in moving 
jobs to people by attracting new industry.
In a free market economy jobs will, in fact, 
tend to move to labor surplus areas naturally. 
The reason is that in a free labor market wage 
rates tend to fall in areas with surplus labor, 
and to rise in areas of labor shortages, encour­
aging firms to move to the surplus areas in 
order to save on their wage bills.
There are, however, numerous impediments 
to this process. Minimum wage laws, the 
methods by which wages are set in unionized 
industries, and desires by employers to offer 
“fair” wages and to avoid meting out demoraliz­
ing wage reductions, all make wage rates imper­
fect as a device for ironing out imbalances in 
labor markets. Even though a strong theoretical 
case can be made for promoting greater flex­
ibility of wages as a means of dealing with such 
imbalances, it seems doubtful that this method 
could be pursued as an aim of government 
policy in Montana. Nonetheless, because of the 
slow increase in demand for workers, market 
forces do work to some extent to hold wages and 
salaries down here, relative to the country at 
large.
Assuming that state policy is not to be used to 
promote lower wages, there are two remaining 
avenues for dealing with the “job gap.” The 
first is to facilitate out-migration, so as to re­
duce the redundant supply of labor. The second 
is to promote new jobs by working to attract 
new industry without resorting to policies that 
depress wages.
The benefits of faster growth in the demand 
for labor are not equally distributed among all 
members of the labor force. They are generally 
greatest for workers in the geographic area in 
which the new jobs open up, and for those 
whose skills are best suited to meeting the new 
demands. Moreover, some types of workers are 
more mobile than others. It is the least mobile 
workers who are most vulnerable to a weak job 
market.
Everyone knows that factors other than con­
ditions in the job market enter into peoples* 
decisions about where to live. Nonetheless, 
among persons in the labor force, moving ap­
pears to be triggered mainly by economic forces. 
For example, The Geographic Mobility of Labor, 
a study published in 1964 by the Area Re­
development Administration of the U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce, based on a nationwide 
sample of about 3,000 workers, indicated that 
among those interviewees who had moved once 
or more in the past five years, 73 percent men­
tioned “economic and occupational” reasons for 
moving. Only 20 percent mentioned “commun­
ity reasons” (a personal liking for the area to
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which they moved or a dislike of the area they 
left). And only 22 percent mentioned “family 
reasons” (a desire to be near relatives).
Willingness and ability to move in search of 
better employment opportunities differs widely 
among various groups of workers within a given 
area. Studies of labor mobility indicate that 
young people are more mobile (that is, willing 
and able to move) than are older people; that 
mobility is considerably greater for highly 
educated workers than it is for those with poor 
educations; and that professional, technical, and 
managerial workers are considerably more mo­
bile than blue-collar workers, farmers, or the 
self-employed. It should be recalled that the 
rate of net out-migration from Montana be­
tween 1950 and 1960 was found to be far higher 
for college-educated males than it was for the 
rest of the population.
Logic suggests that among a given group of 
workers whose opportunities are limited or 
deteriorating, those who do move are harmed 
less than those who do not. If the movers suc­
ceed in getting into a better job market, they 
have, at some cost (the cost of moving—includ­
ing not only the financial sacrifice, but also the 
emotional sacrifice to them and to friends and 
relatives they leave behind) been able to escape 
at least partially the consequences of the poor 
job market. But among those who remain are 
many who stay because they are ignorant of 
opportunities elsewhere or fearful of the uncer­
tainties involved in making a break, and others 
who have their own strong reasons to resist 
moving, even if they end up unemployed or 
making less money than they could elsewhere. 
Thus the benefits of a more rapid growth of 
local job opportunities would accrue mainly to 
persons whose mobility is most limited, rather 
than to those who would otherwise move.
Increased Local Business Profits. Every siz­
able community has its economic boosters— 
people who work actively and tirelessly to at­
tract new industry. There are many motives for 
such endeavors, but it is not surprising that pro­
motional groups are heavily laden with local 
entrepreneurs whose businesses cater to local 
markets. Aside from whatever other gains these 
individuals may experience from more rapid 
growth, an increase in their own businesses is 
an important one.
Since a new export-oriented industry may
provide as many as nine new residents for every 
job it brings, attracting primary industry is a 
matter of acute interest to local businesses. 
Conversely, the departure of a major primary 
employer is a cruel blow to these firms.
According to the 1960 Census, there were 
nearly 10,000 self-employed “managers, officials 
and proprietors” outside agriculture in Mon­
tana. Nearly half were owners of retail firms, 
and most of the others probably engaged in 
activities designed to serve local markets.
Some types of businesses, of course, are more 
affected by growth than others. In a community 
with one television station, population growth 
may be expected to exert a roughly proportion­
ate increase in the value of advertising time on 
that channel. For a drugstore, on the other hand, 
the increase in business would probably be 
much less than proportional to the increase in 
population, since new drugstores would open up 
as the town grew. The same can be said for 
most retail trade firms, and for other derivative 
businesses, including construction, insurance 
agencies, accounting firms, laundries, plumbers, 
and a host of other local establishments. But as 
a general matter, nearly all owners of busi­
nesses that depend on local markets have some­
thing to gain from growth.
Increased Site Values. A closely related bene­
fit accrues to owners of land. Site values can be 
expected to rise as an area’s employment and 
population grow. Fortunes have been made 
turning former farmland into housing develop­
ments, shopping centers, and industrial parks. 
In fact, much if not most of the income earned 
by persons in the development business comes 
from increased site values, and economic growth 
is a major source of such increases.
Individual homeowners as well share in the 
gains from increasing land values although, 
since their gains are not realized until the pro­
perty is sold, it may turn out that the principal 
beneficiaries are their heirs. (And if rising land 
values result in higher property taxes, the 
homeowner who does not contemplate selling 
may actually resent the increase in his net 
worth.)
COSTS OF FASTER GROWTH
It seems abundantly clear that faster econo­
mic development would result in substantial 
economic benefits to certain groups. But it is
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also clear that growth entails costs. We turn 
now to a consideration of two obvious ones.
Pollution and Environment. As we have al­
ready pointed out, pollution has been a problem 
in Montana at least since the early copper min­
ing days. But concern with pollution and en­
vironmental deterioration generally has become 
particularly widespread in recent years. One 
reason is that the enormous technological 
changes since World War II, together with rapid 
population growth, have led to vast increases in 
the amount of pollution generated. Another is 
that as peoples’ real incomes have risen, they 
have been able to afford the “luxury” of worry­
ing about their environment, and have gained 
more leisure time to enjoy it.
Accelerated economic development brings 
with it a threat of accelerated environmental 
deterioration. It is sometimes argued that pollu­
tion is not an economic problem. This is not so. 
Rather, pollution is not a problem that the U.S. 
economic system, in its present state, is up to 
handling efficiently.
Pollution reduces the quality of life (or the 
standard of living, correctly defined). Most 
people would be willing to give up something of 
value—such as part of their income—in return 
for less pollution. In fact, recent studies of the 
relation between pollution and residential prop­
erty values indicate that the amounts people are 
willing to pay to avoid pollution are substantial.
But in the absence of controls, the industrial 
polluter does not have to reckon with the costs 
of his emissions in the way that he must reckon 
with the costs of raw materials, capital, and 
labor that he uses in production. Nor do indi­
vidual consumers have to bear all of the costs of 
their polluting activities, which include litter­
ing the roadsides with empty beverage contain­
ers, polluting the air with automobile exhaust, 
burning logs in fireplaces, and even filling the 
air with smoke from campfires and barbecues.
The result is that industry and consumers pol­
lute too much. The market economy is not up to 
dealing with pollution problems because it does 
not create sufficient incentives not to pollute. 
Rational programs of public intervention are 
needed, and if industrial growth increases pol­
lution, it inflicts costs that must be weighed, 
somehow, against whatever benefits it might 
confer.
Just as benefits from economic expansion are
not evenly distributed, so the costs of any added 
pollution it might bring are not borne evenly. 
Those nearest a polluting facility are usually 
hurt most. The intensity of an area’s air pollu­
tion problem depends, among other things, on 
climatic factors. In Western Montana, for ex­
ample, temperature inversions that trap air­
borne wastes compound the pollution problem 
enormously. And some persons are more sus­
ceptible to the undesirable effects of environ­
mental degradation than are others, whether 
because of specific allergies or because their 
state of mind is more dependent upon physical 
surroundings.
These burdens are extremely hard to measure. 
Most studies of the damage inflicted by pollu­
tion have tended to concentrate on its more 
tangible, physical, and easily measurable effects, 
and thus to seize upon over-simplified notions 
of costs. For example, attempts have been made 
to measure costs by adding up wages lost, medi­
cal bills, and funeral expenses that result from 
higher incidence of diseases attributable to pol­
lution. The results are often silly. Impairment 
of human well-being is not accurately measured 
by laundry lists of such expenses. More recent 
studies provide sounder bases for measuring 
costs of pollution, but application of the new 
approaches is still in its infancy.
Congestion. A closely related cost of economic 
expansion arises from the congestion that re­
sults as more and more people are crowded into 
a limited space. On average, of course, Montana 
could hardly be called congested. But in some 
Montana cities there is noticeable crowding, and 
the rural valleys in the western part of the state 
have attracted large numbers of people who are 
willing to go to substantial lengths to avoid 
crowded conditions. Moreover, congestion tends 
to exacerbate the problems of pollution as more 
and more waste is discharged in a limited area.
Industrial expansion that brings more people 
into the state may pose the threat of added con­
gestion. A lot of Montanans are particularly 
sensitive about this problem. For one thing, 
many residents consider Montana’s outdoor life 
the chief reason for living here. Fishermen, 
hunters, hikers, campers, horseback riders, 
snowmobilers, yachtsmen, and skiers all have 
reason to be uneasy about the effects of popu­
lation growth. By their words and actions, many 
of them have made it clear that they are willing
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to give up some of the benefits of growth in 
return for the amenities of an uncongested en­
vironment.
OTHER EFFECTS OF ACCELERATED 
GROWTH
In addition to the rather easily specified bene­
fits and costs just discussed, an increase in the 
rate of economic growth might be expected to 
have other important effects which cannot be 
labeled “good” or “bad” a priori.
Levels of Taxation. It is sometimes argued 
that faster growth will ease tax burdens in the 
state. As far as we know, this hypothesis has 
not been subjected to rigorous testing. The fis­
cal influence of economic growth cannot be 
determined a priori, since it adds not only to the 
tax base but to the required level of government 
services as well. The question has not received 
much systematic study, but it is clear, both on 
logical grounds and on the basis of case studies, 
that the fiscal impact of economic growth dif­
fers from case to case, depending upon the kind 
of activity involved, the extent to which it re­
sults in increasing the population (as opposed to 
absorbing resident, unemployed workers), and 
numerous other detailed considerations.
We have tried to find out if data on 1967-68 
per capita taxes by state shed any light on this 
question. Numerous studies have shown that 
the two factors that influence spending by state 
and local governments most heavily are popu­
lation and income. Since most government 
services must be expanded more or less propor­
tionately with population, it is to be expected 
that increased total expenditure and taxes will 
accompany population growth. And since ex­
penditure per capita tends to be closely tied to 
per capita income, any policy that raises per 
capita income is likely to raise, not lower, per 
capita taxes, by some fraction of the increase in 
per capita income. This does not mean that tax­
payers are made worse off, since the added ex­
penditures result at least partly from the higher 
level of services that people demand, and are 
willing to pay for, as their incomes rise.
We find that data on per capita tax levels in 
the 48 conterminous states in 1967-68 do not 
support the notion that growth per se brings 
lower taxes. They do, however, reveal a loose 
(and inconclusive) association between per cap­
ita tax levels and population density for the
least densely populated states. Nevada and 
Wyoming, the two states that have lower popu­
lation densities than Montana, had higher per . 
capita state and local taxes. Among the more 
heavily-settled states, there appears to be no 
systematic relationship between per capita taxes 
and population density.
Slightly stronger evidence comes from an 
examination of the relationship between per 
capita taxes and total population. In 1967-68, 
the states with the smallest populations (not 
necessarily those with the lowest population 
densities) had, on average, higher per capita 
taxes than all but the very largest states. In 
1967-68, Montana’s per capita state and local 
taxes were $340. The eight states in Montana’s 
size group (500,000 to 1 million inhabitants) had 
average per capita taxes of $315, about 20 per­
cent lower than the average for the three states 
with populations under 500,000, but about 10 
percent higher than the average for the seven 
states with populations between 1 million and 
2 million. (Average taxes began to rise again as 
population increased beyond 2 million.)
This evidence is consistent with the oft-heard 
statement that Montana’s population is too 
small to permit certain government programs to 
be carried out on a scale that permits maximum 
efficiency. If this is so, growth would make pos­
sible realization of some “scale economies” that 
are not now available.
It should be stressed that numerous other 
factors are involved in determining tax levels, 
so that per capita taxes vary widely even among 
states with roughly equal populations. For ex­
ample, among the eight states with populations I 
between 500,000 and 1 million, one—New Hamp- j 
shire—had per capita taxes of about $270 in | 
1967-68, while both Delaware and Montana had J 
per capita taxes in excess of $340. With many 1 
factors at work, it is difficult to pinpoint the in- J 
fluence of a single one. Using more sophisticated 
statistical procedures that permit more than one 
factor influencing per capita taxes to be taken J 
into account, we are unable to detect any sig- j 
nificant relationship between the level of pop- j 
ulation and per capita taxes. More research ] 
might dispel the uncertainty that surrounds this j 
question, but our own work leads us to be skep- j 
tical about the proposition.
The Way of Life. Economic growth or decline j 
can change the character of an area drastically, j|
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Opinions differ widely as to whether the effects 
are good or bad, and we cannot settle that ques­
tion. There are, however, notable problems as­
sociated with both large and small size. One is 
the congestion that goes with a large population, 
already discussed. Another is the “social cost of 
space,” treated in Chapter 8 of this study and 
touched on briefly earlier in this chapter.
Even though some of the larger cities of the 
state are able to offer a modicum of cultural at­
tractions, and the larger school districts can pro­
vide well-rounded programs, specialized staffs, 
and attention to the needs of particular small 
groups of students, for many smaller communi­
ties such amenities are rare or absent entirely. 
Many of these communities do not offer a 
reasonably full range of services and shopping 
facilities to the local population. Inadequate 
medical service poses a particularly difficult 
problem in some of the least settled areas.
On the other hand, the problems of big cities 
across the nation are multiplying rapidly, and it 
seems doubtful that many Montanans are very 
interested in metropolitan life. And even on a 
small scale, expansion can produce substantial 
problems, as a consideration of some of the 
growing pains of Missoula and its surrounding 
area (the state’s fastest growing urban area) 
will testify.
The many changes that might be expected 
to accompany accelerated development depend 
partly, of course, on whether the growth is 
anticipated and planned for. But in the final an­
alysis, even with ideal planning, growth would 
mean different things to different people.
It seems unlikely that the state will develop 
any major metropolitan areas in the near fu­
ture. But even now, Montana’s larger cities are 
experiencing, in small doses, some of the prob­
lems that have reached critical proportions in 
the nation’s major urban centers.
WHERE WE COME OUT
Clearly we can offer no “scientific” final 
answer to the question whether Montana should 
pursue faster growth, and if so, how and to what 
degree. The issue is a live one, involving num­
erous conflicting interests, and ultimately it has 
to be worked out in the political arena.
Attitudes toward industrial promotion differ 
widely among, as well as within, states. Com­
pare, for example, the intensive campaigns of
the large industrial states of the northeast to 
attract still more industry with a recent account 
by Editorial Research Reports of the “anti- 
growth, anti-tourism posture” in Oregon, which 
“stems from concern about the effects of over­
population on the state’s scenic and recreational 
resources.”
As we see it, Montana is very different from 
Oregon. According to preliminary census data, 
Oregon’s population increased by 287,000 per­
sons, or 16 percent, between 1960 and 1970, 
reflecting substantial net in-migration. In Mon­
tana, the final census tabulations show that pop­
ulation increased only about 20,000, or roughly 
3 percent over the entire decade. Moreover, 
Oregon’s population density is presently more 
than four times Montana’s.
More rapid growth, as we have emphasized, 
means different things to different people. But 
its benefits are likely to be much greater in a 
state that is growing slowly than in one that is 
already growing rapidly. Similarly, the costs of 
still faster growth are likely to be greater in a 
state that is already growing rapidly than in one 
that is growing slowly. There is no rate that is 
just right for everybody, and there is surely 
some rate of growth that would be too fast for 
most Montanans. Our own opinion is that this 
rate is not likely to be reached in the near fu­
ture. There is, we think, solid reason for the 
state to endeavor to moderate the downward 
trend of its economy relative to the nation as a 
whole. (We doubt very much that the state 
could actually reverse the decline in the years 
immediately ahead.)
This is not to say that increased growth is 
worth any price, or that a policy is necessarily 
good if it promotes growth. Some such policies 
could entail substantial costs in terms of other 
goals. Suppose, to take an extreme example, 
that as other states tightened up on pollution 
standards, Montana were to enact a constitu­
tional amendment stating that neither the state 
nor any of its subdivisions could interfere with 
the “rights” of any person or business to dump 
waste on the ground, or into the streams, or into 
the atmosphere. The state might then attract 
new firms that found compliance with anti­
pollution laws elsewhere costly. These firms 
would provide new primary jobs, and total em­
ployment would rise. So might per capita per­
sonal income. Nonetheless, people who had to
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live with the resulting pollution might well be 
made worse off. The moral is obvious. The suc­
cess of economic development policy cannot be 
measured simply by determining whether it 
increases employment and income. All of its 
ramifications count, and the various interests at 
stake may conflict with one another.
State Development Policies
The power of the state to influence the rate at 
which it grows without resorting to actions 
clearly deleterious to the general welfare is 
severely limited. The realities of economic de­
velopment often get lost in the rhetoric of public 
debate. For example, one might think from 
public discussion of the subject that the failure 
of Montana’s per capita income to grow as fast 
as the national average is primarily the fault of 
the incumbent in the statehouse, whoever that 
might be at the time. The fact is that the state 
has relatively little power to affect this figure.
In the past, short-term fluctuations in Mon­
tana’s per capita income have been due pri­
marily to changes in agricultural markets. Even 
though income from agriculture accounts for 
only about 10 percent of Montana’s total per­
sonal income, it is by far the most volatile com­
ponent.
Over the longer term, the growth of per 
capita income is heavily influenced not only by 
the fortunes of agriculture, but also by the trend 
of income per worker in nonagricultural pur­
suits, by the level of unemployment, and by the 
changing age structure of the population. In all 
of these areas, there is some room for state eco­
nomic policies to exert an influence. But it 
would be a mistake to suppose that state policies 
are the most important determinants of the 
region’s economic fortunes.
CRITICAL ROLE OF PRIMARY JOBS
The key to providing expanded job oppor­
tunities in Montana is accelerated growth of 
primary employment—employment in busi­
nesses that produce mainly for export. Accord­
ing to our projections, there will be 2.4 jobs in 
derivative industries for every primary job in 
1980. Even after allowance is made for inac­
curacies in our projection, it is clear that the 
main effects of attracting new primary indus­
tries will be registered in derivative employ­
ment, and that the over-all effect of even a small 
increase in primary employment will be sub­
stantial.
To some extent, growth can also be sparked 
by what we have classified as derivative indus­
tries. This reflects the fact that the classifica­
tions are imperfect. For example, in the financial 
business, local growth can reflect development 
of export markets for financial services, or it 
can reflect a displacement of imported serv­
ices that would otherwise be obtained in, say, 
Minneapolis, Denver, or Spokane. In Montana’s 
case, employment attributable to interstate 
tourism ought properly to be segregated from 
other trade and service industry employment, 
and placed in the primary category. The prob­
lem is that we have no statistical basis for mak­
ing such a separation.
Interstate competition naturally centers on 
primary industries, especially manufacturing 
and federal government installations. The pre­
occupation with attracting more manufacturing 
industry derives partly from an exaggerated no­
tion that manufacturing activity itself confers 
“prestige” on an area. But it also reflects the 
fact that many kinds of manufacturing provide 
high-paying, reasonably stable jobs. The same 
is true of federal government employment.
Most importantly, however, these two kinds 
of employment are the most dynamic. Agricul­
ture, mining and railroads, the other major 
primary industries, have all been declining, 
both in Montana and across the nation. (It 
should be remembered, however, that we pro­
ject an increase in Montana’s mining employ­
ment in the coming decade.)
Manufacturing in Montana is concentrated in 
lumber, food, and primary metals, industries 
which have declined or grown only slowly 
across the nation. Although the state has ex­
perienced a rapid percentage growth of jobs in 
“other” manufacturing activities—nearly 50 per­
cent between 1950 and 1968—this sector is so 
small in the state that the absolute increase 
(two thousand jobs) was of limited importance. 
Our projections visualize a further growth of 
1.6 thousand jobs in “other” manufacturing be­
tween 1968 and 1980, more than for any other 
category of primary employment except federal 
government, where the projected increase is 4.2 
thousand jobs.
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LIMITED STATE POWERS TO PROMOTE 
GROWTH
It is worth reemphasizing that our projection 
of slow growth for Montana in the years ahead 
is not based on a view that, industry-by-indus- 
try, the state will fail to share national growth. 
Rather, it reflects the fact that Montana still 
specializes in industries that are, nationally, 
going downhill or growing only slowly. These 
projections are founded on a consideration of 
the basic forces we expect to be at work, both in 
the national economy and in Montana. The state 
has no power to control trends of the national 
economy. And it has only limited ability to in­
fluence most of the basic factors that enter into 
business location decisions. These include the 
cost and availability of raw materials, qualified 
labor, and other production “inputs” including 
energy, transportation, and a whole range of 
ancillary services. The powers of the state to 
affect these factors are constrained by the 
United States Constitution, by Montana’s consti­
tution, and by a need to consider other, possibly 
conflicting goals, including environmental pro­
tection.
It is difficult, for example, to imagine that 
the state could have done much to reverse the 
decline in mining and railroad employment dur­
ing the past two decades, or to have accelerated 
the growth of jobs in forest products industries, 
at least without resorting to policies that were 
unacceptable for other reasons.
In attracting new industry, Montana’s most 
important disadvantages, probably, are the 
state’s distance from major markets and its rela­
tive lack of large pools of skilled labor. The 
state is relatively powerless to control these 
factors. But it does influence, and in some cases 
control, what are sometimes called “secondary” 
factors that affect business location decisions. 
These are factors that may make the difference 
if the basic factors are generally favorable.
SECONDARY FACTORS INFLUENCING 
LOCATION DECISIONS
In 1963, Fortune magazine published a survey 
of management designed to determine the im­
portance attached to various “community fac­
tors” involved in the selection of plant sites. 
These included most of the factors over which 
the state has some control. Table 1 shows the 
findings.
None of the four items mentioned most often 
by the respondents was a direct policy tool of 
government used specifically to attract indus­
try. Rather, all had to do with general charac­
teristics of the region, its government, and its 
inhabitants. In general, government policies 
seem more likely to reflect these factors than to 
influence them.
TABLE 1
FORTUNE SURVEY OF COMMUNITY FACTORS 
AFFECTING LOCATION DECISIONS
F acto r
N um ber 
of T im es 
M entioned P e rc e n t
Community attitude tow ard industry 
Good em ployer-employee relations
_  376 95.4
in  s ta te ____________________ __ 357 90.6
Productivity of workers ... 346 87.8
Political calm and s ta b ili ty _________ __  215 54.6
Educational o ppo rtun ities .....................__  204 51.8
Local or state tax  concessions - -  133 33.8
A vailability of training fa c ilitie s___ __  77 19.5
Recreational opportunities — 55 14.0
Local or state sponsored f in an c in g____ 53 13.5
P o p u la t io n __________________________ 51 12.9
Good w e a th e r ................... __ 40 10.2
C ultural opportunities — __ 39 9.9
Source: Fortune, A  Fortune Survey on Locating Plants, 
Warehouses, Laboratories, 1963.
Tax policy receives enormous attention in dis­
cussions of economic growth, but in the Fortune 
survey educational opportunities were men­
tioned 50 percent more often than tax conces­
sions. A superior education system not only in­
creases the local supply of well-trained workers; 
it also has an important bearing on a firm’s 
ability to attract and retain such workers, who 
are typically sensitive about the quality of edu­
cation their children receive.
The findings of the Fortune survey were not, 
of course, definitive. For example, another 
study, published in 1964, asked 32 business firms 
that had recently located in South Carolina 
about the importance of various factors enter­
ing into their location decisions. It found that 
taxation policies and the quality of local govern­
ment were about equally important. And some 
of Fortune’s findings for 1963 are by now dated. 
But the survey does provide a point of depar­
ture.
The two most commonly employed devices for 
attracting industry—tax concessions and finan­
cing aids—do figure in business location de-
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cisions, but their importance is more limited 
than is sometimes thought, judging from For­
tune’s findings. And as one expert, Benjamin 
Bridges, concluded on the basis of a study done 
for the state of Wisconsin:
Financial inducements of the types now in 
common use are certainly a secondary location 
factor in the choice of region and are probably 
also a secondary factor in the choice of loca­
tion within a region. On the basis of avail­
able evidence it is impossible to establish 
precisely how important secondary location in­
ducements are. In some cases offers of induce­
ments m ight significantly affect the decision of 
a num ber of firms as to whether to locate in a 
particular state or in the adjoining state. In 
addition to reducing costs, offers of induce­
ments by groups in a particular state might 
noticeably improve that state’s image in the 
eyes of business officials.
Business Tax Policy. Since business taxation 
is treated in the recently-completed Montana 
Fiscal Affairs Study, we do not consider it in 
detail here. However, it is useful to take a look 
at the broad outlines of the problem, since in 
Montana and elsewhere it figures so importantly 
in public discussions.
In 1967, the Advisory Commission on Inter­
governmental Relations, a highly regarded 
group of federal, state, and local officials, pub­
lished a comprehensive study, State-Local Taxa­
tion and Industrial Location. Included among 
the findings were these:
1. Mainly as a result of competition for new 
industry, state and local governments have 
tended to reduce their reliance on business 
taxes. Taxes w ith an “initial impact on 
business,” which include levies on real and 
personal property held by business firms, 
corporation income taxes, gross receipts 
taxes, licenses, severance taxes, and other 
miscellaneous business levies, accounted for 
34.2 percent of total state and local tax  col­
lections in 1957. By 1967 the proportion had 
dropped to 29.3 percent. The mirror-image 
of this shift away from business levies was 
increasing reliance on taxes imposed “pri­
marily on individuals.”
2. State and local governments have adopted a 
wide variety of special policies designed to 
attract and retain industry. Table 2, adapted 
from the Commission Report, summarizes 
these policies.
3. The impact of tax  policies on business loca­
tion decisions is lim ited prim arily to in­
fluencing the specific location chosen within  
a broad geographic region.
4. Individual states tend to “stay in line” with 
their neighbors, so that business tax  policies 
do not differ widely among neighboring 
states. This lack of sharp differences makes 
it difficult to determine how powerful tax 
incentives are in determining the location 
of businesses w ithin a given m ulti-state 
region.
5. “In order to maximize the favorable aspects 
of the state tax  image while minimizing loss 
of revenue, state legislative bodies also pu r­
sue highly selective business tax  reduction 
policies—property and sales tax  exemption 
for new industry, freeport provisions to 
minimize business personal property tax 
loads, special rapid write-off provisions for 
corporate income taxpayers, and in some 
cases outright repeal of the tax  on business 
inventories—the tax  that is the target of 
especially heavy criticism from the business 
community.”
Montana’s business taxes provide a larger- 
than-average proportion of state and local tax 
revenues. But the trend in Montana has been 
for the proportion of revenue accounted for by 
these taxes to decline. As table 3 shows, in 1957 
taxes with an “initial impact on business” ac­
counted for 38.8 percent of total levies collected 
by Montana’s state and local governments. By 
1967, this share had dropped to 35.9 percent, 6.6 
percentage points above the average for all 
states. The table also indicates that Montana 
relied more heavily on business taxes than did 
most of its neighbors.
Between 1957 and 1967, the proportion of 
taxes raised from business firms dropped more 
rapidly in Colorado, Washington, and Idaho, all 
of which grew faster than Montana. But it fell 
somewhat less in Utah, whose growth also ex­
ceeded Montana’s, and we would hesitate to 
infer that the differing rates of change in busi­
ness taxes revealed in the table were important 
causes of the differences in economic growth 
rates.
The differences shown in the table trace to 
many factors other than unequal tax rates. For 
example, the low percentages for the Dakotas 
are due partly to the relative unimportance of 
business activity in these predominantly agri­
cultural states. On the other hand, Montana
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TABLE 2
STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICIES DESIGNED TO ATTRACT AND TO HOLD 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFIED BY TYPE AND CHARACTER OF ACTION
Type of Benefit and C haracter of Policy or Practice
Type of Tax
1
Legislative T ax Policies 
Benefiting Most or All Firm s
2
Legislative Tax Policies Benefiting 
Certain Groups of Firm s
3
Adm inistrative Tax 
Practices Benefiting 
Particu lar Firm s
A 1A 2A 3A
Personal 
property tax
No tax  (New York, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
and Hawaii)
Selective tax  reduction 
action1 
S tate adm inistration
Selective exemptions and ra te  reduc­
tions: “F ree port” tax  exemption with 
prim ary benefits accruing to those 
firm s w ith extensive in terstate ship­
m ent (26 states)*
Favorable assess­
m ent obtained 
through 
negotiation
B IB 2B 3B
Real property tax Low effective tax  rates* 
W ell-defined assessment 
standards
1. Reduced real estate tax  load for “new ” 
industry (exam ple—M ontana through 
classified assessments)
2. Tax exemption authorized by legisla­
tion for designated types of “new 
industry” (in 13 states local govern­
ments are authorized to gran t exem p­
tions for “new industry” ; in Louisiana, 
a state board can gran t exemptions 
from  local property taxes)
Favorable assess­
m ent obtained 
through 
negotiation
C 1C 2C 3C
Corporation 
income tax
1. No tax  (11 sta tes)4
2. Low effective ra te  (ex­
ample—Indiana, Missouri, 
New Mexico, and North 
Dakota)
1. P referential “w rite-off” for selected 
types of investm ent (example—New 
Y ork’s accelerated w rite-off provision 
for R & D facilities)
2. Sales destination factor benefits 
hom e-state firm s w ith extensive out- 
of-state sales (example—24 states 





m ultistate firms 
through 
negotiation
D ID 2D 3D
Sales vs. personal 
income tax 
issue
1. S tate use of sales taxes— 
no broad based personal 
income tax  (13 sta tes)5
2. D irect business use ex ­
emption from  sales tax  
(Ohio has most liberal 
exemption provision)
M achinery purchases exem pted from 
sales tax  for “new and expanded” 
industry (example—Kentucky and 
Georgia)




Below average tax  rates® M erit rating  provides greatest benefit to 
those firm s w ith the most stable em­
ployment record
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernm ental Relations, State-Local Taxation and Industrial Location.
Exam ples are: the exemption of wholesalers’ and reta ilers’ inventories in Arizona; the gradual phase-out of the 
tax on m anufacturers’ inventories in Connecticut; the exemption of special tools in Michigan; and the 60 percent 
credit against the tax  on m erchants’ inventories and m anufacturers’ m aterials and finished products in Wisconsin. 
T’he 17 states tha t tax  business inventories and do not have free port laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Cali­
fornia, Colorado (except th a t property in transit w ill be assessed at 5 percent beginning in 1967), Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire (but goods held for out-of-state delivery by a m anufacturer when 
title has passed to the purchaser are exem pt), New Mexico, North Carolina (but tangible personalty held at a sea-
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relies more heavily on business taxes than do 
either Colorado or Utah, both of which are less 
agricultural, and more industrial, than this 
state.
Among the eight states shown in the table, 
only Wyoming collected a larger portion of its 
total taxes from business levies than did Mon­
tana in 1967. In fact, of the fifty states, only 
four—Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia, in 
addition to Wyoming—showed higher percent­
ages of business to total taxes than Montana.
These figures suggest that this state’s tax 
policies are not likely to provide unusual incen­
tives for firms to locate here rather than else­
where in the region. It must be added, however, 
that we have no evidence to prove that taxes 
have had an appreciable effect on Montana’s 
growth.
The state does offer special tax incentives to 
business, through property tax concessions. One 
puts “new industrial property” in “Class Seven” 
for property tax purposes during the first three 
years of operation. This means that the taxable 
value of the property is only 7 percent of as­
sessed value. Normally, land, improvements, 
and equipment are given a taxable value of 30 
percent, and inventories of merchandise 33% 
percent, of assessed value.
This concession is strictly limited to new 
business plants. It is not granted for expansion 
and modernization of established facilities, and 
it applies only to firms engaged in manufactur­
ing, mining, and milling, as opposed to trade 
and service-type firms. The purpose of these 
restrictions is to confine the favor to new busi-
T A B L E 3
PERCENT OF TOTAL TAXES ACCOUNTED FOR BY 
LEVIES WITH AN INITIAL IMPACT ON BUSINESS 
MONTANA, NEIGHBORING STATES AND U.S. 
AVERAGE 1957 AND 1967
1957 1967
Wyoming ...................- — 40.3 40.1
MONTANA __ ______________ . 38.8 35.9
_____  34.5 30.3
Utah . . . . 38.2 29.0
Washington — ___ _____ 30.6 28.3
Colorado -...... .................. ............ 31.4 28.2
North D a k o ta _____________ _______23.2 22.8
South Dakota _ ..................- .......  18.5 18.9
United State Average ______ _______34.2 29.3
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, Supplement to State-Local Taxation and 
Industrial Location.
nesses in primary industries, without giving up 
revenue from established businesses or deriva­
tive industry.
Another Montana concession confers Class 
Seven status on “free port merchandise”—goods 
produced elsewhere that are either in transit 
through the state (including those in storage 
and awaiting transit) or that are incorporated 
into products destined to be sold outside the 
state. Machinery and equipment used to control 
air pollution is also given Class Seven status.
Many other states grant special tax conces­
sions to new industry, often more generous than 
Montana’s. However, according to a study pub­
lished by the New York State Department of 
Commerce, as of late 1969 no other Rocky Moun-
port awaiting shipment to a foreign port is exem pt), Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. As 
noted in box 1A, four states (Delaware, Hawaii, New York, and Pennsylvania) exempt all personal property. In 
addition, Arizona and New Jersey exempt business inventories from  property taxation, and Kentucky exempts per­
sonal property held in public warehouses for trans-shipm ent from local general property taxation but imposes a 
nominal state rate on such merchandise. The remaining 26 states, all of which tax  business inventories, have free 
port tax  exemptions.
•Effective property tax  rates (the amount of tax  paid as a percent of the m arket value of the property) are par­
ticularly low (between 0.5 percent and 0.9 percent) in most of the Southern states, although some of the Western 
states (for example, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, Washington, and Wyoming) also have effective rates tha t are well 
below the U.S. average of 1.4 percent (in 1962).
‘Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyo­
ming.
•Florida, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wash­
ington, and Wyoming.
•The states w ith the lowest effective rates (total unemployment compensation tax  payments as a percent of total 
wages), ranging from .4 percent to .7 percent in 1964 were: Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The U.S. average effective rate was 1.3 percent (in 1964).
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tain states offered tax concessions for new in­
dustrial property. Neither did Washington or 
either of the Dakotas. (North Dakota does allow 
new corporations a limited credit against income 
tax for wages and salaries paid in the state for 
the first five years of operation.)
A majority of states have free port legislation. 
In many cases the provisions are more liberal 
than Montana’s, allowing complete exemption 
of all merchandise, regardless of origin, that is 
destined for shipment outside the state.
Table 2 shows numerous other business tax 
concessions offered by various states. Among 
the more important are low (or no) corporate 
income taxes and exemption of inventories and 
business machinery and equipment from prop­
erty taxes.
Financing Aids. Most states provide financial 
aids for business investment. There are three 
types of programs: development credit corpora­
tions, state industrial finance authorities, and 
borrowing by local governments or develop­
ment agencies which issue bonds to finance 
business investment.
Financing aids rank low in the list of factors 
mentioned in the Fortune survey. However, 
since the survey was published in 1963, competi­
tion among states through such devices has 
blossomed, and failure to provide such assist­
ance is more likely to hamper development 
efforts now than it was when they were less 
widely used. Furthermore, at least one careful 
study has turned up evidence indicating that 
these aids may have a greater impact on the 
volume of business investment than has gen­
erally been acknowledged. And the Montana 
Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment finds that among firms that are contem­
plating investment in the state, many show a 
marked interest in the availability of help in 
securing finance.
One form of assistance comes from state- 
chartered industrial credit corporations, which 
obtain private capital from the sale of stock to 
banks, insurance companies, and other business 
firms, and are empowered to borrow from stock­
holding financial institutions. They make loans 
to businesses that cannot obtain credit from 
conventional sources. It is claimed that they 
permit greater pooling of risks than can be 
accomplished by private lenders. They are more 
flexible than most public lending agencies,
since they can make loans to private firms not 
only for land and buildings but for machinery, 
equipment, working capital, and debt retire­
ment as well.
Montana now has a development credit cor­
poration in the capital-raising stage. Most 
nearby states have authorized corporations, and 
in several they are operating.
Another financing device, the state industrial 
finance authority, takes two distinct forms. The 
first, common in New England, guarantees part 
or all of private mortgage loans made to indus­
try, in return for an insurance fee. The second 
makes direct loans of state funds to local de­
velopment corporations, which in turn assist in 
the financing of industrial development proj­
ects. By late 1969, nineteen states had estab­
lished industrial finance authorities. Of these, 
fifteen were located in the northeastern part of 
the country, and according to the New York 
study, there were none in the mountain states of 
the West.
Still another approach is local government 
borrowing to finance industry. This form of 
assistance has a long history, (starting in Mis­
sissippi in 1936) but it was during the 1960s that 
it mushroomed. Although it has been used most 
intensively in the South, by the end of 1967 
forty-two states had authorized local govern­
ments (or special local development agencies) to 
issue bonds to finance the construction of in­
dustrial facilities for lease or sale to private in­
dustry. Usually, borrowing is limited to revenue 
bonds that can be amortized only out of rev­
enues from the project being financed. In a few 
cases, however, states permit local governments 
to issue general obligation bonds, which in effect 
commit the government to amortize out of tax 
revenues should the industrial project being 
financed fail to produce sufficient revenue.
A major advantage of industrial development 
bonds is that interest paid is exempt from fed­
eral and, in most cases, state income taxes. This 
means that the issues can be floated at lower 
interest rates than could be obtained directly by 
an industrial borrower, whose debt would not 
have tax-exempt status. Because the device 
exploits the exemption of interest on state and 
local bonds from federal taxes it has been 
widely criticized, and Congress has recently im­
posed severe restrictions on its use.
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In addition, the facilities being financed are 
sometimes exempt from state and local property 
taxes. This is not true in Montana, however, or 
in most nearby states.
Montana’s revenue bond law recently passed 
its initial test of constitutionality. The first 
issues will be used to finance anti-pollution 
equipment of the Hoerner-Waldorf Company. 
There remains some doubt about the meaning 
of legal restrictions on the scope of activities 
than can be aided in this way.
According to the New York study, as of late 
1969, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Washington, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota all had laws 
permitting local governments to issue revenue 
bonds, although the constitutionality of Colo­
rado’s legislation had yet to be tested in the 
courts. Washington permits use of these bonds 
by port districts only.
The experts seem to agree that, although 
financing aids are not primary causes of indus­
trial growth, they do have an effect, particularly 
on decisions of firms that have limited access to 
normal private sources of credit. The interest 
subsidy, if any, is thought to be less important 
than the effect of making credit available to 
firms with limited access credit markets. It 
also appears that loan programs are more im­
portant in increasing the amount invested by 
the firm in a local area than in inducing it to 
locate there in the first place.
One student of these programs, Edwin C. 
Gooding of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 
argues that among the various types of financ­
ing aids now in use, the loan guarantee ap­
proach (used by state governments in Maine, 
Connecticut, and Rhode Island) offers the most 
advantages to a state. The critical question, of 
course, is whether there is, indeed, a “credit 
gap” that gives rise to a legitimate need for a 
state-sponsored loan insurance program, and 
whether the program adopted is structured and 
run so as to meet this need. Gooding points out 
that the loan-guarantee programs in operation 
have experienced very few losses. Any insur­
ance-fund approach to loan guarantees requires, 
for sound operation, a fairly large-scale pro­
gram with many borrowers, since effective risk­
pooling works on the basis of the “law of large 
numbers.” In this respect, Montana is in a less 
advantageous position than states with larger 
populations.
Those Important Other Considerations. Al­
though tax concessions and financing aids are 
the chief devices used by state and local govern­
ments for the specific purpose of attracting in­
dustry, other policies designed partly or wholly 
to suit different ends probably have a more im­
portant impact, according to most experts.
As we have noted, educational opportunities 
are thought to be an important secondary factor 
entering into business location decisions. Mon­
tana’s educational program is basically strong, j| 
although some smaller communities have dif­
ficulty providing specialized programs and ade- f  
quate buildings and equipment. All educational j 
institutions in the state, from public schools 1 
through universities, face difficult financing j 
problems. As with other public services, the 
future quality of educational programs will de- 1 
pend on the state’s ability to solve its tax prob- j 
lems and to maintain constant, effective review I 
of program operation. Vocational education, j 
which has grown rapidly in Montana in recent 
years, has an important potential role in supply- J 
ing specialized manpower needs, especially if j 
these needs can be identified long enough in j 
advance for programs to be geared to meeting 
them.
Recreational opportunities, which are one of | 
Montana’s most distinct assets, ranked only 
eighth in the 1963 Fortune survey. Good weather ' 
and cultural opportunities ranked at the bottom. ; 
Looking toward the longer-run future, as in­
comes continue to rise people will become in- j 
creasingly concerned about the quality of their 
lives and the use of their leisure time. Some 
items at the bottom of Fortune's list, including j 
cultural opportunities, recreational opportuni­
ties, and lack of population congestion will be- 
come more important to firms that need to offer j 
an attractive life to their workers. In fact, we j 
would guess that these factors have already be- j 
come more important than they were in 1963 j 
when the Fortune survey was conducted. It 
would therefore seem worthwhile to maintain i 
and cultivate these features in Montana, not 
only for their own sake, but for their contri­
bution to the state’s attractiveness to desirable j 
new industry.
One important consideration that crops up 
often in studies of business location decisions is 
the quality of government generally. Rational, 
efficient government is an important considera-
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tion to forward-looking industries that contem­
plate making substantial investments in any 
state. Investors understandably try to avoid un­
certainty, and to seek “political calm and sta­
bility” to use the term employed in the Fortune 
survey. Almost by definition, rational, efficient 
government generates far less uncertainty than 
does irrational, inefficient government. This 
consideration applies doubly to government 
policies that have a direct bearing on business 
profits.
Tax policies provide a good example. Profes­
sor Ronald Wonnacott, in a thoughtful paper 
written for the Upper Midwest Economic Study 
in 1963, argues that the real or apparent in­
equity of taxes, rather than their level, is what 
generates a good or bad “image” for an area. 
This view is common among students of busi­
ness taxes.
Moreover, businesses worry about the future. 
The South Carolina study mentioned earlier 
found that “trends in tax legislation” ranked 
above “special tax inducements” as an influenc­
ing factor in the minds of the new business 
firms interviewed. Potential investors go to sub­
stantial lengths to protect themselves against 
capricious influences on their costs. Like other 
taxpayers, they might wish to dictate state poli­
cies if they could. But failing that, they value a 
setting in which decisions affecting them are 
arrived at only after a rational consideration of 
the issues involved, because they feel more as­
sured that in such a setting they will not be 
exploited.
Despite the fact that there have been two 
major studies of the state’s fiscal system during 
the past six years, discourse over taxes in Mon­
tana is primitive and propagandistic, and efforts 
to bring leaders of the major political parties 
together to work on the problem in a dispas­
sionate, forward-looking way have failed.
More generally, governmental reorganization 
and consolidation, and coordinated multi-county 
districting are all urgently needed if govern­
ment is to be efficient. The need for efficiency 
arises independently of any effects it may have 
on economic development. But the accompany­
ing improvement in the state’s “image” to po­
tential investors should not be ignored.
SOME STRATEGIC PROBLEMS
The most compelling argument for faster 
growth is the effect on labor markets. Attract­
ing primary industry is the key. The State 
Department of Planning and Economic Develop­
ment works to attract new industry and to help 
solve the problems that arise in connection with 
getting new ventures off the ground. These 
activities should, of course, be geared to provid­
ing new jobs where needs are greatest. We are 
not experts on industrial development. Our 
study does, however, contain a great deal of in­
formation that should be useful in the formula­
tion of policy. Below we touch on some of the 
most important problems that need to be faced.
Dangers of Diffused Effort. One problem is 
that jobs are needed most in those areas where 
employment has been growing least rapidly— 
just the areas where growth is hardest to pro­
mote.
The pinch of the job gap is greatest in the 
areas where the gap itself is greatest, and the 
rate of population change in an area provides a 
rough measure of the severity of this pinch. As 
figure 1 shows, between 1960 and 1970, popula­
tion declined in 41 of Montana’s 56 counties, and 
increased by less than 10 percent in another 
three. As Chapter 6 of this study points out, un­
employment is greatest among the “nonfarm 
rural” population—persons who live outside 
towns with a population of 2,500 or more, but 
who do not earn their livelihoods from farming.
In the future, growth will continue to be 
slowest in rural areas, and it is impractical to 
think in terms of reversing slow growth wher­
ever it occurs. For this reason, it is widely be­
lieved that particular areas should be singled 
out and turned into “growth centers.” The argu­
ment for this approach hinges partly on the no­
tion of critical mass—that new industry requires 
centers large enough to have an adequate pool of 
labor, and to provide a reasonably full range of 
services both for the firm and its employees. In 
addition, the resources of the state available for 
encouraging growth are limited, and should not 
be dissipated in scattershot efforts, but concen­
trated in a limited number of coordinated pro­
grams.
There is a good deal of sense in this argument, 
but if such an approach is to be followed in 
Montana it will be necessary to break down 
some long-standing parochial barriers to re-
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gional cooperation. Moreover, “growth-center” 
approach would necessitate substantial migra­
tion within the state, and require many people 
to change their way of life. It would also re­
quire some hard choices when it comes to 
singling out the most promising “growth cen­
ters,” and a hardheaded awareness that bestow­
ing the designation on an area does not in itself 
bring about the desired transformation.
Indian Poverty. Another problem that de­
serves priority, but that cannot be expected to 
yield easily, is the economic plight of Montana’s 
Indians. As Chapter 6 points out, over 50 per­
cent of Montana Indian families had money in­
comes under $3,000 in 1959. The figures for 1969, 
when they become available in detailed 1970 
Census reports, will probably tell substantially 
the same story. Chapter 6 also points out that 
the 1960 Census found unemployment to be 
more than four times as high among Montana’s 
nonwhite males than it was among white males, 
and nearly three times as high for nonwhite 
females as for white females.
On average, Indians receive substantially less 
education than whites, and those at work are 
concentrated in low-paying jobs. One of our 
Staff Studies deals with possible approaches to 
this problem. It argues that the major need is to 
find ways to adapt the Western factory system 
to Indian cultural values and traits. Indian 
workers apparently are best suited to enter­
prises where the work is done individually, and 
payment is based on work completed. Exper­
ience indicates that precision work, such as elec­
tronics parts manufacturing and the cutting of 
diamonds and jewel bearings is especially ap­
propriate. As an example, the paper points to an 
electronics manufacturing plant on the Sioux 
Reservation near Yankton, South Dakota, which 
has established an enviable reputation for the 
quality of its work. But as the paper concedes, 
there is much to be learned before we can ex­
pect to get far in the difficult job of assimilat- 
mg Indian workers into a predominantly white 
economy without violating Indian cultural pat­
terns.
Achieving a Balanced Job Market. One of the 
TOajor explanations of differences in per capita 
personal income among states is variation in the 
structure of the job market. In Montana, the 
decline of mining and railroad employment has 
tended to reduce not only total population and
income, but per capita income as well, because 
pay in these two industries is unusually high.
It is entirely possible for a state to attract sub­
stantial new industry without increasing per 
capita income, if the new businesses pay low 
wages. In this connection, it is worth noting that 
the trade and service industries that are most 
directly tied to tourism typically pay low 
wages. For example, in 1968 employees of eat­
ing and drinking places earned at an average 
annual rate of $2,557; for hotel and motel work­
ers the figure was $2,600, and for workers in 
automobile dealerships and gas stations it was 
$4,978. Those who did not work all year (and 
there were many of them) earned proportion­
ately less than these annual rates.
One proposed new venture—the Big Sky of 
Montana recreation development in Gallatin 
and Madison Counties—aims to operate year- 
round, offering skiing as well as summer recrea­
tion facilities. In addition to public lodging 
facilities, a large number of homesites will be 
available. This approach helps overcome the 
problem of seasonality. But it is likely that as 
long as present patterns of school attendance 
and family vacations persist, travel for recrea­
tion will continue to be concentrated in the sum­
mer months and around the Christmas holidays. 
This means that jobs in resort areas will con­
tinue to be seasonal.
Montanans should not neglect the fact that 
the state needs industries and businesses that 
will employ skilled workers and provide steady 
jobs. This is especially true if the rapid net out­
migration of highly educated young workers is 
to be moderated.
Notwithstanding the need to be selective in 
efforts to increase primary employment, it 
should be kept in mind that the major employ­
ment impact of attracting a new primary 
industry is on derivative employment, in indus­
tries that serve local markets. And here the 
prospects are that a wide range of jobs, from 
professional to blue-collar, will be opened up.
Labor Market Information. Just as faster 
growth of jobs could help to reduce unemploy­
ment, so would intensified efforts to match 
available workers to jobs, and to make avail­
able to unemployed Montanans better informa­
tion about opportunities both inside and outside 
the state. Most workers who migrate any large 
distance to find jobs rely on information from
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friends and relatives, a strange phenomenon in 
this era of the “information revolution.”
Detailed information about local labor market 
conditions, about the skills that are in greatest 
excess supply, and about seasonal patterns of 
unemployment, are necessary ingredients in the 
development of rational strategies for generat­
ing a better labor market for Montanans. Ex­
pansion of the data gathering and disseminating 
activities of the Employment Security Commis­
sion is needed. An expanded program would, of 
course, require an expanded budget.
Pollution Control. Another critical area is 
pollution control and environmental protection. 
If controls were costless, presumably no one 
would resist them. But they are not costless. 
They cut into business profits, raise product 
prices, and reduce the demand for workers in 
affected industries. It is against such costs that 
the gains from tighter controls must be weighed.
The precise effects depend importantly on the 
nature of the controls and on what other states 
and the federal government are doing. If Mon­
tana’s anti-pollution policies are substantially 
more exacting than those of neighboring states, 
their impact on business activity will be more 
pronounced than it would be if the state were 
“staying in line” with her neighbors. Nation­
wide standards imposed by the federal govern­
ment would in one sense be ideal, for they 
would remove or reduce incentives of states and 
local governments to compete on the basis of 
less onerous restrictions. But even then, some 
industries would find it profitable to shift pol­
luting operations to other countries where stan­
dards were less exacting.
Some persons contend that strict pollution 
controls would make the state so attractive to 
clean, “light” industries that employment and 
income would actually rise. They assert that this 
is so, and they may be right. The question is one 
of fact, not theory. The factual information is 
not easy to come by.
If our own guess is correct, and it is a guess, 
meaningful pollution controls will, at least in 
the years immediately ahead, work to hold em­
ployment and income in Montana below the 
levels they would reach if policies were more 
lax. In return, Montanans will have a cleaner 
environment.
Assuming that stricter controls will inhibit 
growth, at what point do the gains from a
cleaner environment fail to justify the costs of j 
further controls? Do the controls that are 
adopted minimize the adverse effects on eco- ! 
nomic growth for a given gain in environmental , 
quality? Does it make sense to adopt the same 
emission standards for all parts of the state 
when pollution problems are clearly worse in <j 
some areas than in others? Has enough effort 
been devoted to evaluating the harmful effects 
of various pollutants, so as to establish a rational 
order of priorities? In Chapter 7 of the study we 
suggest that more attention should be paid to 
getting the most out of pollution regulation. The , 
controls that have been adopted both here and | 
elsewhere smack of arbitrariness that in turn 
suggests inefficiency. The answers to these 
questions are not easily found, but that does not 
mean that they should be ignored or relegated 
to the background.
Some Conclusions
There is reason to be concerned about Mon­
tana’s slow economic growth. But it does not 
follow that state and local government policies 
are the primary cause of slow growth, or that 
they should be expected to reverse it. As we 
have stressed, any state’s powers to determine 
its economic destiny are sharply limited, by 
law, by the fact that the policies that can be 
used have limited impact, and by the fact that 
some of those policies entail conflicts with other 
goals.
Our projections visualize a decline in primary 
employment from 83.0 thousand jobs in 1968 to 
81.2 thousand jobs in 1980. The projections are 
admittedly crude and speculative. They reflect j 
what we consider to be the most likely set of j 
fundamental economic forces at work, nation- ! 
ally and locally, in the decade ahead. These I 
forces, in our opinion, will continue to generate j 
the kinds of pressures that have held down j 
(indeed reduced) primary employment in the j 
state since World War II. They include con- 1 
tinued slow growth of employment nationally 1 
in some of Montana’s most important primary I 
industries, the cost of shipping products to ma- j 
jor national markets, and the fact that the state’s j 
surplus labor is spread all over the map.
Total employment is projected to increase I 
from 254.4 thousand in 1968 to 278.4 thousand in I 
1980, thanks mainly to the continued shift j
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toward derivative jobs. The overall increase of
24.000 jobs is, according to our projections,
40.000 fewer than would be needed to make 
room for the entire “natural” growth of the 
labor force and, simultaneously, reduce the 
state’s 1980 unemployment rate to the projected 
national average of 3.7 percent.
Using our projection of 2.4 derivative jobs for 
every primary job in 1980, it would be necessary 
for primary employment to increase by 12,000 
jobs, or 1,000 each year, between 1968 and 1980 
to eliminate this job gap. Such a boom would 
entail a dramatic reversal of the postwar trend. 
Between 1950 and 1968, total primary jobs fell 
by nearly 1,000 per year.
We believe it is impractical and unwise to 
think in terms of eliminating the job gap en­
tirely. It is, of course, possible that our projec­
tions are seriously in error, and that by 1980 it 
will turn out that there was not, in fact, a job 
gap. But it is not reasonable to assume that such 
a reversal could be brought about simply by 
state actions designed to attract new industry.
Moreover, some of the employment gains that 
we have projected rest on fragile assumptions. 
For example, our projection of a 1.3 thousand 
increase in jobs in metal mining depends heavily 
on assumptions that the market for primary 
metals in general, and for copper in particular, 
will remain strong. This market is notoriously 
difficult to forecast. The projection also depends 
on an assumption that this growth will be com­
patible with state programs for protecting the 
environment. The same is true of our projec­
tions of employment in metal processing and 
wood products.
We think it would be a mistake for the state 
to set a unique target for economic development
policy in the coming decade, and that it would 
be particularly unrealistic to set a target such 
as elimination of the job gap. Goals are not 
unique and cannot be pursued single-mindedly. 
Given the uncertainties that must surround any 
projections, the limitations on the state’s powers 
to promote growth, and the inability to assess 
fully and to resolve in advance the potential 
conflicts between any particular type of growth 
and other policy goals, setting a concrete goal in 
terms of, say, employment in 1980, would prob­
ably result in undue pressures to accomplish 
what might well turn out to be the wrong task.
But we do believe that promoting a faster 
growth of job opportunities is a sensible general 
goal of state policy. At times, this goal can be 
expected to conflict with other goals, and diffi­
cult decisions as to priorities will arise. We see 
no way for prescribing, in advance, and from a 
university office, what order should be given to 
the priorities.
Indeed, we do not believe that a permanent 
order of priorities—a grand design—can or 
should be established. Planning is a continuous 
process which demands a great deal of flexibil­
ity and an ability to respond in different ways to 
different circumstances. What is a desirable 
development for one part of Montana may be 
undesirable in another; a project that is not 
feasible today may be feasible in 1975; residents 
of one city may have different priorities than 
those of another. It is not that policy should be 
made ad hoc. What we think is needed is an 
orderly, continuous process that will allow Mon­
tanans to consider the facts, express their pref­
erences, and permit priorities to be established 
and changed in the light of current economic 
realities and citizen preferences.
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Comment on the Montana Economic Study
PERRY F. ROYS 
C. R. DRAPER
The Montana Economic Study is a valuable 
and much-needed piece of work. Its analysis of 
economic trends and the conditions behind their 
development, although in some ways unpleasant 
to take, needed to be pointed out and generally 
understood. However, when the study turns 
from data and analysis to an interpretation of 
their significance for action, it invites variant 
interpretations. Thus, this comment is con­
cerned with some of the interpretations of the 
study, and their implications for policy and 
action.
Because of the agency we represent and its 
function in state government, it is always 
chargeable that we speak from a biased view­
point. To this we can only say, “granted.” The 
Planning Department is not the scholar care­
fully balancing the theoretical pro with the 
hypothetical con, but a practitioner in the arena 
of state agency activity, charged with the re­
sponsibility to take action so far as possible to 
counteract some of the very forces that created 
the trends documented by this study, and on 
which its projections are based.
Theoretically, of course, in order to deal with 
the “job gap” pointed out by data in the Mon­
tana Economic Study, one can consider the 
option of “facilitating out-migration” right along
with that of “attracting new industries” as alter­
native policies. But in the political milieu of 
state government, the idea of adopting a state 
policy that hastens the out-migration of poten­
tial wage earners would be worth serious con­
sideration for about as long as, say, the notion 
of selling off the Capitol’s Charles Russell mural 
to help fund the Department of Planning and 
Economic Development. What the listing of 
these two state alternatives fails to consider is 
that “attracting industry” is by no means the 
only way by which employment opportunities 
grow.
For one thing, most of the growth in jobs and 
income in any state results from growth and 
expansion of business concerns already operat­
ing in the state. This is why, for example, one 
company in Montana is able to spend, just for 
equipment to control atmospheric pollution, 
more than the entire original investment to es­
tablish the industry back in 1955.
For another, all industry must start some­
where. And fostering the successful establish­
ment of new primary enterprise within the 
state, with local management and initiative (and 
local capital where possible) is at least as worthy 
a state policy as trying to entice already estab­
lished firms to move or to expand into the state.
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Incidentally, it is worth pointing out with ap­
proval that nowhere does this study fall into the 
assumption all too common among nonecono­
mists that one choice open to the state and its 
representatives is to “locate” industry within 
the area in accordance with area or statewide 
needs as they are seen at the state level. Instead, 
the study rightly points out that a state’s options 
are limited to influencing some of the conditions 
that attract various kinds of enterprises, with 
the “locating” still strictly up to the industry or 
business.
What some states endeavor to do within this 
admittedly limited sphere of influence is to pro­
vide special incentives and assistance to areas 
where problems and needs are most urgent. 
Such special programs may take a variety of 
forms. They generally consist of tax incentives, 
business development financial aid programs, 
and special loan and grant programs aimed at 
community development in selected locations. 
Montana has no programs of this type directed 
to areas of special need; but the state is never­
theless involved administratively and finan­
cially through its partnership and participation 
in federal programs aimed at improving the 
conditions and the quality of living in less af­
fluent areas. These include Manpower Training 
programs, Economic Development Administra­
tion business loans and grants, Model Cities pro­
grams, and other loans and grants for improving 
community facilities and services. There is sub­
stantial evidence at this time to forecast that in 
the years immediately ahead, these federal pro­
grams will increase in number and variety.
The Montana Economic Study also properly 
calls attention to the effect that mobility of 
labor—the ease with which workers are able to 
respond to geographical variations in job oppor­
tunities by moving away from poor locations 
and toward good ones—has upon the working 
out of economic forces, and also the variability 
within the labor force as regards mobility. But 
it concludes that the growth of job opportunities 
is of most benefit to those least able to move— 
the poor, the untrained, the elderly, the Indian. 
And in a later section of the study, the advice is 
volunteered that the greatest need for new in­
dustry in Montana is for the types that furnish 
occupations for these segments of the labor 
force.
What this line of reasoning seems to ignore or
underplay is the nature of the job continuum in 
business and industry. To be sure, it is difficult 
to argue with the idea that the “most benefit” 
would come to the lowest strata in the job mar­
ket. In a society where minimum wages are 
specified, the difference between having a job, 
and no job at all is in general a good deal more 
significant than that between one job and a 
better one. But this is not to say that the only 
way, or even the best way to satisfy needs in one 
segment of the labor force is to find an industry 
that concentrates its job needs in that particular 
segment.
What happens when a new source of jobs is 
introduced to a micro-economy such as a state or 
a portion of it, is a shifting and realignment of 
occupations to fill the needs both of the new 
enterprise and the spaces left in the existing 
ones by wage earners drawn into the new firm. 
The process is subject to all the delays, resist­
ances, and imperfections of most social pro­
cesses, but it operates nevertheless. In other 
words, if there is an oversupply of unskilled 
labor in a town or a state, this does not mean 
the best solution is to go looking for an industry 
that employs only the unskilled. Rather, a suc­
cessful planner looks as usual for those enter­
prises that have the best chances of successful 
operation in this economy, and if they locate 
here, the labor supply adjusts to make available 
new jobs for the unskilled.
In another section assessing the pros and cons 
of more economic growth, the Montana Eco­
nomic Study deals with the argument by anony­
mous claimants that faster growth will reduce 
the tax burden, and uses per capita taxation as 
the measure to test this claim, by comparing it 
with personal income. This approach is admit­
tedly the easiest for which to find ready-made 
measures, but per capita tax figures can be mis­
leading. Per capita taxes, as a matter of fact, 
are not paid per capita. The measure is derived 
by dividing total state taxes by total population; 
taxes, however, are not shared by the total pop­
ulation but by taxpayers. When some of these 
taxpayers are corporations, and when the cor- 
porate-vs.-private share of total taxation varies 
from state to state with the degree of industrial 
development, then the kind of comparisions 
made in this study can lose much of their force.
Another matter that makes it difficult to 
argue with the defenders of industrial growth
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as a means of cutting taxes is that when one 
compares tax burdens between states, counties, 
or communities, there are no good measures 
available to compare the range and quality of 
the services for which tax dollars pay. The 
Montana Economic Study points out that in gen­
eral, taxes tend to rise with increases in per 
capita incomes. The question is whether along 
with that rise, there is not also a change in 
demand for types of services we are accustomed 
to receive from state and local government. 
Reference to the 1967 Census of Government 
shows that when tax expenditures are compared 
per $1000 of personal income, for example, the 
fifteen lowest-income states pay more for wel­
fare and considerably more for education per 
income dollar, than do the top fifteen states.
It would be hard to take issue with any part 
of the discussion on the possible effects of eco­
nomic growth—or too fast a growth—on such 
undesirable conditions as urban congestion. Two 
points might be made in commenting on this 
prospect, however. One is that what constitutes 
congestion is a matter of highly personal judg­
ment, and most people who have experienced 
the truly formidable congestion of the great 
population centers would probably smile at the 
notion that any of Montana’s cities have even 
approached what they would consider real con­
gestion. And as the study points out, it is proper 
planning for anticipated growth that makes pos­
sible the avoidance of conditions that cause the 
worst kinds of urban tangles.
The other point is that there remain all too 
many areas in Montana where the problems of 
too-rapid growth are not even remotely ap­
proached. In the forty-one counties that lost 
population this decade, as well as in many com­
munities in the counties that showed increases, 
the urgent need is to stem the declines that have 
accentuated what the report calls the “social 
costs of space.”
An excellent section of the summary volume’s 
latter half, reprinted in this issue of the Mon­
tana Business Quarterly, deals with the roles of 
primary and derivative employment, reminding 
us that one of the compelling reasons for attract­
ing or developing new primary industries is that 
increases in this kind of employment exert a 
kind of “leverage” on general employment—2.4 
derivative-industry jobs for each primary job, 
according to the study’s projections. The other
reason is that such industries bring “outside” 
wealth into the state’s economy. It is a tempta­
tion, which this study avoids, to say that the 
primary jobs create the secondary ones. But 
since the fastest-growing segment of the entire 
nation’s work force is in the field of service 
occupations, including government service, and 
since most of these occupations are among the 
secondary or derivative ones, then one must con­
clude that primary jobs are increasing in their 
ability to create new derivative jobs. To be sure, 
there is some increase in average individual 
productivity of primary jobs; but the rate of in­
crease has not been high enough to account for 
the rapid rise in service occupations.
A further word of clarification might be 
added to those the authors have already used in 
quoting surveys of location factors that helped 
determine where industries were placed by their 
managements. These are the “secondary” factors 
that come into play after the crucial determin­
ants of markets, transportation, raw materials, 
and labor have been satisfied.
There are at least two problems in getting the 
kinds of information on which the Fortune sur­
vey and the South Carolina study, quoted in the 
Montana Economic Study, are based. One is that 
whether they will admit it or not, the present 
generation of plant managers is frequently at a 
loss to know or remember just what the im­
portant determinants were, back when the de­
cisions were made by their predecessors. The 
second arises out of the nature of the plant 
location process. Businesses tend to locate, of 
course, where the total costs of production and 
distribution are at a minimum. But because the 
means of determining these costs are less than 
perfect often several locations (even dozens of 
them at times) with practically identical total- 
cost characteristics may well present them­
selves.
In that event “secondary” factors, some of 
which may be of a highly personal (even some­
times frivolous) nature may influence a location 
decision, but will rarely make it in the lists of 
factors tabulated by location studies. There is 
the classic case of the bronze-casting plant in 
Nebraska, whose final location was determined 
by the pipe organ’s tone in one of the com­
munity’s churches. It just happened that the 
plant manager was something of an expert on 
the organ, so in this case his preference finally
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became the deciding one, but only at the point 
: when a choice had to be made among communi­
ties that had passed the preliminary screening.
The conclusion for Montana communities, of 
course, is not that they should see about install­
ing costly church pipe organs to insure consider- 
I ation for plant location decisions. The point is 
that the kinds of things a community can do to 
I make itself into a better place to live and raise 
families, are precisely what can become import- 
L ant factors for location decisions, once the pri- 
[ mary factors have been satisfied for potential 
| business and industry that can furnish the badly 
[ needed job opportunities discussed in the Mon- 
[ tana Economic Study.
Now, a word concerning pollution and eco- 
| nomic development. It is the “guess” of the 
I authors of the Montana Economic Study that 
I restrictions on contamination of air and water in 
I Montana will operate to hold back employment 
I and income growth during the next few years, 
| but that the environment will be cleaner than 
I it would have been otherwise. It is impossible 
I to argue with this conclusion, and of course im- 
I possible to prove, ten years hence, that it was 
I either true or false.
But it would be a tragedy if the state of Mon- 
I tana, with misguided zeal for instant reforms to 
I replace the process of undoing and correcting 
I some of the poor housekeeping practices of any 
I one segment of its economy, were to hamper 
I the growth of job-producing economic activities.
I Fortunately, the choice does not have to be made 
I between environmental protection and economic 
I growth on an either/or basis. Steering a course 
| between industrial irresponsibility and tunnel- 
I vision environmentalism is admittedly going to 
I be difficult, but well worth the additional effort.
And finally, although one cannot help but 
I agree with the conclusion of the Montana Eco- 
I nomic Study's authors that “there is reason to be 
I concerned about Montana’s slow economic 
I growth,” one can differ with the premise that 
t the ability of state and local governments to
determine their economic destiny may be 
sharply limited. State and local governments 
are not impotent and need not be merely pas­
sive. Like the study’s authors, we too “believe 
that promoting a faster growth of job oppor­
tunities is a sensible general goal of state pol­
icy.” Because of the state office and programs 
we are charged with carrying out, we would 
perhaps have found even stronger and more 
optimistic words to express our convictions 
about the desirability and efficacy of pursuing 
a faster growth of job and income opportunities.
Indeed, it could be argued that it would be a 
serious default of responsibility by state govern­
ment to lack concern about, and fail to take 
whatever sound actions are in its power to 
reverse or ameliorate a slow and imbalanced 
economic growth. The Department of Planning 
and Economic Development believes that realis­
tic, aggressive policies and programs are a credit 
to any state. But Montana has four factors 
which make such policies especially desirable:
1) both state and local governments are hav­
ing unprecedented difficulties in meeting the 
revenue demands of citizens for more and bet­
ter services;
2) during the last decade 41 out of 56 counties 
lost population;
3) by some estimates as many as 80,000 of 
Montana’s citizens are existing on incomes con­
sidered to be below minimum levels; and
4) 48 percent of its present population is be­
low 25 years of age and therefore at or below 
the threshold of productive employment.
Dealing with problems like these calls not for 
the setting of unique goals, but for struggling as 
skillfully and flexibly as possible with all the 
resources at the command of state and local 
governments. One of the values of the Montana 
Economic Study is that it helps to lay a base for 
programs of the Department of Planning and 
Economic Development and other state agencies 
from which they can confront the kinds of prob­
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The State of the State
Banking in Montana
PATRICIA P. DOUGLAS
Banking history in Montana may be short 
compared to eastern areas, but more than 
twenty years before Montana became a state, 
Mssrs. Allen and Willard opened the first per­
manent bank in Virginia City. Two years later, 
in 1866, Samuel T. Hauser received the first 
national bank charter for his bank located in 
Helena. As new gold discoveries were made, the 
number of banks increased rapidly and by 1885 
there were twenty in the Territory, four of 
which were in Helena.1
In those days banks opened and grew rather 
sporadically. A gold discovery, a fairly good 
reputation, and a place to safeguard bags of gold 
dust were many times the major requirements 
for starting a bank. As one story goes, for ex­
ample, Montana’s first bank was open for sev­
eral months before the doors of the safe arrived. 
In the meantime, the wooden doors were painted 
black and decorated to resemble iron doors. 
Visitors to the bank were not permitted to ap­
proach the safe and apparently no one ques­
tioned the security measure! Once a bank was 
established, its prosperity—and sometimes even 
its survival—depended largely on the fortunes 
of mining in the area.
Commercial banking has changed substan­
tially since the gold rush days. Initially de­
signed to serve miners and mining interests,
For a more detailed discussion of the history o 
banking in Montana, see Jam es H. Dion, “H istory o 
r ' f / n * n ^ 0ntana*” A  History of M ontana by Mer 
i r \ x t  Burlingame and K. Ross Toole, vol. 1, Chapte: 
iocJa 'ew ^ 0I*k: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc. 
1957), p p . 399-409.
commercial banks have gradually changed their 
emphasis as Montana’s economic base has 
shifted, first toward agriculture, and more re­
cently toward manufacturing and trade. Then, 
too, like most other types of business, banking 
has become more complex. Today, it takes much 
more than a good reputation to start a bank. 
Minimum capital requirements are necessary 
and a host of other prerequisites—ranging from 
management capabilities to a survey of competi­
tion—must be met before a bank is given a char­
ter. Day-to-day operations have also become 
more complex. Granting credit involves far 
more today than a handshake and an exchange 
of money. The banker must complete an endless 
number of forms and thoroughly check the 
credit standing of the customer before he makes 
a loan.
Banking has changed in yet another way: al­
though banks still have the important function 
of safeguarding the public’s deposits, they offer 
many more services now than in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s. Most important, banks provide 
credit to businesses, individuals, and govern­
mental units; the money they lend comes, in 
large part, from savings and checking deposits— 
another important banking service. That is, 
they “borrow” from depositors for the purpose 
of making loans. Then, too, each day banks clear 
an untold number of customer checks. Many 
banks in Montana also provide trust services 
and frequently banks are named as administra­
tors for estates. Banks even provide services for 
those persons involved in international business 
by, for example, buying and selling securities on
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behalf of their customers. And many Montanans 
have used the safety deposit facilities of a bank. 
With the advent of computers, some banks offer 
accounting services such as determining the 
appropriate inventory level for a local business.
The quality, as well as the quantity, of ser­
vices is an important indication of change within 
the banking community. To say that the num­
ber of services offered by banks has tripled 
since 1900 tells us very little unless we also 
know what has happened to the quality and 
appropriateness of banking services: is the cus­
tomer getting the services he needs or desires? 
has the quality of those services improved? de­
teriorated? remained static? As Mr. Galusha’s 
article points out, the question of quality has 
been largely ignored, in part because the pub­
lic’s need for banking services varies over time 
and from one community to the next. It is, 
therefore, very difficult to develop standards for 
measuring quality. For this reason, most re­
searchers (including this one) fall back on gen­
eral measures of banking performance, such as 
growth, profitability, and competitive position.
Despite their widespread use, these general 
measures of performance are less than perfect 
indicators of the quality of banking services, 
not only because the public’s needs vary but 
also because banking, as a regulated industry, 
cannot respond to consumers in the same way 
as nonregulated businesses. Consider, for ex­
ample, the XYZ shoe repair shop. If the repair­
man fails to offer the quality and type of service 
demanded by the public, the customers will take 
their repair work to a competitor (or a new shop 
will open to serve the public). As a result, the 
XYZ repair shop will stop growing and profits 
will decline; eventually, if the service is not 
improved or new services added, the XYZ shop 
will go out of business. Thus, profitability and 
growth are reasonably good measures of the 
quality of service offered by a shoe repair shop.
This is not necessarily the case in banking. 
The number of banks in a community is limited, 
and new ones are not easily established. As 
noted earlier, prospective bankers must meet 
certain capital requirements, as well as assure 
regulatory agencies that the new bank will not 
threaten the livelihood of an already estab­
lished bank, before it is granted a charter. And 
in some states, like Montana, existing banks can­
not establish branches in other parts of the com­
munity or in other communities. Then, too, 1 
banks must adhere to regulations limiting the |  
type and amount of loans they make and 1 
securities they purchase. In addition, they are J 
prohibited from paying interest on demand de- I 
posits, and regulatory agencies set maximum I 
rates payable on time and savings deposits. 2 
Taken together, these regulations tend to limit | 
both the number of new banks and the number | 
of bank failures, and perhaps even competition j 
among banks. Growth and profitability, then, | 
may not reflect the quality or appropriateness j 
of a bank’s services. Nonetheless, general meas- j 
ures of performance—growth, profitability, and I 
competitive position—at least allow one to gen- 1 
eralize about the evolution of banking, and they I 
will be used here to examine the development of 
banking in Montana since 1946.
Post World War II Growth 
of Montana’s Banks
Over the 23 years 1946-1969, the growth of 
Montana’s banks lagged behind that of all banks 
in the United States and the five Rocky Moun­
tain states.2 As table 1 indicates, total bank 
assets in Montana increased by 4.9 percent an­
nually, while total assets of all banks in the 
United States and the five Rocky Mountain 
states increased over 5.5 percent per year.
The slower growth of bank assets in Montana 
resulted, in large part, from a slower growth of 
deposits. Between 1946 and 1969, total deposits 
at Montana’s banks grew at an average annual 
rate of 4.6 percent, compared to 5.2 percent per 
year for both the nation’s banks and for banks 
in the Rocky Mountain states (table 1).
If we look at subperiods within the postwar j 
era, we find that from 1946 to about 1950, total j 
assets and deposits increased more rapidly at j 
Montana’s than at the nation’s banks. Then, j 
during the 1950s, banks in Montana were able 1 
to expand assets nearly as rapidly as did banks 
nationwide, and they made loans at a faster 
rate than did all banks in the United States. 
Even though total deposits grew more slowly 
in Montana than nationally during the 1950s, ] *
*The five Rocky Mountain states considered here are 
Montana, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.
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TABLE 1
SELECTED BALANCE SHEET ITEMS 
Insured Commercial Banks 
Montana, United States, and Rocky Mountain States 
1946-1969
M o n ta n a  U n ite d  8 t » t «  m J S E E bS , . .  p S c S e
($ th o u s a n d s )  ($ m ill io n s )  ($  th o u s a n d s )  1946-1969
______ ____________________ 1946__________1969_____________ 1946________ 1969_____________ 1946 1969 ~Mt.------- iTsT------ R jjL
| Total assets 553,805 1,660,839 147,365 524,536 2,963,210 10,298,002 4 9  57  56~
f Total loans 60,597 850,635 30,740 290,469 493,532 5,717,686 12.2 10 3 11 2
Total deposits 531,024 1,485,554 137,029 436,990 2,823,178 9,045,845 4 6 5 2 5 2
Total capital________ 21,931 115,560 9,288 39,576 133,147 753,247 7.5 6.5 7.8
Sources: [All data except percentages] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets, Liabilities, and Capital Ac- 
counts: Commercial and M utual Savings Banks , December 1946 and 1969 (W ashington, D.C.).
. M ontana, Colorado, Idaho, U tah, and Wyoming.
bank capital increased at a rate of 8.8 percent, 
. for above the 6.2 percent nationwide.3
The real failure to keep up occurred in the 
1960s. Between 1960 and 1969 total bank as- 
[ sets in Montana increased by only 7.0 percent 
t per year, while United States banks as a whole 
; recorded an average annual increase of 8.3 per- 
cent.4
As noted earlier, the comparatively slow 
growth of Montana banks reflected a lagging 
rate of increase in deposits. The findings of 
the Montana Economic Study suggest that the 
relatively slow growth of bank deposits might 
trace to the sluggishness of the state’s economy. 
However, a comparison between the percentage 
change in deposits and personal income in Mon­
tana, the five Rocky Mountain states, and the 
United States implies otherwise. As table 2 
shows, the percentage change in both deposits 
and personal income was larger for the five 
: Rocky Mountain states and the United States 
I than for Montana during the 23 years. How- 
| ever, the ratio of the change in bank deposits 
j to the change in personal income has been 
I higher for Montana than for the surrounding 
states and the nation as a whole. Thus, Mon­
tana banks outpaced banks elsewhere, at least 
in relation to this measure of economic growth.
The size composition of Montana banks pro- 
I vides a better explanation for the relatively 
I slow growth of banks in the state. A compari- *
*Derived from  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Assets, Liabilities, and Capital Accounts: Commercial 
and Mutual Savings Banks, December 31, 1950 and 
I960 (Washington, D.C.).
'Idem., I960 and 1969.
son of growth rates by size revealed that na­
tionally and locally the larger the bank, the 
greater was the rate of growth of deposits and 
total assets. Further, Montana banks with 
deposits of $25-100 million grew more rapidly 
during the 1960s than banks of the same size na­
tionally, whereas banks with deposits of less 
than $25 million grew more slowly than their 
national counterparts.
Compared to the United States, Montana has 
a disproportionate representation of small 
banks—both in numbers and percentage of 
total bank assets. Accordingly these banks had 
a greater influence on average growth rates in 
Montana than was true nationally.
The Profit Record of Montana’s Banks:
1946-1969
The profitability of commercial banks in­
creased rapidly following World War II. In 
Montana, the five Rocky Mountain states, and 
the nation alike, net operating income as a per­
centage of total assets about doubled between 
1946 and 1956 (figure 1). During this period 
commercial banks financed loan growth by 
shifting funds from cash and low-yielding gov­
ernment securities to loans. As a result, operat­
ing income increased significantly while total 
assets grew slowly.
As banks began competing more aggressively 
for new deposits in the mid-1950s, both total 
assets and expenses rose rapidly, while the in­
terest rates on loans and securities rose more 
slowly than they had during the immediate 
postwar period. As figure 1 indicates, net oper-
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TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP OF CHANGES IN PERSONAL INCOME AND BANK DEPOSITS 
Montana, United States, and Rocky M ountain States 
1946-1969
M ontana U nited S tates1
Five Rocky 
M ountain S tates2
1946 1969 1946 1969 1946 1969
Total personal income
($ millions) ________________.. 657 2,172 175,701 740,161 3,718 16,066
Total bank deposits
($ millions)8 __ _____________ _ 531 1,486 137,029 436,990 2,823 9,046
Percent change from 1946-1969 
Personal incom e_______ _ ____ 230.6 321.3 332.1
Total deposits .............. 179.8 218.9 220.4
Ratio of percent change in 
total deposits to percent 
change in personal income 
(in percentages) ~ 78.0 68.1 66.4
Sources: [Bank deposits] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets, Liabilities, 
and Capital Accounts: Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, December 1945 and 
1969 (Washington, D.C.).
[Personal income] U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, 
Personal Income by States, Since 1929, Supplement to Survey of Current Business 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956); and idem.. Survey of 
Current Business, vol. 50, no. 8 (August 1970).
U nited  States personal income data exclude Alaska and Hawaii. Bank deposits are 
for the United States and possessions. «
“Montana, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.
'Total bank deposits of insured commercial banks are year-end figures.
ating income in relation to total assets moved 
sporadically over the 1957-1960 period.
Competition for deposits heightened in the 
1960s: bankers relied almost entirely on new 
deposits as a source of loanable funds; in at­
tempts to attract funds away from other types 
of financial institutions and the securities mar­
kets, they raised interest rates paid to deposi­
tors and promoted new types of deposits. This 
stimulation of deposits was costly for banks; 
nationally, between 1960 and 1965 interest pay­
ments as a percentage of total deposits rose 
from 2.6 percent to 3.7 percent, and by 1965 the 
net rate of return on assets had declined to 1.21 
percent.5 For Montana banks, the increased 
cost of funds was reflected in a decline of the 
net rate of return on assets—from 1.44 percent 
in 1960 to 1.30 percent in 1965.
The gradual upswing after 1965 (shown in 
figure 1) reflects the fact that market rates con­
tinued to rise, while regulatory agencies held 
down the maximum rates banks could pay on
“Derived from  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Annual Report, 1960 and 1965 (Washington, D.C.); 
figure 1.
time and savings deposits. Montana banks did 
not, however, share the national or regional in­
creases during the late 1960s. Between 1965 and 
1969, the return on assets in Montana tended to 
decline, whereas nationally it rose from 1.21 
percent in 1965 to 1.44 percent in 1969, and in 
the Rocky Mountain states from 1.28 percent to 
1.54 percent during the same period.
There are two main explanations for the dif­
fering trends in Montana and the United States 
during the late 1960s. First, deposit interest 
payments rose more rapidly at Montana’s 
banks, and second, interest on loans and secur­
ities rose more slowly at all but the smallest 
banks in the state.
Competition for Time 
and Savings Deposits
As the previous section indicated, the expan­
sion of commercial bank credit since the mid- 
1950s has been financed primarily by the 
growth of time and savings deposits. Commer­
cial banks compete for deposit funds not only
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FIGURE 1
NET OPERATING INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Insured Commercial Banks 
Montana, United States, and Rocky Mountain States 
1946-1969
Sources: Derived from  Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Annual Report, 1946-1969 (W ashington, 
D.C.; idem., Assets, Liabilities and Capital Accounts: 
Commercial and M utual Savings Banks, December 
1968 and June and December 1969 (W ashington, D.C.).
with one another, but with thrift institutions 
and the market for directly placed securities as 
well. Two deposit-type thrift institutions—sav­
ings and loan associations and credit unions— 
compete directly with Montana’s commercial 
banks for savings deposits. (Unlike many other 
states, Montana has no mutual savings banks.) 
In 1969, 135 commercial banks, 17 savings and 
loan associations, and 140 credit unions con­
ducted business in Montana, and together they 
accounted for over $1 billion in time and sav­
ings deposits.6
Throughout the 1946-1956 period, the share of 
total time and savings deposits held by com­
mercial banks in Montana and the United 
States declined, while the proportion held by 
savings and loan associations and credit unions 
increased. At the end of 1945, over 84 percent
Savings accounts a t savings and loan associations are 
technically savings shares or capital, b u t for sim­
plicity, this article calls them  savings deposits. Mr. 
Polner’s article in this issue of the Quarterly discusses 
in more detail the role of credit unions in Montana.
of Montana’s total time and savings deposits 
was held by commercial banks.7 By 1956 that 
share had declined to about 59 percent.8
This decline occurred because banks were 
not competing aggressively for deposit funds. 
As noted earlier, banks were financing loan 
growth by utilizing funds from cash and gov­
ernment securities, and therefore felt no press­
ing need to expand deposits before the mid- 
1950s.
The decline in the commercial banks’ share 
of total time and savings deposits was reversed 
in about 1957 when they began seriously vying 
for deposit funds. From then on banks in­
creased their share slowly but steadily. By 1969 
banks accounted for 70 percent of Montana’s 
total time and savings deposits. This gain came 
at the expense of savings and loan associations, 
whose share declined from 38 percent in 1956 to 
about 27 percent in 1969.9
Whether we look at the period in which com­
mercial banks’ share of total time and savings 
deposits was decreasing or that in which it 
was increasing, we find that Montana’s banks 
have always accounted for a larger share of 
total time and savings deposits than have com­
mercial banks across the nation. For example, 
the share of total time and savings deposits held 
by commercial banks has never fallen below 60 
percent in Montana. In contrast, the proportion 
held by all banks in the United States reached 
a low of 42 percent during the 1950s.10 From 
another perspective, per capita commercial 
bank time and savings deposits in Montana 
reached a high of about $1,133 in 1969, over 
16 percent above the national average for that 
year.11
’Derived from  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Assets, Liabilities, and Capital Accounts: Commer­
cial and M utual Savings Banks, December 1945 
(W ashington, D.C.); Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
Combined Financial Statements, 1945 (Washington, 
D.C.); and W alter Polner, CUNA International, Inc., 
“In ternal W ork Sheet,” December 1939-1969, unpub­




“Derived from  [savings data] Federal Deposit Insur­
ance Corporation, Assets, Liabilities, and Capital Ac­
counts: Commercial and M utual Savings Banks, De­
cember 1969; idem., Annual Report, 1969; [population] 
U.S. D epartm ent of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
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The dominant role of Montana’s banks in 
the time and savings deposit market arises, in 
part, because there are no mutual savings banks 
in the state. In addition, it may reflect the 
greater convenience of commercial banks com­
pared to savings and loan associations in 
Montana. There are only 17 savings and loan 
associations in the state while most Montana 
communities with over 1,500 people have a 
bank.
In summary, total assets and deposits of Mon­
tana’s commercial banks grew less rapidly than 
those of banks in the United States and the 
five Rocky Mountain states during the post 
World War II period. On the other hand, total 
deposits of Montana’s commercial banks in­
creased more rapidly in relation to the state’s 
personal income than did deposits of banks 
located in the five Rocky Mountain states and 
the United States.
In addition, during the late 1960s the profit­
ability of Montana’s banks failed to keep pace 
with the national and Rocky Mountain aver­
ages. In relation to other financial institutions, 
however, Montana’s banks have fared well com­
pared to banks in the United States as a whole. 
They have always accounted for a larger por­
tion of total time and savings deposits in Mon­
tana than across the nation, and on a per capita 
basis, commercial bank time and savings de­
posits were more than five times what they 
had been in 1956.
Implications for Customer Service
Growth, profitability, and competitive posi­
tion are, at best, an indirect reflection of over­
all performance. But more specifically, what 
do these measures tell us about service to 
the bank customer? Unfortunately, very little. 
And that which can be said must be qualified. 
For example, one might argue that the domi­
nant role of Montana banks vis-a-vis all United 
States banks in the savings market reflects 
better service to the customer interested in 
savings. Such an argument ignores the fact 
that fewer types of financial institutions com­
pete for the savings dollar in Montana than
Current Population Reports: Population Estimates and 
Population Estimates and Projections, Series P-25, no. 
442 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office).
across the nation. (No data are available for 
other types of savings instruments such as 
government securities and stocks and bonds.) 
Time and savings deposits at Montana banks 
may not represent as large a proportion of total 
savings as implied by their proportion in rela­
tion to savings and loan associations and credit 
unions in the state.
Average rates paid on time and savings de­
posits have consistently been lower at Mon­
tana’s commercial banks than at the nation’s 
banks, suggesting that banks in Montana pro­
vide poorer, not better, service to depositors 
than banks nationwide or local savings and 
loan associations. However, average rates paid 
on time and savings deposits do not take into 
consideration the composition of deposits. Max­
imum rates payable on time and savings de­
posits are lower for the small passbook accounts 
than for the large certificates of deposit. The 
lower average rate at Montana’s banks probably 
traces to a larger proportion of the small de­
posits rather than to a lower average rate 
schedule.
Until recently average rates paid by Mon­
tana’s banks were also lower than at savings 
and loan associations in the state. But in mak­
ing this comparison, it must be remembered 
that savings and loan associations were not sub­
ject to regulations governing rates payable on 
time and savings deposits until 1966. Perhaps, 
then, most of the difference in average rates 
reflected regulatory peculiarities rather than 
customer service. As it was, the difference in 
average rates paid on time and savings deposits 
at the two types of institutions has narrowed 
markedly since 1966; in fact, by 1969 the yearly 
average rate for the two types of institutions 
was identical in Montana.
Two additional measures of service are often 
cited in the banking literature: total loans as 
a percentage of total deposits; and service 
charges per dollar of total deposits. Montana 
banks have consistently loaned less in relation 
to total deposits than have all United States 
banks, indicating that Montana banks may be 
rendering comparatively poor service to bor­
rowers. In general, however, the smaller the 
bank, the lower are total loans in relation to 
total deposits; and the lower loan-to-deposit 
ratio for all banks in Montana reflects, in large 
part, the predominance of small banks in the
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state. Real deficiencies in customer loan service 
may exist at Montana banks, but the commonly 
used measure of loans per dollar of deposits 
does not give a very definitive indication one 
way or another. Thus, there is really no 
answer to the frequently raised question as to 
whether Montana banks are able and willing 
to provide for the capital needs of Montana 
businesses.
Figure 2 shows service charges on deposits 
as a percentage of demand deposits for Montana 
and United States banks. As the chart indicates, 
Montanans have consistently paid higher serv­
ice charges on demand deposits than have bank 
customers generally. (Using total service 
charges as a percentage of total deposits [or de­
mand deposits] still results in a substantially 
higher average rate in Montana than in the na­
tion as a whole.) Again, this difference may 
reflect either more or better services, though a 
cursory examination suggests that the average 
bank in Montana does not offer any more serv­
ices than banks elsewhere.
Some people are understandably dissatisfied 
with the failure of any of these measures to 
provide a really definitive answer to the ques­
tion of the quality of bank services; they would 
argue that overall performance and customer 
service can be better judged in terms of banking 
structure. (Although the Federal Reserve re­
ports three branch offices in the state, Montana 
can be classified as a unit banking state for most 
purposes.) But there is little agreement as to 
which structure—unit or branch banking— 
would best serve the needs of Montanans. Two 
opposing views are discussed in the following 
articles in this issue of the Montana Business 
Quarterly.
Each author examines the impact of a par­
ticular banking structure on: 1) competition, 
2) the allocation of credit, and 3) costs of bank
FIGURE 2
SERVICE CHARGES ON DEPOSITS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEMAND DEPOSITS 
Montana and United States 
1956-1969
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, A n ­
nual Report, 1956-1969 (W ashington, D.C.); idem., 
Assets, Liabilities and Capital Accounts: Commercial 
and M utual Savings Banks, 1956-1969 (Washington, 
D.C.).
services. As was true of the measures cited 
earlier, it is all too easy to ignore the ques­
tion of service to the customer when apprais­
ing the issue of branch versus unit banking. 
In banking many authors (including this one) 
tend to be more interested in assessing the ef­
fects on banks than on their customers. But 
the question of how well Montana banks are 
serving their customers deserves much more at­
tention than it has thus far received by bankers, 
regulators, and researchers alike.
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The Banker’s Role in Revitalizing 
the Rural Community
There are two assumptions implied in the title 
of this talk I would like to dispose of at the out­
set. The first is the assumption that all rural 
communities are dying. There is no gainsaying 
many are. The Ninth Federal Reserve District 
is littered with the shells of abandoned or 
moribund towns, some of which may have had 
life spans of only a few years in the 1870s or 
1880s. The harsh fact is that historically the 
marketplace and the technical structure of 
natural resource industries (such as agriculture, 
mining, logging) have always influenced, to a 
major degree, where people settle and for how 
long. Add to that the vagaries of national policy 
that can shift resources in a bewildering fashion 
among geographic and economic areas, and we 
cannot be surprised that there are rural com­
munities that have withered.
But there are many rural communities that 
are alive and well, thank you, and advancing 
into the favored class of regional growth cen­
ters. This we often forget. There is a growing 
tendency to wring our hands about the rural- 
urban balance that ignores the dynamics of 
growth in this country, and the historic patterns 
of social change so characteristic and so much a 
part of our success.
An address by the President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis at the Member 
Bank Service Conference at Fargo, North 
Dakota on September 2, 1970
In part, this tendency to fret over rural decay 
has been fueled by the plight of the cities; and 
certainly the nostalgia so many of us feel for the 
values, real and imagined, of rural America has 
been enormously stimulated by the new aware­
ness of the dangers of exceeding the critical 
mass in urban concentrations. It has great ap­
peal to everyone from the commune dweller to 
the most conservative Southern politician. Plans 
to reallocate human and financial resources to 
special sectors of the United States economy by 
act of law are not new; many have been passed. 
But the scope of some of those presently under 
discussion is of a different, larger dimension. 
Most recommend the creation of new types of 
credit institutions; all have profound implica­
tions for rural banks.
The second implicit assumption in the title to 
which I object is that all rural bankers have to 
start doing something they haven’t been doing 
in the past, if the rural community alleged to 
have been collapsing around their ears is to be 
shored up. Bankers, like any other minority 
group, suffer from the outsider’s desire to fasten 
identity at the lowest common denominator. 
The same caveat made against generalization 
about rural communities applies here. The
Editor’s note: Hugh D. Galusha, Jr., President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, prominent Montana 
businessman, and University of Montana Foundation trustee died on February 1 during a snowmobile trip  on Bear- 
tooth Pass. Readers w ill recognize Mr. Galusha as a frequent and always welcome contributor to the Montana 
Business Quarterly. We publish this last article w ith a deep sense of loss.
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exhortation to bankers to sally forth and “save 
the community” is largely wasted, I’m afraid, 
for two opposite reasons: (1) for many rural 
bankers, the message is unnecessary because 
neither they nor their communities are in need 
of help; and (2) neither history nor common 
sense affords any assurance the exhortation to 
the rest will be either heard or helpful. And 
this, if true, is most serious for all bankers, no 
matter which class they are in.
And yet, the exhortation does have special 
significance for banking in general and rural 
banks in particular—as distinguished from 
paper box manufacturers, let us say. United 
States banks in their present legal form, the 
principal characteristics of which are restricted 
entry and private ownership, exist by public 
sufferance, because historically this form has 
suited the public interest. The key phrase is 
public interest and not private ownership. One 
may find this hard to believe, but history is 
against the disbelievers. The monetary power is 
a plenary or absolute power of Congress. In a 
succession of cases testing the validity of the 
right of Congress to regulate and on occasion 
transform American banking, the Supreme 
Court has reaffirmed over and over this sov­
ereign right of Congress; which makes this 
right, then, subject to challenge only at the 
polls. But let me develop my case further, for it 
seems to me the relationship of banking and the 
public interest is central to this topic.
The opportunity to operate a bank is a priv­
ilege and not a right. I start with the premise 
that competition and internal failure prune 
American business generally. But—and this is 
an exception to be seriously tested both for its 
validity and its implications—rural banks are at 
least partially exempt from this discipline. 
Three factors support this exception: (1) limited 
entry; (2) capital requirements; and (3) super­
vision.
Designed expressly for the limited but im­
portant objective of continued bank solvency, 
supervision is usually successful in maintaining 
minimum standards of capital and liquidity. 
Supervision, plus emergency credit devices like 
the discount window, help give banks high 
survival quotients. Let’s take a quick look at 
survival rates of American business enterprises 
generally, and banks in particular, and test this 
hypothesis. The lowest annual rate of failure
for nonbank firms between 1950 and 1968 was 
29 per 10,000. In only four of the years did the 
rate drop below 40 per 10,000; during more than 
half the years the rate ran above 50 per 10,000. 
But during those entire nineteen years, there 
were only 94 bank failures in total out of nearly 
14,000 banks. Now, I know many bankers whose 
management skills are as good as the best in 
industry generally, but I do not think one can 
argue from these statistics that the difference in 
survival is due to a quality of management skill 
uniformly distributed throughout the banking 
industry. Otherwise, the profit figures might be 
different. In only three of these years did banks 
show a higher return on equity than manu­
facturing; in twelve of the years banks were 
at least a full two percentage points behind.
There is competition, surely, especially as the 
size of the community increases. But 50 percent 
of United States banks are in one-bank towns; 
77 percent are in one- and two-bank towns; and 
86 percent are in less than four-bank towns. 
Volatility of deposits, especially time deposits, 
are directly related to the size of the community 
and especially the number of banks. Certainly 
customers can and do drive elsewhere for bank­
ing services, but convenience and inertia are 
important considerations that tend to afford a 
measure of insulation for the rural bank espe­
cially.
Finally, because of the capital requirements 
imposed by chartering and supervisory agen­
cies, new banks must start with financial struc­
tures adequate for their needs. And almost no 
bank escapes the continuing pressure from these 
same agencies to add to the capital structure as 
its business grows. The requirements may ap­
pear oppressive to the banker, but at least they 
assure the banker a much greater chance of 
avoiding the capital anemia that causes most 
business failures.
Banking exists as a regulated monopoly in­
dustry for public interest reasons that were 
historically compelling. It was and is the heart 
of the United States economy, and bank credit 
is the lifeblood of our system. Its orderly func­
tioning has been a paramount concern. Unfor­
tunately, in setting up patterns of regulation, 
our primary concern has been the safety of the 
depositor’s money. The quality of a bank’s serv­
ices has been largely ignored. Except for the 
Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company
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Act, the regulations are almost entirely con­
cerned with what a bank can’t do; there is vir­
tually no statutory measurement of what a bank 
should do. Small wonder there are banks that 
are less than fully effective in their commun­
ities.
What are some of the implications of this 
relatively favored position of the rural bank? 
Beset with periodic examinations plus proscrip­
tive regulations like rate ceilings (which a dis­
concerting number of rural banks privately 
welcome), it probably comes as a surprise that 
someone views rural bankers as having greater 
freedom of choice than most in the manner they 
conduct their business. Reflect for a moment— 
what happens to a bank that complies with the 
letter of the law and no more? Obviously, it 
may make less money or show less growth than 
it might have, but it doesn’t go broke, nor can 
a group of unhappy customers or more aggres­
sive bankers from another town move into the 
service vacuum—at least not very easily.
So, assuming that public interest justifies re­
stricted entry, does the public have a continuing 
right to test the quality and quantity of service, 
apart from the bare bones of solvency? I think 
it does, and the periodic explosions of public 
inquiry in legislatures and Congress, some of 
which have culminated in new kinds of credit 
institutions, are practical proof.
And this, I would urge, is the reason banking 
generally, and rural banks particularly, have a 
special interest in the question. And most im­
portantly of all, why competent bankers, wher­
ever located, have to be especially concerned 
about changing the patterns of operation of 
their less competent peers. Banks have a con­
tinuing requirement to justify their existence 
in their present form; a requirement that can­
not be satisfied easily or for long—and I submit 
that the current inquiries into structure, laun­
dry lists, and uniform availability of credit, to 
mention just three points, will be the most 
searching and serious challenges our banking 
system has ever faced. No matter how differ­
ently the First National City Bank of New York 
and the First National Bank of Squaw Gap may 
view themselves, a bank is a bank is a bank to 
the silent majority.
Having made my case, I hope, for the question 
posed by my title, what suggestions have I to 
offer?
“Revitalizing the rural community,” like 
“service to the community,” is one of those 
phrases that is as exasperating to pick up as a 
drop of mercury. Touch it, and the shining 
unity of the phrase disappears. In my frustra­
tion, I turned to our senior officers and posed 
the question in this way: suppose, for instance, 
banks were required to periodically renew their 
licenses to operate, much as radio or TV stations 
are required to, with a showing of public con­
venience, interest, or necessity? Specifically, 
how would they be measured?
I followed this question to them with a hasty 
disavowal of any advocacy for such a system. 
Not because I disagree with the theory; I be­
lieve that if the public is going to award a re­
stricted operating privilege, it has a right to 
check up periodically to make sure that the 
public interest, which justified the arrangement 
in the first place, is still being well served. But 
my mind boggles at the practical problem in the 
judging. Regulation is inherently defensive and 
not creative; there may be some spectacular ex­
ceptions in our political history, but they don’t 
come to my mind. Qualitative standards have 
to be individually interpreted. If they’re not 
individually interpreted, they are no longer 
qualitative; if they are, reconciling the results 
across a country as big and complex as ours, is 
impossible.
After I comforted them with the assurance I 
wasn’t really urging such a system, they set to 
work. One of the approaches was to develop a 
profile of nine rural banks considered well 
managed. From this and other analyses sup­
plied me, only the broadest of guidelines 
emerged; certainly there were no common 
quantitative measurements. An aggressive role 
in developing new businesses; judicious alloca­
tion of credit; due attention to management 
training and succession; deliberate efforts to 
open the bank internally and externally to the 
community and to stay abreast of industry 
developments—the list could go on, but it would 
contain few surprises. The striking thing about 
all these practices was that, directly or indir­
ectly, all were in the banker’s self-interest, how­
ever construed. The only way a rural bank can 
increase its profitability is by broadening its 
base of service. Whether qualitatively by add­
ing new services, or quantitatively by the eco­
nomic growth of its customers, the base has to
Montana Business Quarterly
Banking in the Rural West 49
be increased. If the bank stands pat, as it can 
in a semi-monopoly position, its profitability 
will be affected only by the chance directions of 
monetary policy that may make interest dif­
ferentials more attractive between municipals, 
participative pools, fed funds, and its few 
favored borrowers on the one hand, and the 
costs of its funds on the other. And it can stand 
pat only as long as the public interest leaves it 
alone.
Loan ratios, new sources of funds, new serv­
ices, asset mix, participation in community 
affairs, even the rate of charitable giving—what­
ever the indices used, the desire to find easy 
ways to measure bank performance must in­
evitably fall flat on its face because there is no 
way to equate the requirements of different 
communities in other than the broadest terms. 
If there is a common denominator, it is the will­
ingness of the banker to plan—to anticipate 
needs—to manage by objective—to develop a 
planning, programming, budgeting, and manag­
ing system—whatever the phrase used, it stems 
from a desire to survive. And to survive means 
change must be anticipated.
At this point it is easy to despair. The image 
of rural banking unfortunately is one of “agin 
it. Individual bank structure, management 
training, succession of ownership, the explora­
tion of new sources of funds, or new banking 
services—these are difficult subjects to talk 
about with many rural bankers. Yet these are 
subjects that won’t go away. They won’t go 
away because the public is beginning to sense 
their interest is involved.
But where is the rural banker to turn for 
advice or help? It is all very well to talk about 
planning, but if the staff of the First National 
Bank of XYZ consists of the president who is 
also the chief stockholder, loaning officer, build­
ing officer, planning officer, and public rela­
tions man, and two tellers who share most of the 
rest of the chores, what can he do? A great deal, 
as far as sensing the demands of his community, 
and planning for management and ownership 
succession; but virtually nothing on his own in 
the appraisal of the changing banking environ­
ment and the training of successors. Geography 
is his chief obstacle. But it is surmountable; the 
two best links in the past have been the bank 
associations and his correspondent banks. The 
efforts of associations like the Minnesota Bank­
ers Association to establish training programs 
for rural bankers, and to carry banking issues to 
their membership through special group meet­
ings, are remarkable. Similarly, there are those 
correspondent banks in the Twin Cities who 
have gone beyond the football tickets and free 
dinners that historically have been the principal 
adhesives in cementing the correspondent re­
lationship; they have conducted service-oriented 
conferences designed to make the country bank 
more profitable.
To this list should be added the Federal Re­
serve Banks. We have a responsibility, not al­
ways acknowledged in the past, to help foster a 
healthy, aggressive banking system. Commer­
cial banks happen to be the principal delivery 
mechanisms for monetary policy and the trans­
fer of funds, so it seems patent, to us at any rate, 
that the proper discharge of our public purposes 
requires that we concern ourselves with the 
progress of commercial banks. And even if this 
means our public objectives happen to coincide 
in many instances with the legitimate self-in­
terest of bankers, that still seems a poor reason 
for us to hesitate.
If these outside sources are unavailable for 
whatever reason, the rural banker is in an ex­
ceedingly difficult quandary. If he attempts to 
find all the answers himself, his bank—and his 
community—-will suffer for inattention. But 
given the acceleration of the evolution of bank­
ing, if he doesn’t stay abreast of the political 
and technical changes in banking, it is a sober­
ing fact that he, his bank, and his community 
will lose out.
In summary, these points, it seems to me, are 
clear:
(1) In any showdown between the public 
interest in banking and narrowly construed 
stockholder/management objectives, the public 
interest will win.
(2) There is no easy universal formula in our 
political system for regulatory judgment of the 
success of banks in serving the public interest. 
This will in a way deter the public through 
legislators and Congressmen from making their 
own assessments.
(3) Growth and sustainable profitability of 
rural banks are nearly always a mirror image of 
the growth and prosperity of their communi­
ties.
(4) Banks must individually plan their own
Spring 1971
50 Hugh D. Galusha, Jr.
responses to market needs and continuity; col­
lectively all banks must reinforce each other 
and set about the orderly evolution of the in­
dustry. It is on this last point that the hope of
the rural banker rests—the hope that the leaders 
of the banking industry recognize that they have 
the most to lose by the failure of their weaker 




Their Role in the West
A n examination of a significant force in the 
banking structure of our Western states
On the final day of 1970 legislation was en­
acted amending the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 1956 to include one-bank holding companies. 
The new amendments, climaxing some two 
years of Congressional study and debate have 
great significance for the development of the 
structure of banking and financial markets in 
the United States. The newly amended law, 
which requires federal registration of all bank 
holding companies having effective control of 
one or more banks, reaffirms the highly regu­
lated nature of the commercial banking industry 
and legislative intent to keep commercial bank­
ing separate from other lines of business activ­
ity.
Bank holding companies constitute a signifi­
cant force within the commercial banking 
structure of the Western states.1 This article 
examines the present-day operation of bank 
holding companies in the West. It sets forth 
definitional and legal aspects of holding com­
panies, and traces their comparative importance 
within the several Western states and the 
United States.
Types of Bank Holding Companies
Stated simply, bank holding companies are 
corporations that own or control, directly or in-
T or the purposes of analysis, the W estern states in ­
clude the following eleven states: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ore­
gon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
directly, one or more commercial banks. The 
intrinsic nature of the holding company relation­
ship derives from the use of the corporate device 
to obtain control of banks whether by the direct 
purchase of stock or by the exchange of holding 
company stock for the stock of individual banks.
Two types of bank holding companies can be 
distinguished: multi-bank and one-bank com­
panies.2 The Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 (as amended in 1966) required registration 
with the Board of Governors of the Federal Re­
serve System of any corporation, business trust, 
association, or similar organization that owns, 
controls, or holds power to vote 25 percent or 
more of the rating stock of each of two or more 
banks.
Chain banking, another form of multi-bank 
control that differs from the holding company, 
arises when an individual or partnership con­
trols two or more banks. The 1970 amending 
legislation eliminates the exemption in the 1956 
act that allowed the effective control of chains 
of banks through partnership arrangements.
One-bank holding companies can be nonbank 
originated or bank originated. The nonbank 
type emerges when a company whose major 
line of activity is not closely related to banking 
gains substantial control in a single bank. A *
*Much of the inform ation for this section is taken from 
“The Changing S tructure of Bank Holding Com­
panies,” Economic Review  (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland), A pril 1969, pp. 3f.
Dr. Robert H. M arshall is Professor of Economics and Director, International Business Studies Project, College of 
Business and Public Adm inistration, the U niversity of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.
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bank originated company, sometimes called a 
financial “congeneric,” occurs when an operat­
ing bank forms a holding company in which the 
bank ultimately becomes a subsidiary.3 In this 
case, the bank is the main part of the holding 
company organization and the other parts of the 
holding company engage in financial or bank- 
related activities. Although prior to 1971 the 
one-bank holding company was not required to 
register under the provisions of the Bank Hold­
ing Company Act of 1956, the banking subsidiary 
was subject to the regulations of the various 
bank supervisory agencies.
A strong force underlying the recent flurry of 
one-bank holding company formations is the 
attempt by banks to better serve the changing 
financial needs of customers and to compete 
more effectively with nonbank financial insti­
tutions that can provide a wide range of finan­
cial services other than checking facilities. 
Federal and state law narrowly circumscribes 
the product lines that commercial banks alone 
can offer. Appraising the heightened bank hold­
ing company activity, a financial editorial sug­
gests, “. . . banks nonetheless had to do pretty 
much what they did. For years they’ve been 
struggling with confusing and largely inflexible 
regulation while the economy has been changing 
mightily.”4
“The formation of the “congeneric” is fairly complex 
and involves several steps. Initially, the bank organ­
izing the one-bank holding company m ust form a gen­
eral business corporation. The business corporation in 
tu rn  establishes a “phantom” bank tha t is an entirely 
owned subsidiary of the new corporation. The original 
bank subsequently is merged w ith the “phantom” 
bank, but keeps the name of the original bank.
For example, The Wall Street Journal of January 
24, 1969 (page 7) reported tha t Southern California 
F irst National Bank (San Diego) would organize a 
one-bank holding company, called Southern Califor­
nia F irst National Corporation. Specifically, Southern 
California F irst National Bank (the original bank) 
would merge w ith F irst National Bank of San Diego 
(the “phantom” bank, since it was a nonoperating in ­
stitution being organized as a step in the reorgani­
zation procedure). Excluding directors’ qualifying 
shares, all stock of the merged bank would be owned 
by the holding company, Southern California F irst 
National Corporation.
“ ‘Banking on Holding Companies,” The Wall Street 
Journal, August 22, 1969, p. 6. Commenting on the 
mounting pressure for banks to diversify into new 
lines and to develop new services for customers, the 
editorial observes:
Greater functional diversity and flexibility 
for banks via the holding company route can 
include a variety of activities: mutual funds, 
data processing lines, messenger services, build­
ing and equipment leasing, factoring, specialized 
land development and mortgage financing, 
travel agencies, credit cards, investment coun­
seling, securities underwriting and brokerage 
services, and loan-connected insurance. In 
effect, before 1971 a one-bank holding company 
could achieve functional diversification without 
fear of legal or regulatory challenges. In addi­
tion, since subsidiary companies established by 
the holding company are not subject to state 
branching law, their various services can be 
offered directly anywhere in the United States.5
Legal Regulation of Holding Companies 
Currently, the only federal statute directly 
regulating bank holding companies is the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, most recently 
amended at year-end 1970. The amended act re­
quires, among other things, registration with the 
Federal Reserve System of any company that 
owns or controls at least 25 percent of the stock 
of one or more banks.6 The law also requires 
Federal Reserve approval of formations of regis­
tered holding companies and acquisitions of 
existing banks by them and severely limits their 
nonbanking activities.
The trouble is that m any of these lines and 
services, whether closely related to banking
or not, are forbidden territory  for banks act­
ing on their own. Needless to say, nonbank 
competitors in this territory  do all they can to 
see tha t it remains verboten  for banks.
In some cases the prohibitions are wise and 
should be retained; few banks are equipped 
to wander fa r afield from  finance without 
endangering their solvency. In  other cases, 
the chief results of the barriers are to deny 
the banks legitimate growth opportunities— 
and to deny the public increased access to 
useful services.
'Steven J. Weiss, “Bank Holding Companies and Public 
Policy,” New England Economic Review  (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston), Jan.-Feb., 1969, p. 26. This 
study affords an excellent summary of various aspects 
of the bank holding company phenomenon that are 
relevant to public policy. See also William E. W hite- 
sill, “The Economics of the One-Bank Holding Com­
pany,” The Bankers Magazine, W inter 1969, pp. 28-34. 
“The Banking Act of 1933 was the first Congressional 
legislation regulating bank holding companies. The 
law  compelled registration w ith the Federal Reserve
Montana Business Quarterly
Bank Holding Companies 53
One provision of the 1970 amendments has 
important implications for bank management: a 
bank is subject to holding company regulation if 
in its trust operations it acquires sole discretion­
ary authority to vote controlling shares in 
another bank. The amending legislation requires 
the Federal Reserve to examine every newly 
registered one-bank holding company whose 
banking assets exceed $60 million. The Federal 
Reserve then has a two-year period within 
which to disapprove any nonbank acquisitions 
made by such companies before June 30, 1968. 
Disapproval would occur if the Federal Reserve 
deemed the acquisitions caused undue concen­
tration, unfair or decreased competition, conflict 
of interest, or unsound banking practices. 
Furthermore, any acquisitions made by smaller 
one-bank bank holding companies formed prior 
to June 30, 1968, could be disapproved by the 
Federal Reserve. Any acquisition made by the 
holding company after the cut-off date is ac­
ceptable only if the affiliate is “closely related” 
to banking and its operation by a banking or­
ganization would yield net public gains.
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, cer­
tain rights are reserved to the states. Section 
3(d) of the Act in effect prohibits expansion of 
registered bank holding companies across state 
lines except where the acquisition of a bank by 
an out-of-state holding company is expressly 
authorized by the laws of the state in which the 
bank is located. To this time, no state has en­
acted such a statute.7 Of course, out-of-state 
holding companies can continue ownership or 
control of banks acquired before passage of the 
amended Act (July 1, 1966).
Furthermore, Section 7 of the Act specifically 
notes that the law does not prevent . . any 
state from exercising such powers and jurisdic­
tion which it now has or may hereafter have 
with respect to banks, bank holding companies, 
and subsidiaries thereof.”8
System if the bank holding company owned a t least 
half of the stock of a bank and if the holding company 
intended to vote the stock of its affiliated banks. How­
ever, the legislation was lim ited in coverage and did 
not regulate the form ation or expansion of bank hold­
ing companies.
’John F. Zoellner, “Bank Holding Companies—Tenth 
District States,” M onthly Review  (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City), February  1969, p. 12.
8Public Law 511, Chapter 240, 84th Congress, 2nd Ses­
sion H.R. 6227.
Virtually none of the individual Western 
states has statutes specifically regulating bank 
holding companies.9 In contrast, some non- 
Westem states have passed restrictive legisla­
tion relating to holding companies that own or 
control two or more banks. For example, twelve 
states prohibit these multi-bank holding com­
panies.10
Dimensions of Bank 
Holding Company Activity
Bank holding companies are an integral part 
of the commercial banking structure in the 
United States, as evidenced by the selected data 
contained in table 1. At the end of 1968, a total 
of almost 900 bank holding companies were in 
existence or proposed for operation. Fewer than 
10 percent of these holding companies were 
registered under the provisions of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended. 
These registered companies controlled 648 af­
filiated banks with combined deposits of over 
$56 billion or about 14 percent of total deposits 
at all insured commercial banks in the United 
States.
One-bank holding companies, which account 
for most bank holding company activity in the 
United States, held about 31 percent of the 
nation’s deposits at insured commercial banks in 
1968. The recent growth in these single-bank 
holding companies has been impressive. Be­
tween 1965 and 1968, 260 one-bank holding com­
panies were originated as compared with a net 
increase of 433 in the 1955-65 period.11 At year- 
end 1968, out of a total of 810 one-bank holding 
companies, 728 were nonbank originated, ac­
counting for 5.6 percent of deposits at all insured 
banks.12 Obviously, the typical bank associated 
with these holding companies is small in deposit- 
size and comprises a small part of the parent 
holding company’s assets.
"Washington is the sole W estern state tha t has an ex­
plicit holding company law  th a t perm its holding com­
panies, bu t restricts their operations. See “Recent
Changes in the S tructure of Commercial Banking,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin, M arch 1970, pp. 200-203. 
“These states include Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Okla­
homa, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
u“The Changing Structure of Bank Holding Com­
panies,” op. cit., p. 6.
I Ibid , p. 7.
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Financial congenerics, which are usually or­
ganized by the management of an existing bank, 
were little known before 1967. In 1968, one-bank 
holding companies originated by banks totaled 
82 in number and held over one-quarter of all 
deposits at insured commercial banks (See table 
1). In fact, at the end of 1968, 34 of the largest 
100 commercial banks in the United States either 
formed or announced plans to form one-bank 
holding companies.13
TABLE 1
EXTENT OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
_________________ YEAR-END 1968_________________
Know n O ne-Bank 
R egistered Holding Companies 
B ank Holding B ank Nonbank 




companies 84 82 728 894
Number of 





dollars)8 $56,100 $101,500 $22,300 $179,900
Holding company 
deposits as per­
cent of total 
deposits at all 
insured com- 
merical banks 14.1% 25.5% 5.6% 45.3%
includes those in operation as well as those approved 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System during 1968. Where a bank holding company 
is controlled by another holding company, both are 
counted as registered bank holding companies.
“Includes both proposed and actual holding companies.
‘Deposits as of June 29, 1968.
Source: Data taken from  “The Changing Structure of 
Bank Holding Companies,” op. cit., p. 6.
“U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Cur­
rency, The Growth of Unregistered Bank Holding 
Companies— Problems and Prospects, Staff Report for 
the Committee, February 11, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 6.
This group of banks in 17 states includes such m ajor 
banks as the Bank of America, Chase M anhattan 
Bank, F irst National City Bank of New York, Con­
tinental Illinois National Bank, M anufacturers Han­
over Bank, Morgan Quaranty Trust Company, and 
others. This list includes the six largest commercial 
banks and nine out of the top twelve banks.
Several factors explain the recent emergence 1 
of bank originated one-bank holding companies j 
on the American scene: (1) The phenomenon is jj 
a part of the overall conglomerate merger move- 4 
ment in this country. (2) The holding company j 
affords a more efficient use of modern manage- j 
ment techniques than the narrowly constrained j 
activities of a commercial bank. (3) Existing J 
banking law (prior to 1971) restricts a bank or 1 
registered bank holding company from offering j 
widely diversified financial services. (4) A bank j 
affiliated with a one-bank holding company can 
offer service lines that would evince legal chal- I 
lenges from competitors if such services were 
offered by a nonaffiliated bank.14 \
The extent of bank holding company activity 
in the Western states mirrors national results 
(see table 2). Bank holding companies operate , 
in each state of the Western region. Each West­
ern state, except California and New Mexico, 
has at least one-third of its total commercial 
bank deposits in banks affiliated with holding 
companies. The data in table 2 do not include 
proposed unregistered bank holding companies 
as of year-end 1968. If allowance is made for 
these proposed one-bank holding companies, * 
then the percent of total commercial bank de­
posits in bank holding companies rises to 75.1 
percent for California, to 35.2 percent for New ! 
Mexico, and 85.3 percent for Oregon.15
REGISTERED HOLDING COMPANIES: 
WESTERN STATES 
Registered bank holding companies operate 
within each state of the Western region (see 
table 3). At year-end 1968, registered holding 
companies operated in only 33 states and the j 
District of Columbia. Thus, the eleven Western
““The Changing Structure of Bank Holding Com­
panies,” op. cit., p. 7.
,5U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and 
Currency, op. cit., pp. 8 and 9.
For example, in California eight proposed one-bank 
holding companies would account for over $24.5 bil­
lion in total bank deposits by the end of 1968. Seven 
of these eight proposed companies were bank origi­
nated, w ith the largest company being the one an­
nounced by the Bank of America. See Ibid., pp. 47 
and 48.
P rior to year-end 1968, the Albuquerque National 
Bank of Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the Oregon 
Bank and U.S. National Bank of Oregon, both in Port­
land, Oregon, announced plans to form one-bank 
holding companies.
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TABLE 2
NUMBER, DEPOSITS, AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS 
HELD BY REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES, 1968 
(Dollar Amounts in Millions)
State
N um ber of 
R egistered  
B ank  H olding 
C om panies1
T ota l D eposits 
o f R egistered  
B ank H olding 
C om panies1
U nreg istered  
B ank  H olding 
C om panies3
T ota l B ank 
D eposits of 
U nreg istered  B ank 
H olding C om panies1
T ota l B ank 
D eposits in  All 
B ank H olding 
Com panies
P e rc e n t o f Total 
C om m ercial B ank 
D eposits in  B ank 
H olding Com panies
Arizona ................ _ . 1 $ 872 3 $ 345 $1,217 47.0
California......... ________  6 4,025 15 2,465 6,490 15.7
Colorado______ ________  4 1,018 41 545 1,563 46.2
Idaho _ ________ ________  2 446 0 0 446 43.1M ontana______ ________  4 $67 15 85 752 60.0Nevada _ : ________  1 522 1 93 615 70.9New Mexico ... _ ______  1 162 5 41 203 18.4
Oregon __ _____ ....... - ....  1 1,430 1 4 1,434 42.9Utah _____ -................ 2 745 5 243 988 64.4
Washington ___ ________  3 652 2 951 1,603 34.3Wyoming .......... . 2 102 7 112 214 35.0
‘As of June 1968.
2As of year-end, 1968.
Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, The Growth o f Unregistered, B ank Holding 
Companies— Problems and Prospects, S taff Report for the Committee (W ashington, D.C.: U.S. Government P rin t­
ing Office, 1969), pp. 8 and 9.
states comprised one-third of the total number 
of states having registered companies. Califor­
nia had the most companies with a total of six, 
followed by Colorado with five companies, Mon­
tana with four companies, and Washington with 
three companies.
TABLE 3
BANKING OFFICES AND DEPOSITS OF BANKS IN 
REGISTERED HOLDING COMPANY GROUPS 
INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES, 
YEAR-END, 1968
N um ber o f N um ber of O ffices D eposits 
sta te l______Com panies B anks B ranches T ota l ($ M illions)
Arizona 1 2 99 101 977
California 6 7 271 278 4,340
Colorado 5 19 0 19 1,755
Idaho 2 2 69 71 488
Montana 4 34 1 35 744
Nevada 1 2 37 39 582
New M exico 1 5 21 26 174
Oregon 1 1 116 117 1,667
Utah 2 3 62 65 835
Washington 3 7 83 90 732
Wyoming 2 4 0 4 118
Data for individual states represent bank holding com­
panies having subsidiary banks in the respective states 
rather than bank holding companies whose principal 
offices are located in such states.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1969.
Tables 4 and 5 provide a state-by-state sum­
mary of the development of registered bank 
holding companies over the past decade. These 
data indicate that holding company groups have 
not proceeded to “take over” the banking sys­
tems in the individual Western states. Of the 
eleven Western states, eight states showed a
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF BANKING OFFICES HELD AND 
CHANGE IN  SHARE OF OFFICES HELD BY 
REGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, 
WESTERN STATES SELECTED DATES
P ercen tag e  of S ta te ’s Change In  Share 
B anking  Offices Held o f O ffices Held
State 1957 1962 1968 1957-62 1962-68 1957-68
Arizona 40.9 37.5 35.3 —3.4 — 2.2 _ 5.6
California 10.0 11.2 9.5 + 1 .2 — 1.7 ___ .5
Colorado 1.7 2.9 7.3 +  1.2 +  4.4 + 5.6
Idaho 36.2 37.4 42.5 +  1.2 +  5.1 + 6.3
Montana 27.0 25.8 25.4 — 1.2 — .4 1.6
Nevada 64.9 60.0 45.9 - 4 .9 -1 4 .1 ___ 19.0
New Mexico 15.1 16.0 14.9 +  -9 — 1.1 ___ .2
Oregon 35.9 34.4 32.9 — 1.5 — 1.5 — 3.0
Utah 44.6 45.0 39.2 +  + — 5.8 — 5.4
Washington 15.0 15.4 15.5 +  -4 +  -1 + .5
Wyoming 7.6 7.1 5.7 — .5 — 1.4 1.9
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, October 1958; July 
1963; August 1969.
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE OF BANKING DEPOSITS HELD AND 
CHANGE IN  SHARE OF DEPOSITS HELD BY 
REGISTERED HOLDING COMPANIES, 
INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES 
SELECTED DATES
State
P ercen tage of S ta te’s 
Total Deposits
Change in  Share 
of D eposits Held
1957 1962 1968 1957-62 1962-68 1957-68
Arizona 38.2 35.7 34.2 I S 2-5 — 1.5 — 4.0
California 7.0 10.5 9.6 +3.5 — .9 +  2.6
Colorado 4.5 6.7 45.2 +2.2 +38.5 +40.7
Idaho 40.4 39.8 42.6 — .6 +  2.8 +  2.2
Montana 53.4 51.9 53.1 — 1.5 +  1-2 — .3
Nevada 74.9 70.1 60.9 —4.8 — 9.2 — 14.0
New Mexico 13.5 12.3 14.3 — 1.2 +  2.0 +  -8
Oregon 44.5 42.5 43.0 —2.0 +  -5 — 1.5
Utah 52.7 52.0 49.2 — .7 — 2.8 —  3.5
Washington 13.6 13.0 14.2 -  .6 +  1.2 +  .6
Wyoming 17.1 17.4 16.8 +  -3 -  .6 -  .3
Source: Same as for Table 4.
decline in the share of banking offices held by 
holding companies between 1957 and 1968. Only 
three states increased in share of banking of­
fices held by groups: Colorado (5.6), Idaho (6.3), 
and Washington (0.5).
Six Western states recorded a decline in the 
share of total bank deposits held by registered 
holding companies between 1957 and 1968 (see 
table 5). Of the five states showing an increase 
in holding companies’ share of deposits, only 
Colorado (40.7) had an increase of more than 
five percentage points.
Registered holding company banking de­
veloped considerably in the Western states; 
and it is in the Western states that statewide 
branch banking predominates. Only four West­
ern states do not permit statewide branching: 
New Mexico (limited branching), and the three 
unit banking states of Colorado, Montana, and 
Wyoming.
Many people believe that holding company 
banking is most common and rapidly growing 
in states that prohibit or restrict branching. 
However, the results for the Western states sug­
gest that factors other than state branching law 
may influence holding company development; 
such factors may include, for example, size of 
the state, historical considerations, and so 
forth.16 One study of bank holding companies 
observes: “It is not uncommon for holding com-
“Cf. Weiss, op. cit., p. 12.
panies to exist and have large branch bank sub­
sidiaries in states where branching is unre­
stricted. In these cases, holding companies ap­
pear to serve as complements to branch banking 
rather than substitutes.”17
UNREGISTERED HOLDING COMPANIES: 
WESTERN STATES
A major development in banking during the 
1960s was the appreciable growth of unregis­
tered (one-bank) holding companies. These com­
panies are corporations that hold 25 percent or 
more of the stock of only one bank. In the 
Western states the emergence of single-bank 
holding companies has followed the national 
trend (see table 6). By the end of 1965, some 55 
such companies were formed in the West, ac­
counting for a tenth of the total number in the 
nation at that time.18 Between year-end 1965 
and September 1,1968, some 31 banks with total 
deposits of $1,619 million were acquired by one- 
bank holding companies in the West.
The typical one-bank holding company is a 
small concern holding a small bank as well as 
other properties.19 The data in table 7 indicate 
that most of the one-bank holding companies 
operating in the Western states as of September 
1968, owned relatively small banks with deposits 
of less than $10 billion. On the other hand, only 
7 out of a total of 95 banks owned by Western 
one-bank holding companies were large banks 
(deposit-size greater than $100 million) as of 
September 1968.
During the latter half of 1968 and in 1969 
many of the largest commercial banks in the 
United States formed one-bank holding com­
panies.20 In this period some of the largest 
Western banks became one-bank holding com­
panies: Bank of America, Crocker-Citizens Na­
tional Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, all in San Fran­
cisco, California; Union Bank and First Western 
Bank and Trust Co., Los Angeles, California;
17Ibid.
““Recent Changes in the Structure of Commercial 
Banking,” op. cit., p. 200.
| Ibid.
"A t year-end 1969 almost 900 one-bank holding com­
panies controlled banks w ith about $181 billion in 
deposits, or about 43 percent of total deposits of all 
insured commercial banks in the country. See “Recent 
Changes in the Structure of Commercial Banking,” 
op. cit., p. 200.
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TABLE 6
NUMBER AND TOTAL DEPOSITS OF BANKS ACQUIRED BY ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
BY DATE OF ACQUISITION, INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1968








Banks Acquired in Year 
1966 1967 




Arizona — — 2 $ 52,773 — __ _ ____ _ 1 $292,258
California ~ 4 $ 303,549 6 848,740 — — 2 $1,244,557 1 $ 11,262 2 57,377
Colorado _ — — 23 233,717 3 $34,696 6 20,452 5 217,782 4 38,755
Idaho ______ — — — — — _ _ _ _ _ _
M ontana___ 1 9,743 6 32,374 3 7,140 2 22,616 3 12,891
Nevada — — 1 93,465 __ __ _ ____ _
New Mexico _ — — 3 17,661 — — — __ 1 3,750 1 19,364
Oregon — — — — 1 4,359 __ __ _ - ____ ____
Utah — — 4 223,190 1 20,216 __ __ - ____ ____
Washington .. 1 936,159 — _ _ _ 1 14,648 - ____ ____
Wyoming — — 4 100,815 1 3,307 — — 1 872 1 7,269
Totals 6 1,249,451 49 1,602,735 9 69,718 11 1,302,273 11 246,557 9 415,023
Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, The G rowth o f Unregistered B ank Holding 
Companies— Problems and Prospects, Table 5, pp. 11-46; Table 11, pp. 52-393.
TABLE 7
NUMBER AND SIZE OF BANKS OWNED BY ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
INDIVIDUAL WESTERN STATES, AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1968
State TotalNumber Under 1
Total Deposits Size (in $ millions) 
1-10 10-50 50-100 100-500
500 and 
over
Arizona .............. 3 _ _ 2 _ 1 _
California — -.... 15 — 1 9 2 1 2
Colorado .........._....... ......____  41 _ 28 12 — 1 _
Idaho - ................. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Montana _ 15 — 14 1 — — —
Nevada _______ ____  1 _ — — 1 _ _
New M ex ico_________ ____  5 — 4 1 — — —
Oregon ............... 1 — 1 — — — —
U tah _ .......... 5 — 1 3 — 1 —
W ashington________ 2 — — 1 — — 1
Wyoming .................... ___  7 1 4 1 1 — —
Totals 95 1 53 30 4 4 3
Source: Compiled from data contained in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking 
and Currency, The G rowth of Unregistered B ank Holding Companies— Problems and 
Prospects, Table 5, pp. 11-46.
United States National Bank of Oregon in Port­
land, Oregon; and National Bank of Commerce 
in Seattle, Washington.
Concluding Observations 
Bank holding company activity reflects the 
changing nature of commercial banking in the 
United States. In turn, bank holding companies 
comprise an integral part of the West’s banking 
structure—a banking structure that has evolved
as the region’s economy has grown and de­
veloped.
Direct regulation of bank holding companies 
has been initiated largely by the federal gov­
ernment, culminating in the passage of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956 (later amended 
in 1966 and 1970). Until its 1970 amendments, 
this law excluded one-bank holding companies, 
which grew appreciably in recent years through 
the originating efforts of commercial banks.
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Throughout 1970, Congress considered various 
bills for amending the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956.21 Enacted on the last day of 1970, 
the amending legislation applies specific regula­
tions to the formation and operation of one-bank 
holding companies. Underlying this Congres­
sional concern were varied reactions to the one- 
bank holding company movement. Some ob­
servers viewed the movement as a competitive 
response of the commercial banking industry to 
provide customers with a broader array of ser­
vices. In effect, the one-bank holding company 
enabled banks to enter product and geographic 
markets that had been precluded by either law 
or regulation.22 Other observers were sensitive 
to possible abuses that might emerge: undue
21See One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970, 
Hearings before the Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee on S.1052, S.1211, S. 3823, and H.R.6778. 
Bills to amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956, May 1970, 2 parts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov­
ernm ent Printing Office, 1970).
“See David Rockefeller, “One-Bank Holding Com­
panies: A View From Inside,” The Wall Street Jour­
nal, June 30, 1970, p. 16.
concentration of economic power; preferential • 
treatment in extending credit to nonbank affili­
ates of a holding company; dangers to the sound­
ness of affiliated banks arising from preferential 
lending. Others insisted on maintaining the 
traditional separation of commercial banking I 
and commerce to prevent growth of excessive J 
economic power.
Given the importance of holding companies § 
within the banking structure of the nation and t 
of the West, the newly amended law should be 
interpreted and executed with a realistic regard ? 
for the changing context in which commercial J 
banks and other financial firms operate. It will | 
be particularly important to avoid a strait- j 
jacket, if not punitive controls, on bank holding \ 
companies. Such regulatory strictures that may I 
emerge should enhance the future performance j 
of banking and financial institutions in the S 
country. The findings of the Presidential Com- v 
mission on Financial Structure and Regulation j 
will be especially relevant and helpful in this I 
regard. Thus, we can promote and maintain a 




Why Montana Should Have Branch Banking
A n argument in favor of branching 
by one of Montana’s few bankers 
who are engaging in this practice
Any discussion of the banking structure in 
Montana—its strengths and its weaknesses— 
must begin with this question: Is that structure 
adequate to serve the needs of business, indus­
try, agriculture, and consumers in the state?
If the discussion can be divorced from the 
emotions that always surround it, the answer 
must be: No. Montana’s unit banking structure 
is not adequate. There are too many communi­
ties served by only one bank. There are too 
many small banks, with loan limits so small that 
customers are forced, and often encouraged, to 
go elsewhere for their financial needs.
It should be clear to most observers that the 
economic growth of a state and its people is 
directly related to the vigor of its financial 
institutions. The shortage of capital that has 
historically been a drag on Montana’s economy 
can be attributed, in large part, to the state’s 
rigid unit banking structure and the lack of 
vigor that structure encourages. No better ex­
ample of lagging economic growth can be found 
than in the statistics for per capita income for 
Montanans. The state has consistently lagged 
behind the national average growth in per 
capita income, and year by year is falling far­
ther behind. In 1950, Montana was 12th among 
the states in per capita income; by 1968, it had 
fallen to 31st.
Opponents of change in Montana’s banking 
structure say branch banking would curtail 
competition. But where is the competition in
the 63 communities in the state that, in 1969, 
contained only one bank? Branching encourages 
competition, and competition provides better 
financial service to the public. One need only 
to look at the branch banking states of Califor­
nia, Arizona, Washington, and Oregon to see 
that it is the public that has gained in those 
states, in the form of banking convenience, bet­
ter service, and lower charges brought about by 
more efficient operations.
If branch banking were permitted in Mon­
tana, it is doubtful if there would be an increase 
in the number of banks, as such. Rather, there 
would be an increase in the number of bank 
offices. Fears that existing banks would be 
bought up and consolidated into two or three 
giant corporations are groundless. Such pur­
chases and consolidations are prohibited by 
federal statutes.
Branch banking would permit a better flow 
of capital throughout the state and make it 
easier for larger and healthier banks to bring 
capital into Montana from money market cen­
ters throughout the country. Suburban offices 
of existing metropolitan banks, for instance, 
could offer a larger deposit base and thus take 
better care of loan demand than could a small 
unit bank with a small deposit base. A branch 
could utilize deposits from other offices in the 
system to finance community development. The 
manager of a branch bank in agricultural Wash­
ington, as an example, told me that many times
Lowry K unkel is President of the  F irs t National Bank of Butte, which is affiliated w ith the Northwest Bancorpor- 
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his loans get up to from 150 to 175 percent of 
deposits.
A better example can be found in the exper­
ience of the First National Bank of Butte and 
the Daly National Bank of Anaconda following 
their merger. Both bank offices have remained 
open. There were no rate changes on loans or 
savings as a result of the merger. There were, 
however, very significant changes in the num­
ber and dollar volume of loans.
The number of loans increased from 271 for 
the First National Bank of Butte in the twelve 
months immediately prior to the merger to 1,755 
for the merged bank in the twelve months im­
mediately following the merger. The dollar 
amount of the loans went from $1,044,591 to 
$6,639,507, a gain of more than 500 percent. But 
even more significant, from the public’s view­
point, was the increase in the types of loans that 
were made. Thirteen consumer loans were made 
in the year before the merger at the Butte bank, 
and 1,230 in the year following at this bank 
office alone. Conventional real estate loans 
went from 4 to 58; commercial loans from 56 
to 100; wholesale inventory loans from zero to 
13; and student loans from zero to 101.
A change in Montana’s banking structure also 
could prove beneficial to the owners of small, 
rural banks. As the state’s agricultural struc­
ture changes, with small farms being consoli­
dated into larger units, the small banks are 
hard-pressed to meet increased credit demands 
of the larger farms. One Montana banker wrote 
to me, saying that because of his low loan limits 
—$25,000 on range livestock—and having to sell 
the top end of his biggest and best livestock 
loans, he gave away interest which would have
doubled his net income if he could have carried 
the paper himself.
That same banker is unable to purchase an 
insurance and pension plan for his few em­
ployees, and is reluctant to advertise for time 
deposits because he cannot earn the interest that 
will make it possible for him to pay attractive 
rates. His small deposit gain over the years is 
due mainly to inflation, and his bank is actually 
losing ground in terms of “real” deposits. This 
bank, obviously, is not making money for its 
owners, nor is it serving the needs of its com­
munity. If it were to be purchased by a larger 
bank, and maintained—with the same manage­
ment—as an office of that larger bank, its 
strength and profitability would be increased 
substantially, with benefits for the owner, his 
employees, and the public.
Unfortunately, the arguments for and against 
change in Montana’s banking structure have 
been kept within the banking “fraternity.” The 
public has not been heard from, largely because 
it could get the service it needed from competing 
financial institutions—savings and loan associa­
tions or Production Credit Association offices— 
if the banks could not provide it. But in selected 
instances, the public is indicating that it wants 
more from Montana’s banks than it has been 
getting.
If the public shows enough signs of restless­
ness, there will be hope for change. If the issue 
of better banking services is left to bankers, 
however, it is possible that Montana, which is 
one of only three states that prohibit branch 




Let’s Maintain Montana’s Prohibition 
Against Branch Banking
A n opponent of branch banking states his views
When the Montana legislature not only re­
jected a branch banking proposal but also re­
pealed an existing branching-by-merger statute 
a couple of years ago, it proved itself to be one 
of the most progressive law-making bodies in 
the country.
In too many states, legislatures have suc­
cumbed to the pressures of big banks and have 
permitted branching to one degree or another. 
In every case, the appeal for branch banking did 
not come from the people, not from small bus­
iness, and not from the independent banks that 
are of, by and for the communities they serve. 
Those who pushed for branching were the hand­
ful of giant banks in these states that had the 
resources to expand through branching into vast 
banking systems and empires.
Inevitably, this permissive stance on branch­
ing has whittled down the number of banks in 
hese states and increased the concentration of 
money and credit.
One does not have to look far to discover that 
ranch banking leads to a more concentrated 
banking structure.1
In 1959, only 2,163 banks in the United States 
maintained branches. These banks, along with 
heir 9,387 branches, accounted for more than 
naif of the nation’s commercial banks and of­
fices.
In the following ten years the number of 
banks maintaining branches rose to 3,664 and 
these banks together with their 18,771 branches
Guttentag and Herman, Banking Structure and Per-
■\Q(in\nCe (New York: New York U niversity Press, 19°7), p . 52.
controlled 66 percent of the commercial banks 
and offices in the United States in 1968.
An even more dramatic illustration of what 
can happen when branch banking is permitted 
in a state is provided by a comparison of the 
proportion of deposits held by the largest banks 
in unit banking states with the proportion of de­
posits held by the largest banks in branching 
states.
For example, in nine statewide branching 
states the proportion of state deposits held by 
the five largest banks or bank groups exceeded 
75 percent in 1968.2 In eight of these states the 
largest banking organization held 35 percent or 
more of the total deposits of the state.
On the other hand, less than 25 percent of the 
state deposits in the state were held by the five 
largest banking organizations in the unit bank­
ing states of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, and 
West Virginia. The highest concentration of any 
unit banking state was 60 percent in Minnesota, 
due to excessive holding company control.3
It must be emphasized that a branch is not a 
bank. Branches are merely different mailing 
addresses for offices of a common ownership. 
They do not provide the public with genuine 
options when the public goes shopping for bank­
ing services. Each time an independent bank is 
merged into a large branch banking system, the 
public loses an alternative source of credit.
'Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island.
•Source of data: Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor­
ation.
PresiHo6* i l l l B  _Past president of the Independent Bankers Association of America and Board Chairm an and 
n t of The Yellowstone Bank, Laurel, Montana. H e is a graduate of the University of Montana.
Spring 1971
62 B. Meyer Harris
Branch offices do not have a vital stake in the 
community and exist merely to feed the parent 
in a large money center.
In Montana, branch banking would be par­
ticularly destructive of competition because of 
the fact that three of the country’s largest multi­
bank holding companies own subsidiaries in the 
state—Western Bancorporation of California, 
the largest in the country; Northwest Bancor­
poration of Minnesota, the fifth largest com­
pany; and First Bank System, Inc., of Minnesota, 
sixth largest. With their subsidiary banks, these 
absentee corporations would be in a position to 
multiply their control of the economy of Mon­
tana and siphon the available deposits in our 
state into Minnesota and California.
These absentee landlords, together with the 
relatively small Bancorporation of Montana 
(68th in rank), already control more than 50 per­
cent of the deposits in Montana. 1 To permit the 
destruction of our unit banking system by these 
giant out-of-state banking systems would be 
reminiscent of the 1930s, when a great share of 
Montana fell into the hands of the big Eastern 
insurance companies which foreclosed on ranch 
mortgages.
Reports of Congressional committees suc­
cinctly explain the adverse economic effect of 
concentration of money and credit in a few hold­
ing companies and branching operations. The 
House Banking Committee stated:
Evidence developed during the hearings has 
convinced your committee tha t bank holding 
companies are not in accord w ith the very 
precepts upon which our banking system rests.
The United States early in its history, it should 
be recalled, adopted a democratic ideal of 
banking. Other countries, for the most part, 
have preferred to rely on a few large banks 
controlled by a banking elite. There has de­
veloped in this country, on the other hand, a 
conception of the independent unit bank as an 
institution having its ownership and origin in 
the local community and deriving its business 
chiefly from the community’s industrial and 
commercial activities and from  the farming 
population within its vicinity or trade area. Its 
activities are usually fully integrated with 
local economic and social organization. The 
hank holding company device threatens to de­
stroy this democratic grassroots institution. 
(Italics added)
Your committee believes it is obvious that the *
*Federal Reserve Bulletin  (August 1970), p. A95.
declared w ill of Congress in favor of indepen­
dent competitive hanking is being thw arted hy 
indirect branch banking, through the mecha­
nism of the holding company. (House Report 
No. 609, May 20, 1955) (Italics added)
Five years later, the House Small Business Com­
mittee stated in its report:
Therefore, all things being equal, any reduc­
tion in the num ber of banks in a given m arket 
area or any feature of concentration such as 
the growth of branch banking systems or hold­
ing company systems w ill tend to diminish 
competition in  that area and make it more 
difficult for a given businessman to secure 
loans. I t  is obvious, then, tha t in  the banking 
m arket the existence of alternative sources of 
supply for the would-be borrower is of the 
utmost importance. (Italics added)
Throughout most of our history, our economic 
system has been based on the belief that the 
public is best served by competition in the 
marketplace. When many units are allowed to 
compete freely, the customer can choose the unit 
that gives him the best value for his money. 
At the same time, the self-regulating aspects of 
a competitive system require a minimum of gov­
ernment interference in the commercial and in­
dustrial sector.
Each of America’s fifty states is a unique per­
sonality. Congress, in its wisdom, decided early 
in our history that one set of banking laws just 
wouldn’t be practical in the midst of so much 
diversity. Each state was considered best quali­
fied to judge the type of banking structure that 
suited its people and its economy.
This pattern is fixed in the National Bank Act 
(12 U.S.C. Sec. 36c) which says in effect that 
national banks in each state may branch only to 
the extent permitted to state banks under state 
law.
Also, Congress reasoned that since neither the 
states nor the federal government had the exclu­
sive right to charter banks, the power must be 
shared and an accommodation worked out to 
avoid conflicts. The fact that national banks 
must follow state law in branching matters, for 
example, has resulted in competitive equality 
between the two systems.
The ultimate authority on branching in each 
state resides in its legislature. Today we have 
fifty different statutes relating to banking struc­
ture, each one shaped to the particular needs 
and aspirations of the people in each state.
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The legislature of Montana thus must make 
the choice between a concentrated form of 
banking, or a continuation of our unit banking 
system which offers the public a wide choice in 
the financial marketplace.
* * * *
Proponents of multibank systems, in general, 
contend that such systems are more efficient 
and economical, provide more loans and ser­
vices, permit channeling of money and credit 
where needed, and serve the public interest 
better.
Let’s look at some of these contentions, which 
are of dubious merit. Actually, the alleged ad­
vantages claimed for multibank systems are 
superficial in nature when compared with the 
harm that is caused by concentration of banking 
resources. Even when such alleged advantages 
are considered collectively, they are insignifi­
cant in comparison with the attendant loss of 
alternate sources of money and credit.
In the following contentions, reference is 
made alternately to branch and holding com­
pany systems, centrally managed, expansive by 
nature, and vehicles leading to concentration 
and elimination of competition. Both produce 
the same result—power in fewer hands to con­
trol availability and terms of credit.
In this discussion, we are talking about rela­
tively large multibank systems in the markets 
where they operate. Keep in mind when read- 
ing the contentions on branch banking that 
similar claims are made by proponents of multi­
bank holding companies.
The contentions and the answers are as fol­
lows:
CONTENTION: Branch banking must be 
good, judging from its rapid growth in the 
United States.
ANSWER: The only truth in this contention 
is the fact of rapid growth. Branching is the 
fastest vehicle to banking concentration. For 
example, branch offices have grown in unprece­
dented numbers in the 1959-69 decade. The num­
ber grew by 97 percent from 9,615 branches in 
1959 to 18,966 in 1968. Over 90 percent of this 
growth in the number of branches occurred in 
the states permitting some form of branching.5
Source: Annual Report, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 1959, table 102, pp. 112-19; Annual Re­
port, FDIC, 1968, table 103, pp. 170-77.
Let’s look at a few examples of states which 
recently removed restraints on bank expansion, 
resulting in a dramatic impact on their banking 
structures.
Virginia had contiguous county branching 
until March, 1962, when the restrictions were 
eased to permit branching by merger anywhere 
in the state. De novo branching, however, was 
still restricted to a limited area around the head 
office.
The Virginia approach so captured the ima­
gination of expansion-minded bankers in other 
states that the term “Virginia Plan” has entered 
the banking idiom. It includes all the ingredients 
for rapid expansion—branching, mergers, and 
holding companies.
Between 1959 and 1968 the number of unit 
banks in Virginia declined from 207 to 88. Vir­
ginia had 102 branch banks with 255 offices in 
1959. By 1968, it had 174 branch banks with 797 
branches.
Here’s a brief review of the action:
The state’s largest bank, First and Merchants 
National in Richmond, took over 7 banks. Vir­
ginia National Bank of Charlottesville and Nor­
folk added 11.
From June 30, 1962, to December 31, 1966, 
Richmond banks merged with 14 banks operat­
ing a total of 49 offices, opened 23 branches in 
the Richmond area, and organized 2 bank hold­
ing companies. That made Richmond the money 
center of Virginia, with the 4 largest banks 
holding 24.4 percent of the total state deposits.
The Richmond story was repeated in every 
major city in Virginia: the Norfolk-Portsmouth 
area had 19 mergers, 27 new branches; Newport 
News-Hampton, 4 mergers, 12 new branches; 
Roanoke, 12 mergers, 4 new branches. The 
Washington and Lee Law Review concluded the 
following from its study of the Virginia branch­
ing picture:
As Virginia’s banking structure becomes more 
concentrated, a second issue assumes greater 
importance—the competitive test . . . concen­
tration which m ay become unjustified by 
either economies of scale or public conven­
ience. Further, a t some point, concentration 
also becomes inconsistent w ith competition.® 8
8W ashington and Lee Law Review  (quoted in Econo- 
Facts Newsletter on Banking in Florida, Tallahassee, 
No. 5, M arch 27, 1970).
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More permissive branching was allowed in 
New York in 1960, triggering a modern-day gold 
rush by the state’s giant banks. Between 1959 
and 1968, the number of unit banks dropped 
from 249 to 123. During the same period, the 
number of branch offices increased from 1,453 
operated by 154 banks in 1959 to 2,379 offices 
operated by 173 banks in 1968. New York also 
permits holding company operations, adding 
momentum to the rate of concentration.
The chaotic banking situation in New Jersey 
provides the most recent illustration of what 
can happen when the barriers to branch banking 
come tumbling down in a state.7 On July 17,
1969, a law went into effect which erased New 
Jersey’s county-wide branching limits and per­
mitted branching within each of three banking 
districts. The legislation also permits statewide 
bank holding companies—the double spur that 
accelerates a trot to a gallop.
The impact of the legislation on concentration 
has yet to be measured. However, New Jersey is 
in the throes of a New York-style banking gold 
rush.
Prior to the law change, New Jersey had 249 
chartered banks. By August 12,1969, federal and 
state supervisory agencies had approved 132 
applications for new branch offices out of 294 
applications. By the spring of 1970, 5 new hold­
ing companies had made application for ap­
proval. At this writing 3 have been approved. 
Over 232 new branches had been approved and 
174 more were pending. Also by the spring of
1970, 50 new bank applications were pending, 38 
merger applications involving 20 banks were 
under consideration, and 53 banks had jumped 
county lines.
North Carolina provides a good example of 
what branching statewide produces: the num­
ber of commercial banks in North Carolina in 
1957 was 210. Today the total is 117. However, 
the state is dotted with 902 branches. Only 6 
banks hold nearly 80 percent of the total com­
mercial bank deposits.8
’Frank Flowers, “Expanded Branching: Blot on the 
New Jersey Banking Picture,” The Independent 
Banker (November 1970), p. 26.
SP oik’s Directory.
During the many years of contiguous county 
branching in Pennsylvania, the number of banks 
has declined from 1,117 to 508. True, the number 
of branches has gone up sharply in the same 
period, from 113 to 1,589.9 But the number of 
alternative sources of credit (that is, judgment 
centers) has been cut by more than one-half.
In the Senate debate on the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, it was pointed out that if 
we look abroad we see plenty of corroboration 
for our fears about the concentration of banking 
powers.
Because of a lack of controls on bank expan­
sion, only a handful of banks exists in the 
countries of Western Europe. However, each 
bank has hundreds or even thousands of 
branches. As a result of this extreme banking 
concentration over the years, small business dis­
appeared and cartels and monopolies were 
created.
A century and a quarter ago, England had 
large numbers of provincial bankers who helped 
to finance the relatively small industries in their 
localities. Gradually these private banks were 
merged with the bigger houses. Today there 
are virtually only four banks of any conse­
quence in England—National Westminster Bank 
Ltd., with total deposits of 4.02 billion pounds; 
Barclays Bank Ltd., with deposits of 2.95 billion 
pounds; Midland Bank, with deposits of 2.13 
billion pounds; and Lloyds Bank Ltd., with de­
posits of 1.94 billion pounds.10
The total deposits of 11.04 billion pounds in 
these four banks represent more than 90 percent 
of the total bank deposits in England, Scotland, 
and Northern Ireland.11 And each has thousands 
of branches—National Westminster has 3,660; 
Midland, 3,482; Barclays, 3,260; and Lloyds, 2,260 
branches.12
The most recent move toward further concen­
tration of British banking took place in 1968 
when fourth-ranked Westminster merged with
•Ibid .
10Polk’s World B ank Directory, September 1970.
“The Quarterly Report of the Bank of England (March 
1970) shows gross deposits of 12.1 billion pounds in 
the London Clearing Banks, the Scottish banks, and 
the Northern Ireland banks at the end of 1969. 
**Polk’s World B ank Directory, September 1970.
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j,
fifth-ranked National Provincial to become 
Britain’s largest bank.13
The giant banks in Britain have been impor­
tant in promoting concentration of commerce 
and in reducing competition throughout the 
economy. Furthermore, the power of the pri- 
[ vate monopolies led to the movement for 
nationalization which was carried out for about 
one-fifth of the British industry by the Labor 
Party from 1945 to 1951. The nation came to 
realize that cartels and monopolies destroyed 
> competition as the regulator of the economy, and 
[ that nationalization was the only way left to 
protect the public.
Canada is going through a similar experience. 
There are only ten banks in all of Canada to 
serve sixteen million people. Canada’s Big Four 
banks control about 80 percent of all deposits in 
the country. They are The Royal Bank of Can­
ada, which has $9.3 billion in deposits; Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce, with deposits of 
$8.4 billion; Bank of Montreal, with deposits of 
$7.5 billion, and The Bank of Nova Scotia, with 
deposits of $5.5 billion. The fifth-largest bank, 
The Toronto Dominion Bank, has deposits of $4.8 
billion. The Royal Bank of Canada has 1,200 
branches; the Bank of Montreal has 1,050 
branches; the Bank of Nova Scotia, 850; and The 
Toronto Dominion Bank, 740 branches.14 As in 
Great Britain, monopoly and quasimonopoly in 
industry have accompanied this concentration of 
banking.
Prior to the advent of Hitler, Germany had 
only three banks—the Deutsche, the Dresdner, 
and the Commerz Banks. These institutions 
helped create the cartels and monopolies. As 
students of history know, it was the cartels and 
the big banks which financed Hitler’s rise to 
power.
It is evident from the European experience 
that concentration in banking and concentration 
in commerce and industry go hand in hand.
“Following hard  on the heels of tha t m erger was the 
announcement tha t Barclays (then first-ranked), 
Lloyd’s (then th ird-ranked), and M artins (six th- 
ranked) planned to merge to become not only the 
largest bank in Britain bu t the fourth  largest bank 
in the world (Fortune, M arch 1968, p. 50). This 
merger was never consummated since it was opposed 
by the Board of Trade and the Monopolies Commis­
sion.
uPolk’s W orld B ank Directory, Septem ber 1970.
The United States is the only country left 
where a substantial part of the banking struc­
ture is made up of independent banks which 
serve small business. But despite the obvious 
lessons of history, the United States is follow­
ing the same pattern of concentration in bank­
ing and business as the nations of Western 
Europe and Canada.
CONTENTION: Branch systems offer more 
than unit banks in variety of services offered to 
the public.
ANSWER: This is another way of saying that 
branching from a main bank makes the main 
bank bigger, and thus better able to offer more 
services. This is true of any large bank, with or 
without branches. A large bank will always 
tend to offer a variety of services that a small 
bank cannot afford, such as trust services, data 
processing, bond services, international services, 
and loan participations.
Smaller independent banks obtain these ser­
vices for their customers from large banks on a 
correspondent basis, while branches obtain them 
from their parent bank.
What, then, is the difference? In a given town 
or suburb, neither a smaller bank nor its com­
peting branch has the means locally to furnish 
these additional services. Both must obtain 
them for local customers from a large city bank.
The big difference is that the branch is locked 
into its parent bank, while the smaller indepen­
dent bank has alternate sources for these ser­
vices among several large banks. The advantage 
for the smaller independent bank is the ability 
to obtain these services on a competitive basis, 
at fair costs which only competition can provide.
The advantage for the customer is that the 
correspondent bank system makes competition 
work for him on two levels. First, he has a 
choice between competing independent banks 
bidding for his business; second, if he needs 
larger loans or additional services, his bank can 
obtain these for him from competing correspon­
dent banks.
In contrast, a local branch manager takes his 
orders from the main bank manager who dic­
tates availability and cost of credit and services. 
Where branch systems dominate, the variety of 
services is determined by the profit potential of 
each. The cost of credit and services is less af­
fected by competition where branch systems
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dominate, and the decisions on both are made by 
the central manager.
As branch systems grow, competing indepen­
dent banks disappear, alternate sources of bank 
credit and services shrink, and competition at 
local and correspondent bank levels is reduced. 
This process of banking concentration ulti­
mately hurts the banking public.
CONTENTION: Branch and holding com­
pany systems are more efficient than indepen­
dent banks.
ANSWER: “Efficiency” is an overworked, 
vague word. Its meaning and measurement 
vary because people vary. When applied to 
banking, there are too many variables to make 
reliable comparisons between branch and unit 
bank efficiency.
However, to most minds efficiency can be 
measured by costs, and studies of bank costs 
have been made.
“Most recent studies of economies of scale 
have found that branch banks tend to have 
higher operating costs than unit banks of similar 
size,” says a study published by the U.S. Comp­
troller of the Currency.15
“Comparisons of expense-to-asset ratios of 
branch and unit banks of the same size . .. show 
a consistent pattern: branch banks almost in­
variably have the higher ratios . . .” say econo­
mists Guttentag and Herman.16 The authors 
also attempt other cost comparisons between 
branches and unit banks, not of the same size, 
and flounder into inconclusive findings.
1BU.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Studies in Banking 
Competition and the Banking Structure, published by 
the Comptroller’s Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 
143.
Note: This reference is used because it is often 
quoted by advocates of m ultibank systems. I t was 
compiled and published at the end of the five-year 
term  of Comptroller Jam es J. Saxon, a vigorous pro­
ponent of these systems who openly advocated na­
tional bank branching w ithout regard to state laws 
governing state banks. Needless to say, the studies 
published in compilation are by members of his staff 
or by others who supported this philosophy. 
“Guttentag and Herman, Banking Structure and Per­
formance (New York: New York University Press, 
1967), p. 119.
Note: This is used also because it is based in  large 
measure on the studies contained in the Comptroller’s 
volume cited above and others in the same vein. It 
is often quoted by advocates of m ultibank systems.
CONTENTION: Branch banking brings eco- 1 
nomic benefits to the public in several ways: a j 
high ratio of loans to deposits, lower loan rates, j 
and higher savings rates.
ANSWER: Higher loan to deposit ratio in j 
branch systems. In the Comptroller’s study, the 1 
conclusion is stated like this: “Branch banks j 
have, on average, the highest ratio of loans-to- J 
assets.”17 But, when we look for the supporting j 
data the authors rely upon for this conclusion, j 
we find a hill of sand.
The only study directly cited is one made in I 
New York which does not speak of loan ratio, J 
only loan limit (the two are unrelated). The | 
study notes that the limit is higher in the branch I 
system, which is a natural circumstance because I 
the main bank is usually larger than indepen- , 
dent unit banks in the same area. This is 
especially true in a dense, branching state like 
New York.18
The authors, citing other authors, state that 
“Unit Banks do tend to be more retail-banking 
oriented.”19 Again, there is no support for the 
ratio contention, and one might observe, too, 
that there is naturally more retail business in a 
place like New York.
Even where statistics are given, the loan ratio 
between branch and unit banks is relatively 
slight and the ratio varies as to type of loans.20 
There is no way to test the variances because the 
cities and states are not identified in these statis­
tics.
Lower loan rates in branch systems. Generali­
zations are rarely true. On this contention we 
find a mixed bag, depending on types of loans, 
varying local rate control laws, and urban or 
rural settings:
Short-term  business loans: “With regard to 
rates charged by branch and unit banks under 
settled m arket conditions, the findings for New 
York State and for New England conflict.”11
New car loans: Unit bank rates are lower than 
branch rates where they compete directly.21
"Comptroller, op. cit., p. 177 (3).
“Comptroller, p. 150.
“Ibid.
“Guttentag and Herman, op. cit., pp. 1, 2, 171, 172. 
“Guttentag and Herman, p. 93.
“Comptroller, op. cit., p. 152.
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Conventional mortgages: In New Y ork City 
branch rates are low er but the difference is 
“now quite small.”® But, the New York m ar­
ket is unique.21 “Undue banking concentration, 
facilitated by restrictions on entry, was asso­
ciated w ith relatively high charges for loans.”®
Consumer installm ent loans: “The evidence 
. . . shows m ixed results, and does not support 
any simple generalization.”®
Higher savings rates in branch systems. This 
contention cannot be supported. Regulation Q 
directly affects rates on time and savings ac­
counts, as do many state laws. The evidence 
varies:
“. . . in almost all communities (in New York 
State) in which branches and un it banks w ere 
in direct competition, both paid identical 
rates.”*7
“. . . for six of eight bank size classes, unit 
banks in metropolitan areas served only by 
unit banks had higher average tim e deposit 
rates than branch banks in branch banking 
areas.”®
If branch-unit comparisons are not stan­
dardized for bank size, it is not at a ll clear th a t 
branch banking reduces tim e deposit rates in 
metropolitan areas. This is because tim e de­
posit rates rise m arkedly w ith bank  size, and 
branch banks (meaning the m ain bank  plus its 
branches) are typically m uch larger.®
CONTENTION: Branch offices tend to follow 
the basic policies of the main office and as a 
result this policy tends to extend the more com­
petitive market situation of the larger city to 
the smaller community.
ANSWER: This conclusion is made by advo­
cates of branching with little, if any, supporting 
data. It must be examined in the light of the 
two main functions of banks.
As to deposits, the conclusion is probably cor- 
rect. Branch systems carry on large-scale ad­
vertising and promotion. Such programs, using 
ell the media on behalf of all the branches, 
project the image of power and prestige for the
aIbid.
2'lbid.
p. 151, and to the same effect, G uttentag and 
Herman, pp. 82-86.
“Guttentag and Herman, p. 93.
“Comptroller, p. 152.
Guttentag and Herman, p. 98.
*H>id., p . 99.
branch system as a whole. Independent banks 
in the service areas of the branches, each with a 
small advertising budget, are at a competitive 
disadvantage.
Thus, branch systems may be said to be more 
competitive in the sense that they can afford to 
be more aggressive in seeking and obtaining 
deposits. However, it is what the branch system 
does with its increasing deposits that is of con­
cern to the borrowing public.
As to loans, the real tests are availability and 
cost. Branch systems tend to favor large corpor­
ate borrowers, while independent banks tend to 
favor smaller business firms.30
Branch systems tend to charge more for busi­
ness loans than independent banks.31 Branch 
systems lead to concentration which means 
fewer alternate sources of credit and less com­
petition. Concentration results in higher loan 
rates in some cases.32
CONTENTION: Branches and holding com­
panies increase the ratio of banking offices to 
population.
ANSWER: Note the key reference to “offices,” 
which is quite different from “banks.” For sup­
port of the contention: In metropolitan areas 
branch banking provides more offices.33 In 
communities with populations over 7,500 branch 
banking results in more banking offices to pop­
ulation.34
These findings have no real economic signifi­
cance. We know that large banks having 
branches constantly seek more branches. They 
have the greater means—more money and per­
sonnel—to seek out new locations for branches, 
and the means to wait, several years if neces­
sary, for new branches to become profitable.
Another incidental factor may be public con­
venience, but it is significant that members of 
the public rarely ask for more branches. The 
push comes from big banks that want to get 
bigger, and branching is the fastest way.
As to holding companies, the same urge and 
the same means cause their expansion, with 
more subsidiaries occupying more locations.
“Comptroller, p. 151; G uttentag and Herman, pp. 143-
46.
“Comptroller, p. 151; G uttentag and Herman, p. 92. 
“Guttentag and Herman, pp. 82-88.
“G uttentag and Herman, p. 152.
“Comptroller, p. 177.
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The loanable funds which build up in the 
money center banks are loaned to those bor­
rowers who are likely to produce the most 
profits for the large banks. Thus, the large cor­
porate borrowers are given priority, because it 
is usually more profitable for a bank to make 
one loan for a million dollars than to make one 
hundred loans for $10,000. The servicing of the 
large loan costs far less and the collection prob­
lem is practically nil.
In contrast, many small loans require con­
siderable clerical work and careful watching 
and produce many collection problems. This 
means greater costs—and thus smaller profits— 
to the bank or banks involved.
Of course, some of the money in the sea of 
loanable funds tends to flow back to some of 
the communities from which it came in order 
to provide loans for small businesses in those 
towns. But the tendency is for the money to 
find its way into the hands of large corporate 
borrowers near the larger banks controlling the 
sea of funds.
The interests of small business are thus sacri­
ficed in behalf of big business.
CONTENTION: Multibank systems can shift 
loanable funds where they are most needed.
ANSWER: This is possible in theory. Pre­
sumably, the central manager of a branch or 
holding company system can shift funds to 
various locations according to loan demands.
But will this actually happen in practice? 
What considerations will govern his decisions to 
shift funds or not?
In many cases, the capital stock of a large 
branch bank or of a bank holding company is 
publicly traded. The eyes of central manage­
ment and directors are often on the stock price 
movement in the market. Their management 
performance is measured by how the stock per­
forms. It becomes natural that they will be 
most sensitive to the stockholders, to whom they 
must answer.
Under this influence, they will use loanable 
funds where they will produce the most profit, 
not necessarily where the most loan demand 
exists. In a large bank system, this influence is 
dominant even if its stock is not publicly traded 
—perhaps more so, because fewer stockholders 
with large stakes can directly pressure manage­
ment for more dividend return.
In a multibank system, deposits from branches 
or subsidiaries are funneled to the main or lead 
bank, usually located in a hub city of the trade 
area. There, the central manager is beset by de­
mands of large corporate borrowers, especially 
in a tight money market. He finds he is in a 
lender’s market and that it is easier and more 
profitable to make one loan for a large amount 
than many small loans through distant offices.
In an article on the subject, Donald Jacobs 
states: “Surveys which studied bank loan port­
folios indicate that large banks make a large 
fraction of their loans to large business and a 
small fraction to small business. The opposite is 
true of small banks.”35
As we have seen, this preference of multibank 
systems for large borrowers is borne out by the 
experience in Western Europe. The inevitable 
result is that smaller businesses supported by 
smaller local independent banks finally disap­
pear together, leaving mostly large bank sys­
tems supporting large business cartels or 
monopolies.
Some “experts” still cite figures purporting to 
show that multibank systems shift funds to loan 
demand areas. This may be due, in many cases, 
to competitive necessity in areas where locally 
owned independent banks favor small business 
and competing branches would lose deposits if 
they did not respond. Or, it may occur because 
it is still possible to make good profit from small 
business loans. But, if multibank systems con­
tinue to grow and to dominate banking in this 
country, as in Europe, the shifting fund theory 
will evaporate.
Locally owned independent banks have 
proved, not theorized, that they respond to the 
demands of local business. Indeed, they must, 
for these banks have their greatest stake in 
local businesses, on whom their success depends. 
These independent banks can readily bring in 
needed funds from competing large correspon­
dent banks. This two-level competition gives 
business needed credit at fair rates that only 
competition can provide.
CONTENTION: Bank mergers pose no threat 
to the public interest.
ANSWER: This contention is usually made 
by proponents of branching-by-merger, a type ]
“Donald P. Jacobs, The Journal of Finance, May 1965.
Montana Business Quarterly
Let’s Prohibit Branch Banking 69
of branching repealed by the Montana legisla­
ture. This is the process where the absorbed 
bank is converted to a branch of the resulting 
bank. It is also made by holding companies 
seeking to acquire independent banks as sub­
sidiaries.
When two healthy, competing banks merge, 
the result is to reduce competition and eliminate 
an alternate source of credit and services. This 
result is so obviously harmful to the public in­
terest as to require no further comment, but a 
landmark opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
this point is pertinent:
The fact th a t banking is a highly regulated in ­
dustry critical to the Nation’s w elfare makes 
the play of competition not less im portant but 
more so. A t the price of some repetition, we 
note th a t if the businessman is denied credit 
because his banking alternatives have been 
eliminated by mergers, the whole edifice of an 
entrepreneurial system is threatened; if the 
costs of banking services and credit are al­
lowed to become excessive by the absence of 
competitive pressures, v irtually  all costs, in 
our credit economy, w ill be affected; and un­
less competition is allowed to fulfill its role as 
an economic regulator in the banking indus­
try, the result m ay well be even m ore govern­
m ental regulation. Subject to narrow  qualifi­
cations, it is surely the case th a t competition 
is our fundam ental national economic policy,
offering as it does the only alternative to the 
cartelization or governm ental regim entation 
of large portions of the economy.**
The only real justification of a bank merger in 
the public interest is in the case of a weak or 
failing bank.
A study of the reason for merger of healthy, 
competing banks will show that invariably it is 
simply the selfish desire of the owners involved 
to increase their market power. In no case will 
it be found that the customers of the banks, or 
the public generally, had anything to do with 
driving the banks together.
* * * *
History teaches that local business enterprises 
are best supported by independent banks which 
have a direct stake in community prosperity.
Independent banks give all forms of business 
—small and large—the best that banking can 
provide—competition on the local, as well as the 
correspondent banking level. This two-level 
competition provides availability of credit and 
bank services, alternate sources, and fair rates 
which only bank competition can provide.
In Montana, our type of economy has a special 
need for preserving independent banking.
**U.S. vs. Philadelphia National Bank, et al, 83 S. Ct.
1715, p. 1746 (1963).
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Credit Unions in Montana in the 
1960s and 1970s
The decade of the 1960s has been called the 
“Age of the Consumer,” indicating a trend that 
will probably be accelerated in the 70s. The 
financial institutions in Montana must continue 
to learn to deal directly with the consumer and 
change their methods of operation to meet in­
creased consumer demands. It is significant that 
by the end of the 1960s the insured commercial 
banks in Montana had more consumer loans 
($225.3 million) on their books than real estate 
loans ($219.8 million) .1 The Montana consumer 
looking for other institutions to meet his install­
ment credit needs in the 1960s also began to 
support credit unions.
Although credit unions have existed as one of 
Montana’s financial institutions since the 1930s, 
it is only since 1960 that they have had any real 
growth in dollars and membership. This article 
proposes to discuss the growth of credit unions 
in the Montana economy and their current prob­
lems.
A credit union is a state or federally chartered 
nonprofit financial institution, which accepts 
savings from members and makes certain types 
of loans to them. The members must share some 
common bond, such as a residence, business, or 
religion—-which is usually reflected in the 
names of the credit unions, such as the Malm- 
strom [Air Force Base] Federal Credit Union in
'Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets and 
Liabilities: Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, 
December 31, 1969 (Washington, D.C.), p. 67.
New ideas for consumer credit in the 70s 
from the Credit Union National Association
Great Falls, the Anaconda Federal Credit Union, 
Daniels County Federal Credit Union, the Bil­
lings U.S. Employees Federal Credit Union, and 
the Whitefish Community Credit Union. The 
members are shareholders. They own and con- . 
trol the credit unions.
The State Examiner supervises state-char­
tered credit unions, and the National Credit 
Union Administration supervises those that are 
federal-chartered. These supervisory authorities 
operate under state or federal acts which pre­
scribe among other things, establishment of 
mandatory reserves against bad loans, limits 
on the size of single loans, maximum interest 
rates on loans, maximum security on these 
loans, as well as the operations of boards of dir­
ectors and credit committees.
Growth of Credit Unions in Montana
The number of Montana households rose from 
202,000 at the beginning of the 1960s to more I 
than 218,000 at the end of the decade.2 Credit , 
union penetration of the population grew to ! 
about 10 percent by the end of the 1960s, al- I
*[1960] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract J 
of the United States: 1962, 83rd Edition (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), table 
42, p. 44, citing idem., U.S. Census of Population: 
1960. [1968] Idem., Statistical Abstract of the United |  
States, 1970, 91st Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1970), table 43, p. 37, 1 
citing idem.. Current Population Reports, Series P-25, '•
no. 440.
W alter Polner is Director of the Research and Economics Department of CUNA International, Inc. in Madison, 
Wisconsin.
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though the actual figure on families is probably 
much higher, and savings institutions are pri­
marily concerned with the number of family 
heads.3 Utilizing the data in Montana, we can 
conservatively estimate that if only every other 
member of the credit union is from a separate 
household, at least 16 percent of the households 
in Montana already belonged to credit unions at 
the end of the 1960s.4
Income and Savings
The key to the rise of all of the savings insti­
tutions in Montana has been the increase in per­
sonal income. In 1960 the personal income of the 
citizens of Montana totaled $1,383 million—or on 
a per capita basis $2,037. By 1969, the per capita 
income had reached $3,130.5 With the rise in 
income and a slow rise in population, the sav­
ings institutions—including credit unions—all 
increased their savings holdings.
Bank assets at the beginning of the 1960s came 
to only $907 million, and the savings and loan 
associations had assets of $166 million.6 The 
credit unions had only $16.5 million in assets.7 
By 1969 the banks had $1,680 million, the sav­
ings and loan associations had increased their
Derived from: State of Montana, State Examiner, 
“Annual Statistics for S tate-C hartered Credit Unions,” 
December 31, 1968 (Helena, M ontana). National 
Credit Union Administration, 1968 Annual Report of 
the Federal Credit Union Program  (Washington, 
D-C.), table 13, p. 68. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Estimates of the Population of States, by Age: 1968,” 
Current Population Reports: Population Estimates and 
Projections, Series P-25, no. 437 (January  16, 1970), 
table 1, p. 7.
'Ibid.
5U.S. Office of Business Economics, Survey of Current 
Business, vol. 50, no. 8 (August 1970), tables 1 and 2, 
PP. 34 and 35.
'[Banks] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical A b -  
rl962, table 577> P* 447» citing U.S. Departm ent 
o the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, Annual 
Report. [Savings and loan] Proceedings of the T hirty- 
seventh  Annual Meeting of the Montana Building and 
Loan League, 1961, Billings, Montana, vol. 32, table 
1, p. 33.
Security Administration, “State-Chartered 
edit Unions in 1960,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 
Z?> no- 11 (November 1961), table 3, p. 16. U.S. 
Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, 1960 Report of 
Operations (Washington, D.C.), table 9, p. 10.
assets to about $341 million, and the credit 
unions had grown to over $45 million.8
Although nonagricultural employment rose 
by only 28,500 jobs between 1960 and 1968, a lit­
tle more than half of this increase in jobs came 
in government employment. Manufacturing jobs 
in Montana increased by only 2,900.9 Here we 
can begin to see one of the reasons for the rise 
of credit unions in the 1960s in Montana. Many 
credit unions sprang up to serve the increasing 
area of government employment, or enlarged 
membership of already established credit 
unions.
The largest source of wages and salaries in 
Montana was government employment with 
$341 million in wages being generated in 1969. 
Manufacturing, on the other hand, generated 
only $171 million in wages and salaries in the 
same year.10 With a limited population increase, 
all savings institutions strove to achieve maxi­
mum savings. Within a period of nine years, 
from 1960 to 1969, the banks increased their 
savings by $516 million. Considering the fact 
that they had only $271 million at the beginning 
of the decade, we can see the success that they 
did have.11 The savings and loan associations 
increased by $150 million, while the credit
8 [Banks] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Assets and Liabilities, p. 67. [Savings and loan] Pro­
ceedings o f the Forty-F ifth  Annual Meeting o f the 
Montana Savings and Loan League, 1969, G reat Falls, 
Montana, vol. 41, p. 45. [Credit unions] National 
Credit Union Adm inistration, State-Chartered Credit 
Unions, 1969 Annual Report (Washington, D.C.), table 
S -l, p. 16. Idem., 1969 Annual Report o f the Federal 
Credit Union Program  (Washington, D.C.), table 1, 
p. 56.
®U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings, States and Areas, 1939-68, Bulletin 1370-6 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1969), pp. 292-96.
10U.S. Office of Business Economics, Survey of Current 
Business, table 52, p. 40.
UU.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1962, 
table 577, p. 447, citing U.S. Departm ent of the 
Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Re­
port. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets 
and Liabilities, p. 69. The data are not strictly  com­
parable; 1969 data are for insured commercial banks 




unions increased their savings by $24.2 million.12
Most Montana credit unions are located in 
urban areas—Billings, Great Falls, Helena, Ana­
conda, Butte, and Missoula. Since January 1, 
1955, membership in credit unions in Montana 
has more than tripled. In 1948 there were only 
9,090 credit union members. By 1958 there were 
36,369 members, and by 1969 there were 74,134 
members.13
Nearly half of all of the growth in Montana 
credit unions has been concentrated in the ten 
largest credit unions. By the end of 1969 the ten 
largest credit unions held assets of $21.8 million 
out of a total asset picture of $45.6 million.14 
The largest state credit union is the Malmstrom 
Federal Credit Union in Great Falls, serving the 
civilian and military personnel who work at 
Malmstrom Air Force Base. Over 16 percent of 
the assets of Montana credit unions are held by 
this one credit union.15
Two credit unions, Anaconda and ACM Em­
ployees in Great Falls, serve employees of the 
Anaconda Copper Company. One in Livingston, 
the Northern Pacific Employees Federal Credit 
Union, covers the employees of the Burlington 
Northern Railroad at Livingston and the sur­
rounding area. The Montana Central Credit 
Union covers officers of all credit unions in the 
State of Montana. The Billings U.S. Employees
“ [Savings and loan] Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh  
Annual Meeting, p. 36; and Proceedings o f the Forty- 
Fifth  Annual Meeting, p. 45. [Credit unions] U.S. 
Social Security Administration, “State-Chartered 
Credit Unions in 1960,” table 3, p. 16. U.S. Bureau of 
Federal Credit Unions, 1960 Report o f Operations, 
table 10, p. 11. National Credit Union Administration, 
State-Chartered Credit Unions, table S -l, p. 16. Idem., 
1969 Annual Report, table 1, p. 56.
“ [1948] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Operations of 
Credit Unions in 1948,” M onthly Labor Review, vol. 
69, no. 3 (September 1949), table 1, p. 277. [1958] U.S. 
Social Security Administration, “State-Chartered 
Credit Unions in 1958,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 
22, no. 11 (November 1959), table 3, p. 19. U.S. 
Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, 1958 Report of 
Operations (Washington, D.C.), table 17, p. 18. [1969] 
National Credit Union Administration, State-Char­
tered Credit Unions, table S -l, p. 16. Idem., 1969 
Annual Report, table 25, p. 82.
“Based on individual reports from  credit unions report­
ing to Research and Economics Department of Credit 
Union National Association, Inc., unpublished data.
“Based on individual reports from credit unions report­
ing to Research and Economics Department of Credit 
Union National Association, Inc., unpublished data.
covers the employees of the United States Gov­
ernment in Yellowstone County. Other credit 
unions, Laurel Federal Credit Union, Daniels 
County Federal Credit Union, Richland County 
Cooperative, and Whitefish Community Credit 
Union, cover those living in the community or 
members of a cooperative.
Installment Credit 
How successful have credit unions been in 
providing their membership with installment 
credit? Between 1962 and 1969, the credit 
unions’ installment loans increased from $16.7 
million in 1962 to over $34.2 million in 1969.16 
At the same time, bank installment loans in­
creased from $109.3 million in 1962 to $225.3 
million in 1969.17 Although credit unions tradi­
tionally have been able to attract savings in 
Montana well in excess of the loans added dur­
ing the year, in recent years, however, this has 
not been true. In the decade of the 1960s the 
savings of credit unions increased by $24.2 mil­
lion, and loans outstanding increased by only 
$26.2 million. In 1969 alone, however, loan de­
mand increased nearly $1 million more than sav­
ings.18 On the other hand, during the recession
“ Installm ent loans are loans outstanding less real estate 
loans. [Loans outstanding, 1962] U.S. Social Security 
Administration, “State-Chartered Credit Unions in 
1962,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 11 (No­
vem ber 1963), table 3, p. 16. U.S. Bureau of Federal 
•Credit Unions, 1962 Report of Operations (Washing­
ton, D.C.), table 9, p. 12. [Real estate loans, 1962] 
International Credit Union Yearbook, 1963 (Madison, 
Wisconsin: CUNA International, Inc., 1963), p. 32. 
[Loans outstanding, 1969] National Credit Union Ad­
ministration, State-Chartered Credit Unions, table S -l, 
p. 16. Idem., 1969 Annual Report, table 1, p. 56. [Real 
estate loans, 1969] International Credit Union Year­
book, 1970 (Madison, Wisconsin: CUNA International, 
Inc., 1970), p. 29.
” [1962] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets, 
Liabilities, and Capital Accounts: Commercial and 
Mutual Savings Banks, December 28, 1962, Report of 
Call no. 62 (Washington, D.C.), p. 46. [1969] Idem., 
Assets and Liabilities, p. 67.
“ [Savings shares and loans outstanding, 1960] U.S. 
Social Security Administration, “State-Chartered 
Credit Unions in 1960,” table 3, p. 16. U.S. Bureau of 
Federal Credit Unions, 1960 Report, table 10, p. 11. 
[Real estate loans, 1960] International Credit Union 
Yearbook, 1960 (Madison, Wisconsin: CUNA Inter­
national, Inc., 1960). [Savings shares and loans out­
standing, 1969] National Credit Union Administration, 
State-Chartered Credit Unions, table S -l, p. 16. Idem., 
1969 Annual Report, table 1, p. 56. [Real estate loans, 
1969] International Credit Union Yearbook, 1970, p. 29.
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of 1970-71 it may be expected that savings in­
creased at a greater rate than loans were added.
Although credit unions have been able to 
grow in both numbers and dollars, they do not 
seem to have reached their full potential in 
Montana in the 1960s. Membership data pro­
vided by the National Credit Union Administra­
tion for federal credit unions tells only part of 
the membership story. We suspect that for 
every household head listed, another household 
head is currently eligible, but has not yet joined 
a credit union. Apparently, these families’ de­
cisions have been to save in banks, Production 
Credit Associations, or savings and loan associa­
tions in Montana. Furthermore, credit unions 
have not been able to attract a good deal of 
funds from their potential membership at the 
present time.
Just looking at the raw data does not give us 
a good indication of what is occurring in credit 
unions. The rate of growth of savings actually 
has been declining for nearly a decade. If the 
rate for loans had also been declining, one would 
label the credit unions in Montana as an ex­
tremely liquid institution able to handle in­
creases in loans in the 1970s. Unfortunately, at 
the end of the 1960s the loan volume was in­
creasing at a faster rate than the savings vol­
ume. In its plans for 1970, the credit union 
movement must include services that will ap­
peal to the members who joined in the 1960s, as 
well as attracting new members.
Heretofore, the basis for continued growth of 
the credit union movement in Montana seems to 
have been the large industrial and governmental 
units. We can expect that so long as these large 
units are in existence there will be a continued 
dollar and membership growth for credit unions. 
The payroll deduction privileges granted to fed­
eral government employees will increase a flow 
of funds to these credit unions. By the end of 
1969, payroll deduction services were available 
in 92 Montana credit unions. Other growth areas 
should be pinpointed by the credit union move­
ment and targeted for the 1970s.
Credit unions are not the only institution that 
has had problems attracting funds throughout 
the 1960s. The savings and loans associations in 
Montana may not be able to attract adequate 
savings for all future housing needs, at a time 
when many banks seem to be moving their 
funds from mortgage loans into consumer credit.
We may, therefore, expect that the mortgage 
granting institutions in Montana will be under 
tremendous pressure to use some more of their 
funds for mortgages in the 1970s. With a large 
number of young people reaching marital age in 
the 70s, tremendous pressures to provide mort­
gage funds will probably keep dividend rates for 
funds relatively high in the state. At the same 
time, a relatively small group of savers, gen­
erally those over 45 years of age may be asked 
to produce savings for all the new and old finan­
cial institutions in the state.
Assuming that the dividend rates for savings 
will remain high—that is, higher than they were 
in the early 1960s—what savings instruments 
will be looked at by credit unions in the 1970s? 
One possibility is the certificate of deposit or 
certificate of savings in which a fixed rate is 
offered over a period of time. Such certificates 
have been offered by banks and savings and 
loan associations in recent years. Credit unions 
have begun to offer them to their members and 
to those in the community willing to support the 
credit unions. Assuming that such deferred in­
come certificates will continue to be allowed, it 
may be expected that the large Montana credit 
unions will provide these certificates, although 
this service does not mean a very large innova­
tion in financial institutions for the 1970s.
For credit unions to succeed in the challeng­
ing years ahead, there must be some innova­
tions. They must be willing to try new ideas no 
matter how strange they may seem, based on 
past trends. They must have goals which repre­
sent a specific contribution to the individual in 
society. In light of these goals, what other at­
tractions can be offered to potential credit union 
members?
Negotiable Order Systems
Variations of the negotiable order system sim­
ilar to the Canadian credit unions’ “term deposit 
system” offers another possibility. Under this 
plan the individual places his funds in the 
credit union in shares. The member then applies 
to the credit union for a loan. Nothing in the 
present United States law states that a $2,500 
signature loan at a federal credit union must be 
issued to an individual by a single check. A 
series of negotiable orders may then be issued 
to the credit union member for a signature loan
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that has been approved by the credit committee 
of the credit union. Each negotiable order may 
be limited to a maximum of $100, or arrange­
ments may be made with the bank whereby the 
credit union may accept or refuse any negoti­
able order. The member may use his negotiable 
orders to pay utility bills, credit card bills, or 
auto repair bills. The negotiable order is cleared 
through the local clearing house because it is a 
negotiable order of the credit union using the 
credit union magnetic number at its account at 
a local bank.
The individual may also give prior authori­
zation to the credit union to transfer his shares 
to pay for the loan as evidenced by the negoti­
able order.
The negotiable order system has been intro­
duced by credit unions in Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Kansas, Colorado, and Texas. It is expected to 
be introduced in federal credit unions in the 
Intermountain states in 1971. Normally, the 
large credit unions introduce these innovations 
within the credit union movement first. The 
other smaller credit unions have a tendency to 
follow the innovative credit union.
One system of negotiable orders is called Rite- 
On-Line. It was first introduced by the NCR 
(National Cash Register) Credit Union of Day- 
ton, Ohio. As adopted by the Standard Register 
Federal Credit Unions of Dayton, the procedure 
is as follows: the member applies for a Rite-On- 
Line system. The member fills out the regular 
credit application. If approved by the credit 
union credit committee, the member signs a 
Rite-On-Line note for, say $1,000, and a current 
signature card. The credit union will then issue 
the member a book of negotiable orders in 
drafts of various denominations: three for $200; 
two for $100; three for $50; and, two for $25. (Of 
course, the drafts can be written for any amount 
up to that figure.) The member agrees to an 
additional payroll deduction of $10.00 a week 
which does not go into effect until the first draft 
clears the bank. If and when the loan on the 
Rite-On-Line system is paid off, the additional 
$10.00 a week payroll deduction automatically 
goes into the member’s share account. The mem­
ber always receives dividends on his share 
accounts. Members or spouses may pick up 
additional Rite-On-Line drafts when the original 
supply is exhausted.
The Philadelphia City Employees Federal 
Credit Union has a negotiable order system 
called Surechex. In their system a member may 
designate a portion of his shares to cover the 
Surechex. The member must still obtain the 
approval of the credit committee before any of 
the negotiable orders are issued to the member. 
On the day a Surechex clears the bank an auto­
matic transfer of preauthorized shares in the 
exact amount of the Surechex is made. Since 
the loan as evidenced by the Surechex is paid 
the same day it reaches the credit union, there is 
no interest charged on the loan. The member 
receives his regular dividend on his shares.
The Mt. Carmel Credit Union of Pueblo, Colo­
rado (the largest parish credit union in the 
United States) offers a Sign-A-Check system. 
They provide a member, approved by the credit 
committee, with a book of checks containing ten 
$50 checks. These are considered a loan until 
repaid to the credit union: interest charges be­
gin only when the “checks” are cashed.
These negotiable order systems may be used 
to pay any bill. It is expected that the large 
Montana credit unions will introduce one or a 
variation of these negotiable order systems in 
the early 1970s. If the savers at Montana’s large 
credit unions will accept these systems as 
eagerly as savers in the large credit unions in 
Canada have in the 1960s, this will offer a sig­
nificant innovation in financial institutions in 
Montana from the credit unions.
We can expect that other economic forces and 
pressures will change the institution that we 
now know as a credit union into a different 
type of financial service organization by the end 
of the 1970s. Montana credit unions, as well as 
those throughout the nation, must keep up with 
ideas and answers to these pressures if they are 
to remain competitive with other financial in­
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